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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AS POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM
David E. Pozen*
One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory
is the burgeoning interest in “popular constitutionalism.” One of the most
important features of the American legal system is the selection of state
judges—judges who resolve thousands of state and federal constitutional
questions each year—by popular election. Although a large literature addresses each of these subjects, scholarship has rarely bridged the two. Hardly
anyone has evaluated judicial elections in light of popular constitutionalism, or vice versa.
This Article undertakes that thought experiment. Conceptualizing judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to
show, can enrich our understanding of both. The normative theory of popular constitutionalism can ground a powerful new set of arguments for and
against electing judges, while an investigation into the states’ experience
with elective judiciaries can help clarify a number of lacunae in the theory,
as well as a number of ways in which its logic may prove self-undermining.
The thought experiment may also be of broader interest. In elaborating the
linkages between judicial elections and popular constitutionalism, the Article
aims to shed light more generally on some underexplored connections (and
tensions) among theories and practices of constitutional construction, democratic representation, jurisprudence, and the state courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Few schools of constitutional thought have commanded more attention in recent years than popular constitutionalism.1 Renouncing the
elitism and the court centrism of traditional constitutional theory, a diverse group of scholars has set out to redeem a central role for “the people themselves” in fundamental lawmaking. This is an urgent project, it is
claimed, for the connection between ordinary Americans and their
Constitution has become enervated. Popular sovereignty has given way to
judicial supremacy, “the notion that judges have the last word when it
1. See Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 238 (2007) (“[P]opular
constitutionalism . . . has taken constitutional theory by storm over the last decade.”);
Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1837, 1837
(2009) (calling popular constitutionalism “the most important and influential strand of
recent constitutional theory”); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1594, 1640 (2005) (book review) (describing
popular constitutionalism as “the theory du jour”). Popular (or political) constitutionalism
has likewise assumed a central role in debates over the legitimacy of judicial review in
several Commonwealth countries. See Paul Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review, in Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance 19, 19
(Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010).
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comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine
the meaning of the Constitution for everyone.”2 To sustain the democratic legitimacy of our legal order, scholars associated with popular constitutionalism urge that the people reassert their authority over the construction and enforcement of constitutional norms. From a different
vantage point, a number of political scientists have also begun to offer
sympathetic accounts of legal disputation and mobilization outside the
courts.
In contrast to the tremendous amount of attention that has been
devoted to popular constitutionalism as a theoretical project, hardly any
attention has been paid to questions of institutional design. The scholarship is heavily normative but rarely pragmatic. Those who have championed popular constitutionalism, notes one commentator, “have said very
little about the particular institutional mechanisms that would make their
vision a reality in today’s world.”3 “The obvious question for robust popular constitutionalism,” Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum remark in a
leading critique, “is ‘How?’ How can the people themselves interpret and
enforce the Constitution through direct action?”4 They conclude that
there is no plausible way.5 Proponents of popular constitutionalism have
started to raise similar questions. Larry Kramer, one of the movement’s
principal figures (and the target of Alexander and Solum’s critique),
threw down the gauntlet in the closing lines of a recent speech:
If there is an agenda for constitutionalism today, its first
concern is not substantive. It is institutional. . . . We should . . .
be asking what kind of institutions we can construct to make
popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones. We
need to start rethinking and building institutions that can make
democratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start doing so now.6
2. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review 125 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, The People Themselves].
3. David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1069, 1069 (2006); see also Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism
and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 313, 354
n.191, 321 (2008) (observing that “popular constitutionalists have not yet rallied behind
specific proposals concerning the ways in which the American people might reveal their
constitutional interpretations,” and asserting that “[t]hese are vitally important matters on
which popular constitutionalists owe their critics a persuasive response”).
4. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1635. Robust popular constitutionalism, in
Alexander and Solum’s taxonomy, is the view that “the court of popular opinion [ought to
be] the tribunal of last resort—superior to the United States Supreme Court on issues of
constitutional law.” Id. at 1621.
5. Id. at 1635–40.
6. Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter
Kramer, Response]. Note the slippage in Kramer’s statement between popular
constitutionalism and democratic constitutionalism. The question of how popular
constitutionalist practices relate to democratic ideals will be a central concern of this
Article.
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So, what kind of mechanisms could invigorate the practice of popular constitutionalism? Amending the Constitution through Article V will
never suffice unless Article V is itself amended; formal revisions are much
too rare and too difficult to ensure continuous popular control over the
administration of fundamental law.7 If amendments were readily achievable, one would not find such anguish about judicial supremacy. Alternative possibilities recur throughout the literature. They range from the
soft and discursive (civic education, norm contestation, advocacy movements, presidential rhetoric) to the blunt and disruptive (mobbing,
defunding the courts, disregarding their rulings, stripping them of vast
swaths of jurisdiction). The modest options are already in fairly broad
use and have fairly broad support, but they are also the least efficacious.
They take a long time, and ultimately a lot of political power, to achieve
results. The radical options have not gained much traction, and for evident reason. Valorizing defiance of the courts risks serious harm to the
stability, predictability, and rights-enforcing goods that we have come to
expect from them. Is there any vehicle for achieving popular constitutionalism’s ends that can be genuinely empowering without being anarchic, accessible to the masses yet mediated by professionals, transformative yet realistic?
This Article spills a secret: The answer is yes, and it is all around us.
The United States already has a systematic and pervasive mechanism for
popular constitutionalism of just this sort—at the state level. It has been
in place for nearly two centuries. It is the institution of elective
judiciaries.
By subjecting their judges to periodic elections, more than three
quarters of the states give citizens a powerful tool with which to check the
judges’ interpretive outputs, as well as a recurring focal point with which
to stimulate and structure constitutional deliberation. Without disturbing the finality of courts’ judgments or the conditions of their work,
elections can cement a link to the demos. They are “the most robust
mechanism we currently have to connect the lay citizen to constitutional
7. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 380 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage]. Bruce
Ackerman is sometimes classed as a popular constitutionalist, but his “constitutional
moments” appear to be still rarer and more difficult to achieve than formal amendments,
and the judiciary plays the lead role in interpreting and consolidating them during periods
of normal politics. See generally 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 288–90
(1991) [hereinafter Ackerman, Foundations]; 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations 350–82 (1998). Although the moments themselves may be signal
achievements of popular constitutionalism, they are therefore even less suited to the task
set forth by Kramer. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Calif.
L. Rev. 959, 961 n.3 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism] (stating that
popular constitutionalism “refers,” not to revolutionary acts of constitutional revision, but
“to some idea that the people retain authority in the day-to-day administration of
fundamental law”); Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra, at 380 (“And if twenty-seven
constitutional amendments cannot ensure democratic accountability, neither can three or
four discrete ‘constitutional moments.’”).
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decisionmaking—enabling . . . public participation, dissolving the claims
of the heroic judge, enshrining the people’s supremacy over the courts.”8
Why has no one drawn this connection before?9 Two possible reasons jump out immediately. First, constitutional scholars have been fixated on the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, the
nonelective selection method for which is hard-wired into the
Constitution.10 Focusing on the federal courts is a reasonable approach,
consistent with the focus of legal scholarship generally. But it is an artificially limited approach. State courts resolve exponentially more cases;
they operate at closer proximity to the people; they are at the cutting
edge of constitutional law on issues ranging from same-sex marriage, to
welfare rights, to education finance; and in many ways their substantive
powers and the substantive reach of the state constitutions exceed those
of their federal counterparts. State judges not only play a lead role in
expounding their own various constitutions; they also play a significant,
though constrained, role in interpreting and implementing the federal
Constitution.11
Second, despite the awesome power of the state courts, judicial elections have historically been low salience, low intensity affairs. Under the
traditional model of judicial elections, campaigning was minimal and devoid of substantive content, incumbents almost always won, and few people voted or cared. In the past several decades, however, the sleepy old
model has been overtaken by a spirited “new politics,”12 in which campaigns for the bench routinely feature meaningful competition, sizeable
turnout, and hard-hitting advertisements on legal issues.13 Popular con8. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 328 (2008)
[hereinafter Pozen, Irony of Elections].
9. There is, to be sure, a large literature that evaluates judicial elections in light of
communal and constitutional values. No previous work has offered any sustained analysis
of the relationship between judicial elections and popular constitutionalism.
10. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring presidential nomination and Senate
approval); id. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour”).
11. See infra Parts II.A, III.D.2 (discussing significance of state courts and
constitutions for popular constitutionalism).
12. A biannual series of reports by the Brennan Center for Justice, the Justice at Stake
Campaign, and the Institute for Money in State Politics has popularized this label. See,
e.g., James Sample, Lauren Jones & Rachel Weiss, The New Politics of Judicial Elections
2006 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2007).
13. On the distinction between the old and new models of judicial elections, see
Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 265–68, 296–306. The new model has not
entirely supplanted the old; many races for the bench still fail to generate much public
participation, discussion, or interest. Yet it is remarkable to learn that on at least two key
metrics, challenger and retention rates, partisan state supreme court elections are now
significantly more competitive than elections for the U.S. House of Representatives.
Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in
Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections
165, 182–83 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
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stitutionalist potential was always latent in the soil of judicial elections.
Now, it has begun to flower.
A third reason is more speculative but, to my mind, irresistible. If
judicial elections really are such an obvious means of operationalizing
some of popular constitutionalists’ core commitments, as well as such an
obvious framework for evaluating some of their claims, one wonders
whether the failure to identify this connection betrays a certain anxiety
about their project. Judicial elections, that is, suggest what a vigorous
practice of popular constitutionalism might entail, and the theoreticians
do not like what they see. It may be reckless to psychologize one’s subjects, much less an entire line of scholarship, but the “repressive” reading
of this hole in the literature is intriguing.
This Article begins to plug the hole by exploring the question of
judicial selection through the lens of popular constitutionalism. Its primary goal is to demonstrate that judicial elections have the capacity to
serve, and to some extent already have served, as highly consequential
vehicles of popular constitutionalism. Its larger goal is to unpack what
this insight can tell us about the institution of elective judiciaries and the
project of popular constitutionalism. This exercise can help clarify some
important questions the literature has scarcely addressed, such as
whether a well-functioning regime of judicial elections might be vulnerable to criticism on democratic terms, and how a judicial system can preserve a commitment to higher-order law while simultaneously making
that law more accessible to mass manipulation; the exercise can serve as a
kind of case study on some of the problematics inherent in efforts to
popularize a constitution. And to the extent that scholars like Larry
Kramer would discount elections for breeding interpretive practices that
are not “popular” or “constitutional” in the relevant sense, we will have
learned something. We will begin to develop a better sense of what kinds
of public participation they would be willing to recognize and why.
Part I summarizes the normative tenets of popular constitutionalism.
Part II explains how selecting judges through the ballot box could
advance the theory’s goals. In so doing, Part II explores another question
that has received little scholarly treatment: whether a judge’s selection
method ought to have any bearing on how he or she decides cases.
Elected judges, it contends, might claim a special license to incorporate
public opinion into their decisional process, to engage in majoritarian review. Although rarely acknowledged by its practitioners, the evidence
suggests this phenomenon is widespread.
Part III investigates whether and what sorts of popular constitutionalists should embrace judicial elections. It shows that, on a variety of levels,
use of these elections is as liable to subvert as to serve many of the movement’s underlying commitments—which calls into question the feasibility
and coherence of the movement. The analysis thus has a chiastic structure. In using the theory of popular constitutionalism to test and critique
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elective judiciaries, the Article ultimately uses elective judiciaries to test
and critique the theory.
***
A methodological note is warranted to clarify the nature and scope
of this study. In the pages that follow, I map a broad normative theory
(popular constitutionalism) onto a broad social practice (electing
judges). To do this, the Article inevitably assumes a stylized model of
both. The imaginary “popular constitutionalist” deployed here proxies
for an agglomeration of views in the literature, associated with many
scholars but not necessarily an accurate depiction of any one in particular. The “judicial elections” under consideration are generally contested
races for a seat on a state high court. The Article does not have much to
say, except by way of comparison, about the lower courts or about retention elections, merit selection, or the other methods of choosing judges.
Nor does the Article address many of the myriad routes through which
constitutional meaning is developed outside the courts.14 Although I
hope to contribute to our understanding of this issue—and of “living
constitutionalism” generally—by examining some of the microfoundations of popular influence over legal doctrine in an elective regime, my
primary aim is to cast an old institution in a new critical light.
Thinking about judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, it turns out, can illuminate a wide range of matters at the intersection of constitutional construction, democratic representation, jurisprudence, and the state courts. It significantly complicates the popular
constitutionalist account of, and reform agenda for, American legal practice, and it points the way to powerful new arguments both for and
against electing judges. Or so I will try to show.
I. THE BASICS

OF

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
AND TYPOLOGY

It can be difficult to get a firm grip on what people mean by “popular constitutionalism.” As many have observed, scholars invoking the idea
typically have done so at a high level of abstraction. “A major frustration
in discussing the body of scholarship arguing for popular constitutionalism,” Erwin Chemerinsky laments, “is its failure to define the concept
with any precision.”15 “It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism
would work,” Suzanna Sherry adds, “since few (if any) of its advocates
make any concrete suggestions about how to implement popular constitutional interpretation.”16 The literature’s lack of institutional specificity
14. A vast descriptive literature, spanning several disciplines, explores this question.
For an excellent overview, see Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 967–74.
15. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 673, 676.
16. Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 Const. Comment.
461, 463 (2009); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich.
L. Rev. 2596, 2598 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism] (stating
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mirrors a lack of theoretical detail about how, for example, popular sovereignty is to be realized while keeping lawlessness at bay and maintaining sufficient respect for the past.
Nevertheless, the core premise is comprehensible, the core variants
identifiable. With apologies to the many important scholars whose distinctive views I scant—and with particular emphasis on the work of Larry
Kramer and Mark Tushnet17—I sketch in this Part the basic normative
concept of popular constitutionalism and the basic programmatic distinctions among its adherents. Those well versed in the literature may wish to
skim or skip ahead.
A. Popular Constitutionalism Generally
To varying degrees, a half-dozen interrelated propositions underlie
many conceptions of popular constitutionalism.18
The first is a background presupposition: Americans now live in an
age of judicial supremacy, in which the people have largely abdicated
their collective authority to determine constitutional meaning. Judicial
supremacy has “become the norm,”19 citizen passivity its byproduct and
enabler. The literature often stresses the contingency of this dynamic.
American history is replete with examples of popular and governmental
that “the particulars” of popular constitutionalism “have not been worked out”). But cf.
Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 991, 996
(2006) [hereinafter Tushnet, Political Law] (defending “the inherent fuzziness of the
category popular constitutionalism”).
17. I also draw heavily on the work of Robert Post and Reva Siegel, though it should
be noted that much of their scholarship in this area is positive rather than normative, and
their views diverge from Kramer’s and Tushnet’s in important ways. If my primary focus
on Kramer seems methodologically suspect, I can say only that his writings have proven
especially influential—they helped crystallize the perception of popular constitutionalism
as a major school of thought—and that many have been interested in working out their
implications. In condensing an “enormous” literature, Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism,
supra note 7, at 961, the discussion sacrifices nuance in the hope of clarifying common
themes.
18. For a lucid summary of recent critiques of judicial review, including but not
limited to popular constitutionalists’, see Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review:
Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 971, 974–82 (2010).
The major charges against judicial review, in Aronson’s telling, are that it “is at odds with
democratic rule”; funnels “morally-laden issues” to “professionally [in]adequate arbiters”;
“impedes, numbs, and diverts political deliberation on constitutional issues”; and
constitutes “an elitist mechanism for preserving the social structure.” Id. at 975. Aronson’s
project, which aims to “break[ ] down th[e] monolithic concept of ‘the courts’ by shifting
the focus to the lower levels of the judicial system,” id. at 971, echoes and complements my
own. Aronson, however, rules out the possibility of incorporating state courts into his
“inferiorizing” strategy—and he cites their typically elective nature as one of two reasons
why. See id. at 973 n.2, 997 n.98. (The other reason is “extreme jurisdictional
complexities.” Id. at 973 n.2.) I admire Aronson’s insightful analysis but find this an
unfortunate limitation, because it severely limits the practical relevance of his project and
because, as I will show, some of the same critiques of judicial review that motivate his work
can be used to motivate a popular constitutionalist defense of elective judiciaries.
19. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 964.
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resistance to judicial interpretations of the Constitution.20 “Sometime in
the past generation or so,” however, “Americans came to believe that the
meaning of their Constitution is something beyond their compass, something that should be left to others.”21
Critics of judicial supremacy reject the idea that the federal courts
are sufficiently attuned to public preferences to compensate for this deficit. Notwithstanding the occasional decision that generates mass outrage,
we now have ample evidence to show that their outputs are “not regularly
or commonly outside the run of popular opinion.”22 Some set of mechanisms continues to connect judicial doctrine to the popular will. But the
mechanisms are too weak, too slow, too fickle; their functional consequences cannot compensate for the feeling of the people that judges
have the final say on all but the rarest of matters.
A second proposition sharpens the point: Judicial supremacy is the
“enemy.”23 Far too often, popular constitutionalists believe, judges in
20. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 83–91,
266–67 (2009) [hereinafter Friedman, Will of the People] (providing notable examples
from early 1800s and 1960s); cf. Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?
It Depends 5 (Aug. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1658549 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The historical narrative
frequently told by popular constitutionalists . . . argues that popular constitutionalism is the
initial American form of constitutional interpretation.”).
21. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 229. “Constitutional history was
recast—turned on its head, really—as a story of judicial triumphalism.” Id.
22. Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 2600; id. at 2606–13
(reviewing empirical literature on this issue from Robert Dahl’s canonical work forward).
23. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1608; Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular
Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 Geo. L.J.
897, 904 (2005); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism,
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1027, 1027 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel,
Popular Constitutionalism]; see also Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 776 n.17 (2002)
[hereinafter Whittington, Extrajudicial Interpretation] (cataloguing criticisms of judicial
supremacy). I am using “judicial supremacy” in the sense articulated by Larry Kramer,
among many others, as the notion that judges are the preeminent and ultimate arbiters of
constitutional meaning for everyone. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also
Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy 6–7 (2007) (“A model of
judicial supremacy posits that the Court does not merely resolve particular disputes . . . . It
also authoritatively interprets constitutional meaning.”).
A still more perfidious enemy is “judicial sovereignty,” the notion that judges have not
merely the final word but the only word in constitutional interpretation. Larry D. Kramer,
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 13
(2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943,
2023 n.250 (2003). All of the criticisms of judicial supremacy and then some would apply
to judicial sovereignty. I focus on the former because the term “judicial sovereignty” is not
in widespread use, and because the idea that extrajudicial actors lack the authority even to
partake in constitutional interpretation is not a plausible depiction of American
constitutional practice: Just glance at the editorial pages of the New York Times or the Wall
Street Journal after a major Supreme Court ruling, or at any issue of this journal. In this
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America serve as the first and last expositors of constitutional meaning.
Far too often, the adjudicated Constitution is equated with the actual
Constitution. Our constitutional culture has become “juricentric.”24 We
conceptualize constitutional law in terms of the courts, we look to them
to drive constitutional change, and we bow to their pronouncements.
The Supreme Court’s self-aggrandizing and ahistorical position that “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution”25 must be rejected. The Constitution must to some significant extent be “taken away from the courts.”26
In fact, very few popular constitutionalists seek to disestablish judges’
interpretive authority across the board. Almost everyone, for example,
accepts that when a dispute is properly brought before an Article III tribunal, its judgment ought to bind the parties irrespective of what the
public thinks.27 Popular constitutionalists are not necessarily “anticourt,”28 or even anti-judicial review (though some are). The key goal,
rather, is to limit judicial supremacy in substantive and symbolic effect, so
regard, judicial sovereignty was a strawman in Kramer’s Harvard Law Review Foreword, and
it is notable that he has not returned to the term.
24. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1029; Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on
Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1, 2 (2003).
25. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The Rehnquist Court took the Warren Court’s view of judicial
supremacy further, articulating it more frequently and more stridently. See, e.g., Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“[I]t falls to this Court, not
Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.”). Particularly galling to
many popular constitutionalists, the Court repeatedly invoked its own interpretive
supremacy in curtailing Congress’s explicit grant of power to legislate under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy,
95 Va. L. Rev. 1663, 1725 (2009) (“Popular constitutionalists reserve their fiercest criticism
for the Rehnquist Court’s ‘Section Five’ decisions . . . .”). The judicial supremacist logic of
Cooper v. Aaron has now found its way into the Supreme Court visitor’s guide. See U.S.
Supreme Court, Visitor’s Guide to the Supreme Court, available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/guide_court.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (“The Court stands as the final arbiter of the law and guardian
of constitutional liberties.”).
26. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (2000) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution]; see also Jamin B. Raskin, Overruling Democracy: The
Supreme Court vs. the American People 224 (2003) (urging Americans “to outflank the
new system of judicial supremacy”).
27. Abraham Lincoln famously defended this judicial supremacy floor in arguing that
the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision was binding upon the parties—meaning Scott
himself would have to remain a slave—but not upon Congress, the Executive, or the
American people. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution, supra note 26, at 8–9. Above this
floor, there is “intense controversy” over the extent to which extrajudicial actors ought to
be bound by the principles and reasons of judicial opinions as well as by their specific
holdings. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1040; see also
William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1811–12, 1841–45 (2008)
(summarizing views of leading scholars).
28. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism: A Reply to
Professor Barron, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. (Online) (Sept. 18, 2006), at http://
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that disfavored constitutional rulings do not bind a mobilized opposition,
or do not bind them for long. Judges still have a role to play in articulating and applying constitutional values; their views just “have no normative
priority in the conversation.”29
A third proposition motivates the second: Judicial supremacy has
been a peculiarly debilitating force in American public life. Its harms
include citizen passivity, elite rule, constitutional alienation, and judicial
overreach. “The danger of judicial supremacy,” Robert Post and Reva
Siegel write:
is not that the people will be deprived of the authority to decide
a particular case, but rather that they will cease to maintain a
vibrant and energetic engagement with the process of constitutional self-governance. Even if the people retain the last word
on the meaning of the Constitution, which they undoubtedly
will, they may nevertheless no longer feel entitled to disagree
with the opinions of the Court and hence lose the vital motivation and will for civic participation.30
Rarely are these harms conceptualized in instrumental terms. Popular constitutionalists do not tend to claim that judicial supremacy has diminished social welfare or social justice, though they occasionally draw
attention to the Court’s propensity to thwart progressive legislation or to
the fragility of constitutional commitments that lack a grounding in public support. The focus is on process and culture more than outcomes. As
normative theorists, popular constitutionalists have stressed a nonconsequentialist point about the courts’ ability to impede collective selfdetermination. They believe that judicial supremacy threatens to sap the
democratic legitimacy of American constitutional law and therefore the
health of our legal-political order.31 Undergirding both the populist and
civic republican strains in the literature is this belief in the intrinsic value
of citizens’ identification with, and struggle over, the Constitution.32
A fourth proposition, also normative, follows easily: We ought to rectify judicial supremacy by empowering the people, in their corporate capacity and as individuals, to reclaim the Constitution. Formal amendwww.hlpronline.com/2006/08/post_siegel_01.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(refuting this charge).
29. Tushnet, Political Law, supra note 16, at 999. Although many non-popular
constitutionalists would agree with Tushnet that judges should not have a monopoly on
constitutional meaning, most American lawyers would depart from him in assigning the
courts some degree of normative priority over other interpreters.
30. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1042–43 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (recapitulating Larry Kramer’s thesis).
31. See Strang, supra note 20, at 5 (citing, as “clear favorite” normative argument of
popular constitutionalists, idea that “by privileging Supreme Court constitutional
interpretations, democracy is undermined and the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian
position is aggravated”).
32. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const.
Comment. 427, 461–66 (2007) (arguing that American people must recognize
Constitution not only as “basic law” and “higher law” but also as “our law”).
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ments to the document are well and good, but they cannot ensure “active
and ongoing [popular] control over the interpretation and enforcement
of constitutional law.”33 Ordinary citizens must feel the Constitution to
be their Constitution in an everyday sense. They must have the ability to
create, modify, and apply constitutional norms continually and efficaciously, through an accessible political process.
This does not mean that public opinion may trump the text of the
Constitution even if the latter clearly resolves a legal question. Popular
constitutionalists still take themselves to be constitutionalists. No one in
their ranks would (to my knowledge) endorse the view that the voters or
their representatives may decide that certain U.S. states shall have three
senators, rather than the allotted two,34 without first having amended the
written Constitution.35 Likewise, no one in their ranks has endorsed the
view that constitutional questions must ceaselessly be ratified by the present people. Popular constitutionalists accept that prior generations can
bind future generations through constitutional commitments. They fear
the “dead hand” not so much because it is dead—which would amount to
a disdain for constitutionalism—as because of a second-stage concern
about the democratic inadequacy of judicial interpretation of those commitments. Legal norms would continue to constrain the exercise of contemporary preferences in their ideal world; the two would just be more
closely linked, the former more clearly subordinate to the latter.
A corollary of this stance is a fifth, basically empirical proposition: a
progressive faith in the capacity of lay persons to interpret and implement the Constitution in a principled fashion.36 The enemies of popular
constitutionalism, on this account, are elitists and aristocrats. They dismiss “democratic politics as scary and threatening” and harbor “deepseated misgivings about ordinary citizens.”37 Popular constitutionalists,
in contrast, accept that constitutional lawmaking can be loud, messy, and
polycentric without being irrational, immoral, or anarchic. Indeed, they
believe it must be quite loud, messy, and polycentric to be democratically
33. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 959.
34. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
35. No significant popular constitutionalist, that is, embraces what Larry Alexander
and Lawrence Solum call “noninterpretive popular constitutionalism,” Alexander &
Solum, supra note 1, at 1619–21, or what James Fleming calls “populist anticonstitutionalism,” James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking
the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1377, 1378–79 (2005).
36. See Pettys, supra note 3, at 339–58 (defending this view and noting that “popular
constitutionalists share a deep faith in citizens’ ability to constrain themselves and their
elected officials in the kinds of desirable ways that lead us to value the Constitution in the
first place”).
37. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 242–44 (citing Jack Balkin,
Richard Parker, Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Unger for having “similarly noted the
profoundly anti-democratic attitudes that underlie modern support for judicial
supremacy”); see also Whittington, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 23, at 839
(observing that supporters of judicial supremacy “tend[ ] to assume that there is an
inherent antagonism between populism and principle”).
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legitimate. This insistence that the people be allowed to play a larger role
in constitutional lawmaking, it bears noting, may sit uneasily with the fact
that opinion polls and observational evidence consistently show
Americans to be quite happy with judicial review as currently practiced.38
Underneath the romantic gloss, one sometimes glimpses in the popular
constitutionalism literature a hint of the view that judicial supremacy has
bred a kind of false consciousness in the people, who no longer realize
just how disempowered they are.
Finally, we come to the sixth core proposition, which can be the most
difficult for lawyers to grasp: The lines between constitutional law and
constitutional culture, between “higher” lawmaking and “normal” politics, are more fluid than is commonly realized. “[O]n the popular constitutionalist understanding,” David Franklin observes, “many things we are
used to thinking of as questions of ordinary law or policy turn out to be
constitutional questions.”39 Presidential rhetoric about the proper role
of judges, newspaper editorials blasting the latest Supreme Court decision, street protests about social conditions—each of these acts may be of
constitutional dimension. The Constitution’s text and history leave many
fundamental questions underdetermined; the Supreme Court, in turn,
has left many (though perhaps not enough) of these questions unanswered.40 Multifarious forces inevitably compete to fill the gap. In Keith
Whittington’s influential formulation, many of our authoritative norms
arise outside the judiciary through an “essentially political” process of
“constitutional construction.”41
38. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1637 (“[T]he idea that the judicial
branch should act as the final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution has been a
profoundly popular one.”); Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 Yale
L.J. 886, 910–11 (2008) (book review) (summarizing theoretical and empirical literature
and “hypothesiz[ing] that members of the public, more than institutional political actors,
have laid the foundations for judicial supremacy”); see also Kramer, The People
Themselves, supra note 2, at 230–33 (acknowledging pervasive “[p]ublic acceptance of
judicial supremacy”).
39. Franklin, supra note 3, at 1074.
40. Cf. Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 45
(1996) (“The meaning of most provisions in the Constitution is . . . determined in the
course of the interaction between the executive and legislative branches.”); Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213–20 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (arguing that courts
systematically underenforce Constitution on account of institutional limitations and
strategic concerns). Note that these claims are perfectly compatible with the originalist
premise that the semantic meaning of a constitutional provision remains fixed from the
time of its framing and ratification. See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller
and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 944–47 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and
Originalism] (identifying this “fixation thesis” as core tenet of originalism).
41. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning 6 (1999). Constitutional construction may legitimately be used, in
Whittington’s view, when originalist interpretation does not resolve a question. Keith E.
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial
Review 5–14 (1999).
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This willingness to expand the horizons of the constitutional raises
an identification problem: How do we distinguish genuine popular constitutionalism from simulacra or impostors thereof, “judgment[s] about constitutional meaning” from “policy-driven, constitution-blind” acts of opportunism or reform?42 Popular constitutionalists have generally
declined to specify criteria to resolve this problem.43 To cabin popular
constitutionalism into neat procedural or phenomenological categories is
to risk being elitist or formalistic, to overlook the political character of
the Constitution and the boundless creativity with which Americans may
struggle to make it their own.
B. Three Models
We are now in a position to consider several ideal types of normative
popular constitutionalism. Having outlined the theory’s core premises
and its interwoven themes of popular sovereignty, civic republicanism,
and historical redemption, we can draw distinctions based on (i) how
easy or difficult it ought to be for extrajudicial actors to overthrow judicial interpretations, and (ii) which actors ought to play the lead role in so
doing.
1. Modest Popular Constitutionalism. — Modest popular constitutionalists generally reject the notion that the people or their representatives
can ignore a judicial ruling because they disagree with it. They accept
that courts may occasionally strike down statutes or contravene majority
preferences as part of their constitutionally assigned role. However, to
ensure that such events do not end the conversation—that judicial pronouncements do not displace popular mobilization as the engine of lawAlthough this Article draws on Whittington’s basic idea of constitutional construction,
it does not apply the distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” as it has been
developed by so-called new originalists. See generally Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra
note 40, at 973 (distinguishing interpretation, “[t]he activity of determining the linguistic
meaning—or semantic content—of a legal text,” from construction, “[t]he activity of
translating the semantic content of a legal text into legal rules”). To the extent that
popular constitutionalists have shown an interest in the substance of constitutional
exegesis, they have focused on questions of construction: When they insist that the people
play a role in determining the Constitution’s “meaning,” they generally do not have the
document’s semantic content in mind. Like the popular constitutionalism literature, this
Article uses the term “interpretation” more loosely. My sense is that the interpretation/
construction distinction raises a number of interesting questions for popular
constitutionalism—both the democratic and consequentialist case for pluralizing
interpretation, for instance, seem much weaker than the case for reducing judicial control
over construction—but an exploration of those questions will have to wait for another day.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 207 (2007).
43. Those such as Bruce Ackerman who have tried to establish rigorous criteria have
been cast out of the popular constitutionalist community for setting too high a bar. See
Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 961 n.3 (arguing that Ackerman’s
theory of non-Article V amendments “does not in fact fit the concept” of popular
constitutionalism in light of its “stringent rules of recognition”).
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making—they insist that extrajudicial actors play an active, self-conscious
role in the articulation, contestation, and codification of constitutional
norms. Modest popular constitutionalism is popular constitutionalism
because it valorizes political engagement with the Constitution. It is modest because it does not directly challenge the institution of judicial review
or the finality of judicial outcomes.
Writers in this camp may still wish to hold out the possibility of popular resolve trumping judge-made law under certain conditions, as when
the courts make a grievous mistake or “blatantly usurp their constitutional authority.”44 (Though we have an identification problem here too:
How to tell when a court has gone so far astray?) Primarily, however,
modest popular constitutionalism seeks “a change in attitude.”45 It calls
upon the political branches to take constitutional interpretation seriously
and to enforce their constitutional convictions with or without judicial
instruction. It calls upon members of the public to reject the view of the
Constitution as something legalistic, immutable, or beyond their ken.
And it calls upon all extrajudicial actors to stop seeing the Supreme
Court as “an oracle” with a monopoly on constitutional truth,46 to follow
the Court’s work more closely, to criticize it when they disagree, and to
take action when they strongly disagree. In a phrase, it asks the American
people to seize a fuller measure of the “active liberty” that the Framers
sought to bestow upon them.47
Modest popular constitutionalism entails a commitment to a certain
kind of republican virtue. It is a “tonic” for the passivity and ignorance
that permeate so much of our constitutional culture.48
2. Robust Popular Constitutionalism. — Robust popular constitutionalism shrinks the domain of binding judicial interpretation. For writers in
this camp, the interpretive authority of the people trumps that of the
judiciary any time the people are sufficiently ready and willing to use it.
Robust popular constitutionalism does not simply encourage lay persons
to engage the Constitution in some active and sustained fashion; it assigns
44. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1624. The taxonomy offered here draws on
Alexander and Solum’s but simplifies their categories. What they break out into “modest,”
“trivial,” and “expressive” popular constitutionalism, id. at 1623–26, I lump together into
“modest.” And whereas they see departmentalism as a “rival” to popular constitutionalism,
id. at 1607–15, I see the latter as subsuming the former. While Alexander and Solum’s
scheme offers attractive precision, it does not do a very good job of tracking the arguments
that popular constitutionalists themselves make.
45. Franklin, supra note 3, at 1071.
46. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1626; see also Richard D. Parker, “Here, the
People Rule”: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto 79, 87 (1994) (assailing legal culture’s
“chronic fetishism of the Constitution, constitutional law, and the Supreme Court” and
arguing that “‘higher’ law” rhetoric is “poisonous to our society and our polity”).
47. See generally Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution (2005).
48. Franklin, supra note 3, at 1071. Franklin dubs this the “populist sensibility model”
of popular constitutionalism, which he contrasts with models that aim to empower the
people through strong forms of departmentalism or through direct action. Id. at 1071–77.
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lexical priority to their views whenever they do so. It seeks to displace not
only judicial supremacy but also judicial settlement as the prevailing
norm in our constitutional culture. “It would return all constitutional
decision-making to the people acting politically,”49 “essentially substitut[ing] the people themselves for the Supreme Court as the ultimate
interpreter and enforcer of the written text.”50
How exactly a society could make this substitution is unclear. The
paradigm case of robust popular constitutionalism would presumably involve a concerted effort by ordinary citizens to effectuate their constitutional beliefs, as through assemblies or mobs. Larry Kramer repeatedly
and sympathetically refers to these mechanisms in The People Themselves,51
although in the years since he has pulled back from what some took as an
endorsement.52 Mobs and assemblies might be effective at dealing with
the odd, discrete legal question. But modern America is much too big
and diverse, and political power much too entrenched, for direct action
or direct democracy to supplant representative democracy. To realize
their beliefs, the people will generally need to act through mediating institutions such as civic organizations, political parties, and the elected
branches of government. To the extent that these institutions are seen as
more responsive to the people than the Article III courts, robust popular
constitutionalists may wish to shift the locus of interpretive authority in
their direction. In this spirit, some prominent scholars have advocated
the abandonment of judicial review,53 which would leave the legislative
and executive branches free to police their own views of what the
Constitution requires. Others have called on Congress to be much more
liberal in its use of retaliatory measures such as jurisdiction stripping,
court packing, and budget cuts,54 which at some point may amount to the
functional equivalent.
49. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution, supra note 26, at 154.
50. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1621.
51. See Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 27–28, 109–11, 128, 168.
52. See, e.g., Kramer, Response, supra note 6, at 1175 (“Mobs were fine in their
context and in their time, but no one, least of all me, is suggesting that this is a good way to
go about doing things today.”). Kramer has also clarified the departmentalist basis of his
theory of popular constitutionalism. See id. at 1180 (describing “goal” of “restor[ing] a
true departmental system” as envisioned by Madison and Jefferson).
53. See, e.g., Tushnet, Taking the Constitution, supra note 26, at 154–94; Jeremy
Waldron, Law and Disagreement 282–312 (1999) [hereinafter Waldron, Law and
Disagreement] (addressing judicial review of legislation); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1376–406 (2006) [hereinafter
Waldron, Core of the Case] (same); see also Parker, supra note 46, at 111 (advocating
formal continuation but functional diminishment of judicial review, through norm “that
it’s all right not only to criticize or even condemn constitutional argument enforced by
judges, but also to disobey it”).
54. See, e.g., Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 249; Tom Donnelly,
Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell Our Children,
118 Yale L.J. 948, 953, 958 (2009).
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Unlike modest popular constitutionalism, robust popular constitutionalism does not command significant support in the academy. It remains on the fringe. It is useful to mark its existence, though, because we
will see that both camps may have reason to care about judicial selection.
3. Departmentalism. — Alluded to in the discussion above is an important adjunct to popular constitutionalism, which focuses not on “the people themselves” but instead on the political institutions they create.
Departmentalism refers to the idea that the coordinate branches of government possess independent authority to interpret the Constitution.
This authority might be divided, so that each branch exercises exclusive
control over discrete interpretive areas, or it might be shared, so that the
branches render overlapping and potentially conflicting interpretations
on the same subjects.55 For our purposes, it is not necessary to break
down the many possible variants of departmentalism, just to note its basic
aim of recognizing the legislative and executive branches as expositors of
constitutional meaning and enforcers of constitutional norms.
Many have been attracted to departmentalism not for democratic or
civic republican reasons but for reasons grounded in historical practice,56
comparative institutional competence,57 or the separation of powers.58
Many departmentalists, that is, are popular constitutionalists only incidentally. Some have questioned whether departmentalism really is popular constitutionalism, given that it relocates political control from ordinary citizens to their representatives in government.59 Yet as we have
already seen, only the most stringent and impractical form of popular
constitutionalism would reject any mediation between the populace and
the levers of power. Scholars sympathetic to popular constitutionalism
are liable to embrace departmentalism on two alternate grounds. First,
departmentalism diversifies and amplifies the debate over constitutional
meaning by introducing potent new voices into the mix. Second, it empowers the people in the debate by augmenting the interpretive role of
their elected agents as against that of the unelected Supreme Court.60
Departmentalism can be modest or robust. Modest departmentalism
does not elevate the political branches to a higher station than the appointed judiciary on account of their electoral pedigree, and to the con55. Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1609–15.
56. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 passim
(1987).
57. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response
to Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 347, 348 (1994).
58. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political
Process ch. 7 (1992).
59. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 1, at 1609 n.37 (“Departmentalism places
ultimate constitutional authority in the hands of the departments . . . whereas popular
constitutionalism insists that the people have the final say over constitutional
interpretation . . . .”).
60. Popular constitutionalists have had little to say about the unelected components
within the political branches, such as the heads of executive agencies.
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trary expects them to abide by the logic of judicial rulings except perhaps
when a profoundly wrong decision justifies retaliatory action. Robust
departmentalism does elevate the political branches above the Court, and
would reassign to the former much of the interpretive authority that the
latter currently wields. By curtailing judicial review or doing away with it
altogether, robust departmentalism would effectively make Congress and
the President the supreme institutional interpreters of the Constitution.
A simple diagram may help synthesize the distinctions sketched
above. In the debate over how constitutional law is to be made, we have
identified two basic axes of dispute. The horizontal axis reflects the preferred locus of constitutional lawmaking authority, ranging from politically
insulated Article III judges, to the elected branches, to the people themselves. The vertical axis reflects the degree of exclusivity with which the primary lawmakers may determine the content of constitutional law. (Although I have placed all of the categories in discrete boxes for
convenience, they can be better conceptualized as points on a continuum.) Those scholars in the leftmost, “Juricentrism” column are the antagonists of popular constitutionalism; many if not most constitutional
lawyers can be found here. The farther east and north one travels on this
matrix, the closer one comes to the paradigm case of popular
constitutionalism.
TABLE I. HOW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SHOULD BE MADE
Juricentrism

Departmentalism

Populism

Robust

Judicial sovereignty

Legislative or executive
supremacy

Direct democracy (e.g.,
assemblies), direct action
(e.g., mobs)

Medium

Judicial supremacy,
routinely and confidently
asserted

Each branch acts on its
own interpretations of
the Constitution

Social and political
movements drive
constitutional change

Modest

Judicial supremacy, rarely
and cautiously asserted

Each branch interprets
the Constitution

Civic engagement, norm
contestation

II. HIDING

IN

PLAIN SIGHT: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

AS

VEHICLES

OF

Imagine an America in which federal judges can be removed not just
for misbehavior but also for deciding cases in ways the public does not
like. A removal option is regularly put before the people. It is not mediated in any way by the House or the Senate, much less by trial proceedings. A simple majority of those paying attention can unseat a judge on
their own initiative. They do this all the time.
Sound fantastical? Although the removal analogy is imperfect, this
dynamic is already familiar in most U.S. states, where general jurisdiction
and appellate judgeships are determined by recurring popular elec-
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tions.61 If enough voters are unhappy about what a court has been doing,
they can reconstitute its membership come the next election cycle. The
use of judicial elections is one of the most striking features of the nation’s
legal system;62 no other advanced democracy has anything like it.63 Yet
popular constitutionalists have been incurious about this distinctively
American practice. They have overlooked the single most populist institution associated with our courts.64
This Part sketches a positive theory of judicial elections as engines of
popular constitutionalism. Section A explains why state courts merit consideration. Section B explains how their elections can advance the popular constitutionalist project beyond the courthouse, by inspiring and empowering members of the public to engage constitutional questions.
Section C explains how judicial elections can advance the popular constitutionalist project within the courthouse, by inspiring members of the judiciary to internalize norms of deference to public opinion. In drawing
these connections between the institution of elections and the aspirations
of popular constitutionalism, I do not mean to assert that every connection is likely to be forged in every campaign for the bench. This is not an
exercise in empiricism. The goal, rather, is to show what judicial elec61. Popular elections currently play some role in the selection or retention of
approximately ninety percent of these judgeships, across thirty-nine states. Roy A.
Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Geo. L.J. 1077, 1105 app. 2
(2007) [hereinafter Schotland, New Challenges]. Election methods vary significantly
across the states: Some elections are “competitive” (i.e., multicandidate) whereas others
are for retention purposes only; some are “partisan” (i.e., candidates run under party
labels) whereas others forbid party affiliation; some recur annually whereas others take a
decade or more; some apply stringent campaign contribution limits whereas others do not
apply any. See generally Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate
and General Jurisdiction Courts (2009), available at http://ajs.org/selection/docs/
Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Schotland,
New Challenges, supra, at 1084–86, 1104 app. 1. Any attempt to evaluate “judicial
elections” as a collective phenomenon therefore entails a simplifying conceit. The analysis
that follows generally assumes competitive, partisan elections—“the strongest case for
defending the democratic nature of judicial elections,” Mariah Zeisberg, Should We Elect
the US Supreme Court?, 7 Persp. on Pol. 785, 787 (2009)—though much of it holds up for
nonpartisan elections as well.
62. See Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1995, 1996 (1988) (“To the rest of the world, the American adherence to judicial
elections is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system.”); Adam Liptak,
Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. Times, May 25, 2008, at A1
(examining judicial elections as part of “American Exception[alism]” series).
63. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different
Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 423,
431 (2007) (stating that judicial elections are used outside United States only in several
Swiss cantons and in Japan for its high court retention elections).
64. Juries are the only plausible rival. Yet their role in the system is intermittent and
highly constrained—by judges, no less—and does not involve explicit legal interpretation.
A robust practice of jury nullification, however, could upend the balance of interpretive
power between judge and jury.
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tions are capable of—to clarify a plausible ideal against which they might
be evaluated and in pursuit of which they might be engineered.
In Part III, I will critically reevaluate many of the claims made here:
The popular constitutionalist case for judicial elections, I will show, is beset by deep conceptual as well as practical difficulties. It is useful, first, to
develop a richer understanding of why and how elective systems may hold
appeal.
A. Taking State Courts Seriously
The task I have set for myself might seem quixotic. Judicial elections
are used only at the state level, after all, and it is the federal Constitution
and the federal Supreme Court that have commanded the attention of
popular constitutionalists. Moreover, campaigns for the bench may focus
on issues about the candidates’ personalities or local politics that would
seem to have nothing to do with the Constitution. These are not good
reasons for the popular constitutionalist to write off judicial elections, for
at least five reasons.
First, state courts play a major role in interpreting and enforcing the
federal Constitution. State high courts, in particular, not only apply U.S.
Supreme Court precedents but also help stimulate and supplement them,
as when they rule on issues the Court has yet to decide or when they
exceed a constitutional floor the Court has established. Recent scholarship demonstrates that in many areas of law, “state courts, as a practical
matter, have the ability . . . to determine what the Constitution means
with little or no oversight by the Supreme Court.”65 If state courts do not
always seize the full measure of this interpretive power,66 and if they have
65. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Neal
Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a StateCentered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1629, 1636 (2010)
[hereinafter Devins, State Constitutionalism] (describing “volume and import of state
supreme court decision-making” as “truly awesome” and identifying examples of state high
courts “paving the way for Supreme Court decisions expanding constitutional
protections”). Professor Mazzone concludes that given this functional “sharing” of
interpretive authority, “we should worry less about the Supreme Court, and more about
what is happening to federal constitutional law as it is developed and implemented in the
state courts and in other venues.” Mazzone, supra (manuscript at 2).
66. See Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to
Become Independently Wealthy, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1065, 1075 (1997) (“Even now,
state courts [that] have no doubt of their power to disagree with the Supreme Court often
do not wish to use this power after the Supreme Court has already visited the issue . . . .”).
But see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 549 (1986)
(asserting that, in interpreting their own constitutions, “state courts have responded with
marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by
the decisions of the Supreme Court majority”).

\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL802.txt

unknown

Seq: 21

9-NOV-10

16:19

2010] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 2067
failed more generally to develop their own constitutional discourses,67
that is all the more reason for the popular constitutionalist to attend to
them.
Second, state courts play a lead role in interpreting and enforcing
their own constitutions,68 which often include positive rights and regulatory norms for which there is no federal analogue.69 Many of these
courts and these constitutions have become deeply implicated in controversies over education finance, welfare entitlements, and same-sex marriage, among other issues, and “now stand as key elements in activists’
strategies for legal, political and social change.”70 “Over the past thirty
years,” Neal Devins contends, “state courts have eclipsed the U.S.
Supreme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in
their home states and throughout the nation.”71 There is nothing essential to most theories of popular constitutionalism that would confine it to
a national constitution. To the contrary, the imperative of reconnecting
ordinary citizens to fundamental law could be seen as particularly urgent
within smaller units of governance. Because state courts are closer to the
people, their operations may be critical to “popular constitutionalism’s
objective of reasserting democratic control over [constitutional]
meaning.”72
Third, campaigns for the bench are no longer sleepy or parochial
affairs across many parts of the country. In the “new era” of judicial elections, candidates have begun to stake out positions on disputed legal and
political questions, including questions of constitutional interpretation,
67. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 761 (1992). “[S]tate constitutional law today,” in Gardner’s subtle formulation, “is a
vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”
Id. at 763.
68. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (“Not only do
state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense
power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.”).
69. See Gardner, supra note 67, at 818–19; Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the
“Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1876–905
(2001) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Passive Virtues]; Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and
Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 Va. L. Rev. 389, 391 (1998).
70. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 Rutgers L.J. 871, 873 (1999). See generally Randall T.
Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 421,
421 (1996) (heralding “renaissance in state constitution jurisprudence [that] has extended
for nearly a generation”); Robert F. Williams, Juristocracy in the American States?, 65 Md.
L. Rev. 68, 68–73 (2006) [hereinafter Williams, Juristocracy] (describing post-1960s
emergence of state courts as “major policymakers” and constitutional interpreters).
71. Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1635; see also Traylor v. State,
596 So. 2d 957, 961, 962 (Fla. 1992) (asserting that “state courts and constitutions have
traditionally served as the prime protectors of their citizens’ basic freedoms” and that
“[s]tate courts function daily as the prime arbiters of personal rights”).
72. Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to
Judicial Review, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1003, 1023 (2006).
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and then to urge voters to select them on the basis of these positions.73 It
seems plausible to expect that constitutional law will play an increasingly
explicit role in judicial races in the years to come.
Fourth, even if judicial candidates do not cite particular constitutional cases or provisions in their interactions with voters, it does not follow that those interactions are devoid of constitutional import. Popular
constitutionalism invites us to broaden our understanding of the constitutional, to “remov[e] the conceptual blinders that higher law constitutionalism has placed” on our legal imaginations,74 and see how everyday
struggles over distributional arrangements and social values contribute to
the development of authoritative norms, if not also to the evolution of
constitutional text and doctrine. When candidates for the bench use a
campaign ad to decry or defend legalized abortion—a common occurrence75—they may be “doing” popular constitutionalism even if they
never once mention the Constitution.76
Finally, the federal Constitution is not immutable. If elections really
do have a claim to being superior vehicles of popular constitutionalism,
then its proponents ought to consider whether and how to advocate
amendment of the Constitution’s judicial selection procedures. They
ought to try to learn from the states.77
B. Judicial Elections Outside the Courthouse
Let us consider first what judicial elections may entail for the world
beyond the courthouse. We can posit a variety of interrelated mechanisms through which they can advance the popular constitutionalist
agenda.
1. Elections as “Critical Moments for Expressing the People’s Active, Ongoing
Sovereignty.” 78 — Most basically, elections provide a mechanism—the paradigmatic mechanism—for enshrining popular control over the institution in question. Elections bring that institution into the sphere of ordinary politics, inviting voters to conceptualize the individuals selected as
73. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 265–68, 297–302.
74. Reed, supra note 70, at 892.
75. James L. Gibson, Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign
Speech?, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 899, 910 (2008).
76. Cf. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8–9 (2003) (“The
boundary between culture and constitutional culture is quite indistinct . . . . [Lay persons]
can fervently believe that the federal government ought to have plenary power, or that
abortion is murder, without ever connecting these views to a conclusion about the nature
of the Constitution.”).
77. Although the idea of electing U.S. Supreme Court Justices has never gained
substantial political traction, it continually resurfaces. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The
Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments Process 201–06 (1994)
(proposing hybrid system of presidential nomination and electoral ratification); Friedman,
Will of the People, supra note 20, at 182–83 (summarizing Progressive Era proposals).
78. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 197.
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agents and representatives, rather than autonomous actors or distant
technocrats. They invite voters to think about the substantive powers
wielded by the institution, and whether they would like to see those powers wielded differently. In assigning identical weight to each participant’s
judgment, and zero weight to all other inputs, majoritarian decisionmaking systems have an intuitive claim to being consistent with political
equality and procedural fairness.79
Elections are special moments, then, for the realization of popular
sovereignty. When the elections involve judgeships, they are special moments for affirming our collective commitment to popular sovereignty
with respect to the application of law. To be sure, the “popular” nature
of any given election may be marred by interest group capture, incumbent advantages, low turnout, or other pathologies. And executive and
legislative appointments can be seen as popular acts, too, in that the selecting officials are themselves selected by the public; America’s appointive jurisdictions are still a long way away from the career judiciaries of
certain Asian and continental European nations, in which prospective
judges are groomed in special schools, vetted in technical competitions,
and, once on the bench, promoted in large part by more senior colleagues.80 But in an appointive system the connection to the demos is
mediated, attenuated. The people have no necessary role to play. Elections hold out the promise of a more authentic mode of representation.
However imperfectly, they clarify the democratic basis of judicial authority and help legitimate that authority by grounding it in repeated public
consent.
Judicial supremacy may still exist in an elective system to the extent
that extrajudicial actors believe themselves bound by the logic of court
rulings. As a cultural construct, “‘a matter of sensibility,’”81 judicial
supremacy cannot necessarily be dispelled by any particular institutional
arrangement. Yet it is hard to think of another selection method that
could more forcefully instill the counternotion that judges are not supreme82—not infallible luminaries, not Platonic guardians, not invulnerable to popular pressure. Of all the selection methods in use, only elec79. See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 53, at 113–14. According to
Professor Waldron, “it is well known, as a matter of decision-theory, that the principle of
majority-decision and only the principle of majority-decision” permits each member of a
community to have his or her voice count equally in a common settlement. Jeremy
Waldron, A Majority in the Lifeboat, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1055 (2010).
80. See Carlo Guarnieri & Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative
Study of Courts and Democracy 34–67 (2002) (discussing European civil law systems);
David M. O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan and Ten
South and Southeast Asian Countries, in Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power:
Critical Perspectives from Around the World 355 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds.,
2006) (discussing Asian systems).
81. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 241 (quoting Parker, supra note
46, at 4).
82. Hard, but not impossible: Judicial selection by random lottery would do so even
more forcefully.
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tions tell members of the public that the resolution of legal questions is
not “something that should be left to others,”83 at least not entirely. They
demonstrate that the courts serve the people in a community, and not
just some antiquated legal text or esoteric professional code. They make
it clear that ordinary citizens are entitled to disagree with their judges.
Elections can help disestablish judicial supremacy as a sociological and
expressive norm.
2. Elections as Accountability Mechanisms. — Elections are not merely
symbolic vehicles for affirming the people’s active, ongoing sovereignty
over the Constitution and the officials who apply it. They are also practical instruments for translating that sovereignty into concrete outcomes,
for ensuring that the adjudicated Constitution remains aligned with public opinion. By giving citizens a means and a forum with which to register
dissent, if not also to elicit pledges from judicial aspirants, elections give
them a tool with which to shape the trajectory of legal doctrine.
Elections are special in this regard as well. Every judicial selection
and retention system incorporates various forms of popular accountability. When the governor or the legislature controls reappointments,
judges are judged by the people’s representatives. Life-tenured federal
jurists are checked by their desire for approbation and efficacy, commitments elicited during the appointment process, the potential for promotion, and Congress’s ability to control jurisdiction, remedies, and salaries.
Although causation remains obscure, these sorts of mechanisms have
consistently prevented the outputs of the U.S. Supreme Court from straying beyond “the mainstream of public opinion.”84 Yet the mainstream of
opinion can be a broad current, encompassing a range of controversial
viewpoints; the Court’s structural independence and diffuse support allow its positions to lag behind or deviate from majority preferences for
many years. And while no American judge is insulated entirely from the
voters’ perspective, only elected judges stake their jobs on it. Elections
entail the crudest and most potent form of public discipline of all the
selection methods. They effectuate the popular will most directly.
It should not be surprising to learn, then, that states that use elections have granted their judges significantly shorter terms than states that
use appointments.85 For the choice to hold elections reflects a commitment to popular accountability that demands continual satisfaction.86
Nor should it be surprising that the empirical evidence shows that, as
compared to state judges in appointive and merit selection jurisdictions,
judges facing elections, particularly partisan elections, are more likely to
83. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 229.
84. Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 2613. Even definitive
proof that Supreme Court decisions always track public opinion would not dispel the
procedural critiques of judicial supremacy outlined in Part I, though it might take the edge
off.
85. Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 284–85.
86. Id. at 285–86 & n.91, 312–13, 329.
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decide cases in a manner consistent with majority opinion.87 Elections
appear to be forcing faster and fuller correspondence between judicial
outputs and communal preferences. They can help disestablish judicial
supremacy as a functional norm, without necessarily breeding defiance of
any particular judicial ruling.
When one recalls that state judges routinely decide (and decline to
decide) constitutional questions, these considerations take on a popular
constitutionalist tint. Imagine an elected state supreme court that rules,
by four votes to three, that under the equal protection clause of the state
constitution and/or the federal Constitution—both grounds are available—same-sex couples must be afforded the right to marry on identical
terms as opposite-sex couples. Imagine, too, that many citizens of the
state strongly oppose this outcome on constitutional grounds: They are
outraged. Elections give these citizens a means to operationalize their
outrage as soon as the next election cycle comes around. Challengers
can try to vindicate this sentiment by championing an alternative interpretation of the Constitution. Those four justices in the majority put
their jobs on the line the moment they signed the opinion. So did the
dissenters.88
3. Elections as Constitutional Change Agents. — In tying the substance
of judicial outputs to the views of the people, elections can thus operate
to preserve the status quo against unwanted incursion from independent
judges. They can also help see to it that, when gaps open up between the
governing legal regime and the strongly held views of the electorate, the
former is moved in the direction of the latter. They can serve as engines
of constitutional change.89
87. Research on this question has exploded in the past decade. For summaries of the
literature with citations to leading studies, see David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging
Measures, 77 UMKC L. Rev. 381, 397–99 (2008); Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of
Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. Legal Stud. 169, 174–76 (2009); Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061, 1064–65 (2010) [hereinafter Shugerman, Economic
Crisis].
88. Take another example: A watershed event in the modern history of judicial
elections occurred in 1986, when Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues on the
California Supreme Court were unseated after an aggressive campaign attacked their low
rate of affirmance in death penalty cases. No California justice had ever lost a retention
election before; a new breed of judicial elections had arrived. The legal establishment
responded with indignation at the affront to judicial independence. See Pozen, Irony of
Elections, supra note 8, at 287 & n.99. To the popular constitutionalist, however, the
moral of the story could easily be flipped. Justice Bird and her colleagues consistently
declined to uphold death sentences in a jurisdiction that had legislated their use. Having
witnessed their constitutional beliefs defied for too long, the people rose up to assert their
sovereign authority. They also bothered, for once, to take an interest in what their courts
were doing and to come out to vote. This was accountability in action.
89. By “constitutional change,” I mean to refer to changes in the official doctrines,
statutes, regulations, and practices that interpret and implement the Constitution. I do
not mean to take any position on the relative significance, legitimacy, or canonicity of such
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It is now banal to observe that constitutional law may evolve even if
the constitutional text remains static. This explains why so many care so
much about the President’s picks for the Supreme Court. By placing on
the Court one or more Justices with a sympathetic worldview or jurisprudential style, a President can increase the odds that the Court’s doctrine
will move in the direction of positions he and his constituents favor.90
For the popular constitutionalist, such executive efforts to influence the
elaboration of law through “transformative appointments”91 are all to the
good. They help deal with one of the foundational problems to which
popular constitutionalism responds: the slowness and difficulty of formal
constitutional change and the concomitant empowerment of judges to
manage the interregna. To sustain the democratic legitimacy of constitutional law, “more persistent and nuanced forms of exchange” than those
offered by Article V are needed to root that law in the beliefs of an energized public.92
Elections are at least superficially more dynamic vehicles for popular
constitutional change than presidential appointments. They occur not
episodically and idiosyncratically but quickly and regularly. They involve
a qualitatively more direct form of democracy. And in competitive jurisdictions, they put many more candidates—many more potential authors
of transformative opinions—before the people. Consider again the samesex marriage example. If the U.S. Supreme Court reached that same ruling, and the American public likewise despised the result, it could easily
take several decades before constitutional doctrine caught up with popular sentiment.93 Judicial elections can effectuate this same change over
one or two election cycles, without the contingency of vacancies arising
and like-minded executives holding office. Elections “mean that controversial decisions and judges can become rallying cries for an activist and
mobilized citizenry, who seek to resist the constitutional interpretations
advanced by judges.”94
Even this example may undersell the potential comparative advantage of elective judiciaries as instruments of constitutional change, for
such change can be creative and additive rather than defensive and predevelopments as compared to an Article V amendment—an issue on which the popular
constitutionalism literature is all but silent.
90. See Griffin, supra note 40, at 42 (“Many different observers have accepted the
thesis that judicial interpretation has been the primary means of adapting the Constitution
to change outside Article V.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1066–83 (2001) (arguing that
“constitutional revolutions” occur through partisan entrenchment of federal judges).
91. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164
(1988).
92. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 380; see supra notes 7, 33, and
accompanying text (explaining insufficiency of Article V amendment process for popular
constitutionalism).
93. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 20, at 383 (discussing “stickiness” of
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions).
94. Reed, supra note 70, at 887.
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servative. Elections are disruptive events. They foist upon communities a
periodic reevaluation of the status quo, and thereby invite new ideas for a
better society. In the judicial context, they invite what might be termed
constitutional competition: the presentation by candidates of alternative visions of a good constitutional order. Judges can campaign on the basis of
particular constitutional understandings they wish to advance—say, that
a health insurance mandate is impermissible or that every citizen is entitled to a decent income—and then, when an appropriate case comes
along, seek to apply them. In the vernacular of political scientists, candidates for judicial office can serve as constitutional “entrepreneurs.” The
campaign gives them a platform as well as an incentive to mobilize support for specific substantive reforms or general interpretive approaches—
to seek a competitive advantage by translating abstract concepts into
tractable messages, exploiting policy windows, reframing the terms of debates, dislodging old legal norms and moving society toward new ones.95
Appointments and merit selections cannot generate the same kind
of constitutional competition or entrepreneurship. They are comparatively insulated, elite affairs, yoked to the prevailing norms of the legal
establishment. Their choices may reflect the influence of popular movements, but the institutions themselves are unlikely to spark any.
4. Elections as Dialogue. — Judicial elections are also comparatively
noisy. Merit selection panels labor in obscurity before proffering their
slate of candidates to the appointing authority. Governors and presidents
vet potential nominees behind closed doors before introducing the selections as a fait accompli. Although confirmation hearings can generate
public discussion about the candidates and their views on the
Constitution, they do so in a highly structured, performative, and timebounded way. In practice, confirmation hearings at the federal level have
rarely achieved any significant level of constitutional debate.96 I have not
seen any research on confirmation hearings at the state level, but my
sense is they have proven equally if not more devoid of substantive
content.
Judicial election campaigns, by contrast, increasingly generate political speech on the order of a legislative or executive contest. Candidates
develop distinctive themes and narratives and seek to communicate them
through the media and through direct appeals. This is the defining feature of the “new era”: As campaign conduct codes have been weakened
95. See generally David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 283, 300–10 (2008) (explaining related concepts of policy entrepreneurship and
norm entrepreneurship).
96. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in
Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 38, 44–51 (2006), at
http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/27.pdf (urging more robust discussion of
nominees’ views, especially on previously decided cases); Richard Brust, No More Kabuki
Confirmations, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2009, at 38 (reporting widespread dissatisfaction with Justice
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings). But see Tushnet, Taking the Constitution, supra
note 26, at 64 (discussing “public edification” value of Robert Bork hearings).
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and attack ads, interest groups, and big money have flooded the market,
judicial races have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier.”97
Despised by critics, these same attributes of judicial races can serve
popular constitutionalist ends. Competitive elections can render the
work of the courts more salient and comprehensible. They facilitate public discourse about previous judicial decisions and potential future decisions. They encourage judges to communicate with the people, and the
people to communicate with each other, about the methods and consequences of legal interpretation. They encourage ordinary citizens to try
to become judges.98 They serve as agenda setters and focal points that
help citizens coordinate opposition to or support for government policy.
They create a kind of marketplace of constitutional ideas. They reward
active political participation and persuasive norm contestation at the expense of passivity. They have, in short, the potential to transform a constitutional culture from one that is apathetic, sterile, and professional
into one that is active, vibrant, and popular. The nastier, noisier, and
costlier they are, the greater their transformative potential.99
This transformation may have spillover effects that undermine the
influence of judges well beyond the close of the election cycle. Even if
judicial supremacy remains accepted on a case-by-case basis, in the sense
that extrajudicial actors continue “to give way in the face of judicial interpretations of the Constitution and embrace the logic of those judicial
interpretations,” the dialogic aspect of elections can illuminate possibilities for engaging the Constitution “prior to and in the interstices of judicial interpretation.”100 By injecting questions of constitutional law into
the political arena, these campaigns may inspire members of the public
and the other branches to take their role as constitutional exegetes and
advocates more seriously. Every popular constitutionalist (and every
departmentalist) would celebrate this development.
5. Elections as Teaching Moments. — Finally, elections can contribute
to popular constitutionalism beyond the courthouse by educating members of the public about the content of the state and federal constitutions,
97. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1998, at 149, 150
[hereinafter Schotland, Comment].
98. Cf. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 290, 327 (2010) (finding that elected judges are “more politically involved,
more locally connected, more temporary, and less well educated than appointed judges,”
and hence “are more like politicians and less like professionals”).
99. In line with this hypothesis, Melinda Gann Hall and Chris Bonneau recently
found that increased spending on judicial elections leads to increased voter turnout.
Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on
Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 457, 467–68
(2008). “[E]xpensive campaigns,” Hall and Bonneau conclude, thus “strengthen the
critical linkage between citizens and [judges] and enhance the quality of democracy.” Id.
at 457, 458, 468.
100. Keith E. Whittington, Give “The People” What They Want?, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
911, 913 (2006).
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as written and as interpreted, and about the work of the courts. This
“teaching” function of judicial elections is made explicit whenever the
supervising authorities publish voter information guides. It is made even
more pointed when these guides incorporate measures of “judicial performance,” as they increasingly do.101 Any time a judicial candidate takes
to the airwaves, puts up a billboard, or mails out a flyer, an opportunity
arises for her to comment on the Constitution, in a format and register
designed to be accessible to the lay person. Some candidates may decline
to engage constitutional questions; some may transmit misleading or sensationalistic messages. But others will take this opportunity in earnest.
Mobilized groups of citizens can likewise try to inform and persuade the
masses.
If Supreme Court rulings still have the capacity to provide a “vital
national seminar” on important legal issues,102 state court races have the
capacity to distribute the CliffsNotes to the millions of Americans not enrolled. While confirmation hearings may serve a teaching function as
well, the lessons are filtered through representatives and ignored by most
citizens. As dialogue, judicial elections can facilitate a democratic debate
about constitutional questions. As teaching moments, they can clarify
and vivify the stakes.
Given the traditional antipathy of the legal establishment toward
elective judiciaries, it was remarkable to find a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, Anthony Kennedy, invoking this line of argument in a recent
concurrence:
A judicial election system presents the opportunity, indeed the
civic obligation, for voters and the community as a whole to become engaged in the legal process. Judicial elections, if fair and
open, could be an essential forum for society to discuss and define the attributes of judicial excellence and to find ways to discern those qualities in the candidates.103
Justice Kennedy pulled back at the critical moment, however, when he
suggested that the topic of conversation would be “judicial excellence.”
That is just the tip of the iceberg. Experience indicates that elective systems are liable to stimulate discussion not only about the personal qualities of the candidates, but also about the substantive views they es101. Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Univ. of Denver, Shared
Expectations: Judicial Accountability in Context 19–61 (2006), available at http://
www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/SharedExpectations.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
102. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 193, 208 (1952). It is conventional wisdom among political scientists that the Court’s
rulings do not in fact have this capacity. See, e.g., Gerald R. Rosenberg, Romancing the
Court, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 563, 564 (2009) (“[F]or decades social science researchers have
repeatedly found that judicial opinions neither educate nor teach. Ordinary people do
not know about them, are unlikely to find out about them, and are not interested.”).
103. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Only Justice Breyer joined Kennedy’s concurrence. Id. at 209.
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pouse.104 As in legislative and executive contests, competitive judicial
races prime voters to demand results. The teaching moments and the
dialogue they foster will inevitably come around to the consequences of
judicial decisionmaking, to questions regarding what kind of interpretive
outcomes the candidates seem likely to deliver. And one assumes that for
many popular constitutionalists, though perhaps not for Justice Kennedy,
this is exactly as it should be.
C. Judicial Elections Inside the Courthouse
We have seen that judicial elections have the potential to transform a
constitutional culture in ways that empower ordinary citizens and that,
compared to other methods of selection and retention, they might claim
a special democratic legitimacy on account of the public accountability,
civic discourse, and legal education they promise. Whether or not they
have come—and ever could come—anywhere close to fulfilling this
promise is a controversial question, on which political scientists have generally taken a more optimistic view than lawyers. We will return to this
question in Part III. More subtle, but perhaps more consequential, are
the ways in which use of an elective system can transform judicial rulings
from the inside out.
1. Judicial Restraint. — What’s a popular constitutionalist judge to
do?
Although some prominent (robust) popular constitutionalists reject
judicial review altogether,105 that position remains a minority view. A
much larger camp accepts that judges should continue to invalidate legislative and executive action for trenching upon the Constitution. These
modest popular constitutionalists just want judges to tread more softly, to
show greater respect for the role of extrajudicial actors in interpreting
the Constitution.106 Let us group these jurisprudential views, crudely,
under the heading of judicial restraint. As used here, the term refers not
so much to a theory of constitutional interpretation as to a theory of the
judicial function, a regulative ideal, aimed at minimizing interference
with the political process.
Judicial restraint could take many forms. It might involve relaxed
scrutiny of decisions made by the other branches, liberal use of the political question doctrine and the constitutional avoidance canon, a minimal104. Indeed, an opinion that Justice Kennedy joined half a decade earlier, Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), foreclosed state efforts to concentrate
discussion on the candidates’ qualities by preventing them from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues. Id. at 788 (striking down Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct’s prohibition on such announcements as violation of First Amendment).
105. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
106. See Whittington, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 23, at 780 (“Critics of
judicial supremacy . . . are united in the view that nonjudicial actors should be active
constitutional interpreters whose interpretations are entitled to respect and deference
from the courts.”).
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ist approach that seeks common moral ground and narrow legal holdings, special solicitude for legislative achievements borne of mass popular
mobilization, or simply a less grandiose self-presentation.107 Each of
these techniques can serve to qualify judicial supremacy from within
Article III. Many popular constitutionalists identify themselves as political progressives. Yet in connecting the vision of a more vibrant constitutional democracy to prescriptions for a more limited judicial role, their
project resonates with themes that have in recent decades been seen as
conservative in American legal thought.
Will an elective system be more or less likely than alternative systems
to produce judges who are restrained in these ways? The answer is far
from clear. It depends upon, among other things, what the selecting and
reselecting authorities want and what the judges think those authorities
want. Although we can posit mechanisms through which elective systems
will conduce to greater restraint than life tenure or merit selection, a
system of gubernatorial or legislative reappointment may be superior to
all of these.108
First, restraint may be forced upon the judiciary at the voting booth,
through the types of jurisprudes favored by the electorate. If a stable
majority of voters in any given state desires judges who will practice
Thayerian minimalism and grant legislation the highest presumption of
constitutionality,109 the composition of that state’s judiciary will, assuming minimal voter competence, come over time to reflect this jurisprudential trait. In political cultures that brand less deferential judges “activists” or “legislators in robes,” judicial elections may likewise tend to
produce and reward candidates who already believe, in advance of being
selected, that courts should have a modest constitutional footprint. Still,
it may be unrealistic to think that the average electorate will value such
107. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719, 723–24 (2006) (summarizing
“concrete legal proposals” that popular constitutionalists have offered).
108. The limited empirical evidence we have on this question is somewhat mixed.
Focusing on abortion cases, Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall, and Laura Langer found that
judges subject to competitive reelections are less likely to overturn statutes than meritselected judges and judges with life tenure; that gubernatorial and legislative retention
procedures lead to the fewest invalidations; and that the latter result is driven by judges’
declining to hear challenges rather than rejecting them on the merits. Paul Brace,
Melinda Gann Hall & Laura Langer, Judicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion:
Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 1265, 1291–95 (1999).
More recently, Joanna Shepherd found “that no statistically significant difference exists
among retention methods in judges’ likelihood of overturning statutes,” but “that judges
facing gubernatorial reappointment become less likely to overturn statutes as retention
approaches.” Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 Duke L.J.
1589, 1616–23 (2009). Shepherd further found that state high court justices facing
gubernatorial or legislative reappointment are more likely to vote for litigants from the
other branches in civil cases, and that they do so with increasing frequency as their
reappointment date approaches. Id. at 1616–22.
109. See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
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restraint as much as the average legislature or executive, the bodies that
will most often be its direct beneficiaries.
Second, elected judges may be induced to practice restraint because
they anticipate this is what the voters and opinionmakers desire, and they
wish to preserve their jobs. The empirical literature has largely borne out
the rational choice assumption that a key strategic objective of elected
judges, like all other elected officials, is to get selected and reselected:
“Judges want to secure the job and keep it.”110 The literature has further
indicated that, “[w]hile voters in judicial elections generally are uninformed, . . . judges nonetheless perceive their positions to be at risk, and
therefore adjust their behavior when deciding controversial cases.”111
Members of the public do not actually need to say or do anything to curb
what election supporters see as “the blatant display of judicial preferences” permeating our courts.112 “There is ample empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrating that [elected judges], ‘regardless of how safe
their positions are[,] . . . often fear voters.’”113
Elected judges might reasonably assume, for example, that any statute passed by the legislature and signed by the governor is likely to command the support of voters, and that striking it down will incur a political
cost. They might therefore be loath to do so. Systems of legislative or
gubernatorial retention create even more obvious incentives to avoid statutory invalidations: The nineteenth-century movement away from these
systems was spurred in large part by a desire to make courts less beholden
to the political branches, and the first generation of elected courts struck
down more laws than their appointed predecessors.114 In the present
day, however, the relative force of these incentives has been dimmed by
the close connections that many elected judges have to political parties,
along with the long terms of office and strong norms of reappointment
110. Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach 9, 26 (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical literature).
111. Brace, Hall & Langer, supra note 108, at 1271 n.34.
112. Melinda Gann Hall, The Controversy over Electing Judges and Advocacy in
Political Science, 30 Just. Sys. J. 284, 286 (2009) [hereinafter Hall, Controversy over
Electing].
113. Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1664 (alterations in original)
(quoting Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in
the American States, 23 Am. Pol. Q. 485, 488 (1995)). The most familiar piece of
anecdotal evidence is former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus’s oft-repeated
remark that ignoring the potential political consequences of one’s decisions, as an elected
judge, is “‘like ignoring a crocodile in [one’s] bathtub.’” Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 733, 739 (1994).
114. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 207–19 (1993)
(discussing reformers’ motivations); Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 87, at
1066–68, 1097–105, 1143–44 (discussing reformers’ motivations and analyzing invalidation
rates).
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that prevail in the appointive jurisdictions.115 Judicial elections may have
originally been touted as a “weapon” for empowering courts to stand up
to the other branches, but in practice they have become a tool for
“weaken[ing] state courts” against politicians and voters alike.116
Elected judges might further assume that recognizing new constitutional rights that benefit a minority group, and deciding novel or nonessential legal questions more generally, risks generating popular backlash.
Consciously or subconsciously, they may therefore aim to steer clear of
such outcomes, even if they could be persuaded in the abstract that the
relevant constitutional text and case law are best read to support them.
Through ex post incentives as well as ex ante selection effects, self-interested motives as well as high-minded principles, it is plausible that judicial
elections will tend to foster judicial restraint.
2. Judicial Populism. — It is not obvious why popular constitutionalism should prize only restraint in jurisprudence, especially when the
judges are selected in the same basic manner as the officeholders to
whom they are meant to be deferring. A commitment to any such principle will resolve only a fraction of cases; the commitment itself may be an
artifact of the federal courts’ structural independence. Consider a widely
noted passage from the final paragraph of Larry Kramer’s The People
Themselves:
What presumably would change [after a transition to popular
constitutionalism] is the Justices’ attitudes and self-conception
as they went about their routine. In effect . . . Supreme Court
Justices would come to see themselves in relation to the public
somewhat as lower court judges now see themselves in relation
to the Court: responsible for interpreting the Constitution according to their best judgment, but with an awareness that there
is a higher authority out there with power to overturn their decisions—an actual authority, too, not some abstract “people” who
spoke once, two hundred years ago, and then disappeared.117
115. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 283–85 (contrasting term lengths
and reselection practices in elective versus appointive systems).
116. Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 87, at 1064, 1067; see also Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and
American Tort Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 1349, 1401 (2010) [hereinafter Shugerman, Twist of Long
Terms] (citing, as factors weakening elective judiciaries since nineteenth century, increase
in cost of campaigns and power of political parties and special interests, and decrease in
average term lengths).
117. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 253; see also id. (suggesting
that Court invites disaster when it “pa[ys] too little mind to the public’s view of things”);
Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America, at xiii (2006)
(contending that federal judges should aspire to “reflect the constitutional views of
national majorities” in their decisions); Preis, supra note 25, at 1726 (stating that popular
constitutionalism entails that judges “listen[ ] to the populace in setting constitutional
meaning”). Some have read Barry Friedman’s recent work to make a similar point. See,
e.g., Justin Driver, Why Law Should Lead, New Republic, Apr. 8, 2010, at 28, 29, 32 (book
review) (arguing that Friedman’s The Will of the People valorizes “view of the Supreme Court
. . . as an instrument for transforming popular sentiment into law,” and “seems to
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Consider, too, this sympathetic passage from Richard Posner’s latest book
on judging:
[A]s long as the populist element in adjudication does not swell
to the point where unpopular though innocent people are convicted of crimes, or other gross departures from legality occur,
conforming judicial policies to democratic preferences can be
regarded as a good thing in a society that prides itself on being
the world’s leading democracy.118
What, exactly, would it mean for a judge to adjust her attitude and selfconception in light of the people’s superior authority or to conform her
policies to democratic preferences? Kramer and Posner do not elaborate. One possibility is that the judge ought to practice the deference
techniques described above and cede as much ground as possible to the
coordinate branches. This is the standard prescription of popular constitutionalists. Lurking in their theory, however, is another possibility: that
the judge ought to incorporate into her decisionmaking calculus the beliefs of the citizenry, to the extent she can perceive them, irrespective of
what the legislature or executive has done. She ought to proactively see
to it that judicial doctrines “mirror popular views.”119 Just as the lower
court judge in Kramer’s analogy must ask herself how the Supreme Court
would resolve the case, the Supreme Court Justice must ask herself how
the people would want her to rule.
The leading academic defenders of judicial elections, political scientists Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, recently made the point
forthrightly: The democracy-respecting judge ought to “draw upon public perceptions and the prevailing state political climate when resolving
difficult disputes.”120 It is a great virtue of elected judges, for Bonneau
and Hall, that they have shown themselves more likely to do this. Let us
call this approach—the manipulation of interpretive outcomes to promote what the public appears to desire—majoritarian judicial review.121
admonish” Justices “to spend less time reading precedents and more time parsing polling
data”).
118. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 136–37 (2008) [hereinafter Posner, How
Judges Think].
119. Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 2598 (describing
popular constitutionalist agenda).
120. Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections 15
(2009); see also Hall, Controversy over Electing, supra note 112, at 286 (suggesting that
“judges should adjust their behavior to constituency preferences in matters where they
have discretion”). I devote greater attention to Bonneau and Hall’s book, and to Hall’s
normative turn more generally, in a companion piece to this Article. David E. Pozen, Are
Judicial Elections Democracy-Enhancing?, in What’s Law Got to Do with It? What Judges
Do and Why It Matters (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., forthcoming 2011).
121. This label is also crude. “The people,” of course, are not necessarily coextensive
with a majority of the people, nor do majorities always get their way. And as we will see,
numerous difficulties may confound any judicial effort to follow the “prevailing” view.
Bonneau & Hall, supra note 120, at 15. Notwithstanding its crudeness, I can think of no
better label. Like politics itself, majoritarian judicial review may not reflect a purely
numbers-driven calculus in practice. But in theory, at least, those who have urged judges
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Although explicit theorizing about “popular constitutionalism” is
fairly novel, this prescription is not. Jed Rubenfeld identifies Christopher
Tiedeman as the most influential postbellum exponent of the view that,
for democratic reasons, judicial interpretations of the Constitution ought
to track popular preferences.122 The judge “who would interpret the law
rightly,” Tiedeman wrote in 1890, “need not concern himself so much
with the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.”123 Rather, “as
soon as we recognize the present will of the people as the living source of
law, we are obliged, in construing the law, to follow, and give effect to, the
present intentions and meaning of the people.”124 If Tiedeman’s formulation now looks a little archaic in its intentionalism and its suggestion of
a collective will, Rubenfeld shows further, his basic idea lived on in the
work of the many late twentieth-century judges and scholars, from
William Brennan, to Terrence Sandalow, to Harry Wellington, who would
have courts look to contemporary attitudes and practices in interpreting
the Constitution.125 These are theorists who reasoned from “the implicit
premise . . . that constitutional law can achieve democratic legitimacy
only if interpreted responsively to popular will.”126 They laid the groundwork for the popular constitutionalism of today.
to draw upon public sentiment appear to agree that judges should attend primarily to the
most widely held sentiment; there is an irreducibly majoritarian basis to the literature’s
popular theories of judging. It is useful, furthermore, to draw the rhetorical contrast with
the so-called “countermajoritarian” theories of judicial review that predominate in
academic discussions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
122. Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government
57–58 (2001). Tiedeman is far from an isolated example in earlier American legal
thought. To take just one other, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, while serving as an elected
judge on the New York Court of Appeals, argued that when the legal answer is unclear, the
judge has “a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community” and may depart
only in rare circumstances. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 108
(1921); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of
Politics in Judging 125–27 (2010) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Beyond the Divide] (providing
additional explication of Cardozo’s views and noting widespread assent they received from
contemporaneous judges).
123. Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States 151
(1890).
124. Id. at 154.
125. Rubenfeld, supra note 122, at 58.
126. Id. As Rubenfeld sees clearly, nothing about these interpretive commitments
leads inherently to a “‘restrained’” judicial philosophy. Id. at 58–59. Majoritarian review
also shares affinities with “dynamic statutory interpretation,” the interpretive method
championed by William Eskridge whereby judges adapt the meaning of statutes in light of
changed circumstances and political preferences. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation (1994); cf. Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to
Interpret Unclear Legislation passim (2008) (arguing that courts should aim to maximize
satisfaction of “current enactable preferences” when statutory text is unclear). Yet,
whereas Eskridge’s dynamic interpreter uses her discretion primarily to pursue justice or
the common welfare—to pursue what she thinks would be good for the public—the
majoritarian jurist aspires, in the first instance, to do what the public appears to wish for
itself.
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Strange though it may sound to the modern ear, majoritarian review
can (at least in theory) promote popular sovereignty values without being
lawless, unprincipled, or perverse. First, it is important to bear in mind
that, at the state level, many judges already have extensive experience as
policymakers. The state judges considered here are common law generalists, and the constitutional structures in which they operate frequently
envision that they will issue advisory opinions, engage political questions,
perform administrative functions, and participate in decisions on budgetary matters and access to government services.127 In light of these background characteristics, the idea that a state judge would possess the competence and authority to advance popular preferences might sound less
far-fetched.
Second, judges who adopt this approach need not be mere conduits
for public opinion. As in many respectable theories of political representation, they could lead as well as follow—within limits—when they believe
their constituents lack relevant information or ought to take a different
tack.
Third, these judges need not run roughshod over the other
branches. If the legislature and executive have settled on a view, that will
usually serve as a pretty good proxy for what the people want. For the
majoritarian jurist, the fact that the other branches have taken a certain
position is, in itself, incidental; yet it may be highly relevant for the insight it provides into the content of public opinion.128
Fourth, and most important, these judges need not act wantonly or
extralegally. They can confine their populism to cases in which the legal
answer seems uncertain, while public sentiment seems clear, widespread,
and of constitutional dimension (however this is gauged). The people’s
views would remain irrelevant to the application of, say, a fixed numeric
rule, but they might be consulted in construing a vague standard such as
“equal protection” or “due process.” Public opinion could be used to
supplement or gloss the traditional interpretive aids; it could be reserved
for when the original meaning of a provision is obscure or when the orthodox legal materials are in equipoise; it could be given more or less
weight depending on context; and so forth. Just as there are many different types of judicial restraint, there are many different types of
majoritarian review, and I wish to be agnostic among them. As used here,
majoritarian review entails only that the judge assigns public opinion
some meaningful role in the decision calculus, either as an external
source of value, like justice or welfare, or as an independent source of
127. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1179–82 (1999) [hereinafter
Hershkoff, Positive Rights]; Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 69, at 1842–76.
128. In outcome terms, accordingly, the distinction between judicial restraint and
judicial populism may collapse in a substantial number of cases. Majoritarian jurists may
turn out to be modest jurists; elected judges may be deferential so as to be popular.
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legal meaning.129 At the least, the majoritarian jurist can aim to avoid the
least popular options within the range of plausible alternatives, within
what Judge Posner calls the “zone of reasonableness.”130
An analogy to Chevron 131 may help clarify this last point. At step one,
the judge described here, like all judges, asks whether the relevant legal
materials are unambiguous or decisively point in one direction. If the
answer is yes, her job is done; she must apply the law. If the answer is no,
however, she proceeds to step two—except as the voters’ agent, her
touchstone is not which interpretive option would best comport with
original public meaning, common law precepts, or any other retrospective standard, but rather which permissible interpretation would best
comport with the will of the current electorate. While the answers to
these questions will in many cases be the same, they can diverge when
relevant social norms or conditions have changed, or when the previous
lawmakers have done something unwise or unpopular as applied to the
instant case.
3. Role Fidelity. — Judicial elections have a special relationship to
majoritarian review, not only in their expected outputs but also in their
structural logic. To see this, we need to consider a more general, and
surprisingly undertheorized, normative question: Should the fact that a
judge is selected by any particular method have any bearing on how he or
she decides cases? The traditional view of lawyers has been an emphatic
no, for “[t]o expect judges to take account of political consequences . . .
is to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do.”132 Regardless of
how they came to hold office, judges should decide cases solely on the
basis of their own legal judgment; they must “resist public clamor and
criticism” and “make decisions impartially and independently of their
constituents.”133 This kind of interpretive independence, Kathleen
Sullivan observes, “ensures the rule of law by ensuring that courts decide
129. Judges might also look to public opinion not as a distinct end or source of
meaning, but rather as a guide to the “correct” interpretation of a constitutional provision,
with correctness determined by other criteria. See generally Sunstein, supra note 42, at
183–95, 206–12 (discussing and critiquing proposition that, in virtue of its numbers and
heterogeneity, populace is more likely than any given judge to be “right” about questions
of interpretation). This kind of epistemic weighting of public opinion, in the service of an
objectively best answer that does not itself depend on public opinion, is a separate
enterprise from majoritarian review. Similarly, it does not count as majoritarian review
when a judge uses public opinion to inform a pragmatic inquiry into the expected effects
of a ruling. This judge cares about the people’s views only instrumentally, as a variable in a
consequentialist equation, and not for their own sake.
130. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
Rev. 1049, 1053, 1065–66 (2006).
131. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
132. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (Scalia, J., denying motion
to recuse).
133. Symposium, The Debate over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial
Selection, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1347, 1357 (2008) (remarks of Professor Geyh)
(describing “traditional[ ]” model of judging).
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cases in accord with the law and facts, uninfluenced by judges’ political
affiliations . . . or other improper skewing factors.”134
There is, however, a plausible alternative to this traditional understanding, and it is one that complements the theory of majoritarian review. It is the idea that jurisprudential norms should change when the
selection and retention methods change, that there is no global ideal of
judicial craft that exists independent of judicial structure. Whereas appointive systems with life tenure reflect a societal aspiration for judges
who will follow the law and the law alone, elective systems might legitimize a different conception of the judicial role: They might “send a signal to judges that sensitivity to public opinion is part of the job description.”135 Drawing on Robert Cover’s analysis of antislavery judges in the
antebellum North,136 Jed Shugerman has recently described this idea
under the rubric of “role fidelity.”137 Many states adopted judicial elections in the nineteenth century in a concerted effort to strengthen
judges’ ties to the voting public.138 The advent of elections created a new
personal narrative for those who attained the bench, Shugerman hypothesizes, in which the judge came to see it as her duty to incorporate considerations of “constituency and conscience” into the panoply of legal materials used to decide cases.139 She came to see herself, that is, more like a
legislator.
On this view, even if an elected judge is about to retire and will never
face another vote, role fidelity demands that she nevertheless attend to
constituent preferences in each and every case of public concern. When
critics such as Kathleen Sullivan decry the “improper skewing factors”
that prey upon elected judges,140 they are impliedly equating these
judges with federal judges. They are overlooking the possibility that what
would be an improper skewing factor in the federal context, might be an
appropriate factor in a state context. We have seen, however, why it is not
self-evident that elected judges ought to approach cases in the same manner as appointed judges, in that public opinion may (the theory goes)
legitimately exert a larger influence on the decisional process of the former. If the very notion that a judge should attend to public opinion
134. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What Are the
Alternatives?, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1327, 1334 (2008); see also Note, The Rule of Law in
the Marketplace of Ideas: Pledges or Promises by Candidates for Judicial Election, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1525–26 (2009) (tracing intellectual lineage of view that judges should
“stand outside public opinion”).
135. Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 277.
136. Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (1975).
137. Shugerman, Twist of Long Terms, supra note 116, at 1396–401.
138. Id. at 1379–85, 1396–97. Elections, the theory went, could reduce the
corrupting influence of party machines and special interests at the same time that they
realigned judicial incentives with popular preferences. Id.
139. Id. at 1399. In conceptualizing the elected judge’s role fidelity (or role morality)
in these terms, Shugerman is thus inverting the standard conception of judicial role fidelity
as precluding considerations of public opinion.
140. Sullivan, supra note 134, at 1334.
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sounds heretical, recall that this notion has been with us for a long
time,141 and that many state courts already “play an active policymaking
role in ways that would be unimaginable for federal courts.”142
It seems safe to assume that majoritarian review is already pervasive
(though perhaps often subconscious) among our elected state judges. In
addition to the evidence that these judges tend to decide cases in more
voter-friendly ways,143 we already know, for example, that they become
significantly more punitive in criminal sentencing as their reelection date
approaches.144 This research is particularly notable because it deals with
what Brian Tamanaha has dubbed the “rule of law baseline” problem:
the problem, which cripples empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial decisionmaking, that it can be virtually impossible to confirm the
“correct” legal answer in any given case, and consequently to measure
deviations therefrom.145 The sentencing evidence is so powerful because
it suggests that elected judges systematically deviate from their own views
of what the correct legal answer is.
They do this, one assumes, because they understand that voters tend
to favor harsh criminal sentences and that the availability heuristic renders recent decisions more salient than older ones. They are afraid their
next opponent will accuse them of being soft on crime. In the vernacular
of political scientists, judges who are facing reelection make sentencing
decisions “strategically” rather than “sincerely.”146 It does not follow that
elected judges are more likely than other types of judges to deviate from
the guidelines or to make objective errors in sentencing determinations.
Sentencing is an area in which legislatures have given courts discretion to
choose among a range of outcomes. Elected judges appear to be guided
141. See supra notes 121–126 and accompanying text (discussing pedigree of theory
of majoritarian review).
142. Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1651; see supra note 127 and
accompanying text (discussing policymaking and administrative functions of state judges).
143. See sources cited supra note 87.
144. See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion:
Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247, 253–62 (2004) (finding
Pennsylvania trial court judges give significantly longer sentences for aggravated assault,
rape, and robbery convictions as retention-election date draws nearer); Carlos Berdejó &
Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in
Criminal Sentencing 15 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic613697.files/Thursday_01_Paper_01_Berdejo_
10-01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding in Washington Superior Court
“essentially the same defendant . . . having committed the same crime, facing the same
judge, receives 10 percent more time in prison if he is sentenced at the end of the judge’s
political cycle rather than the beginning”); see also Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics
and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. Pol. 427, 438–43 (1992) (finding state
supreme court justices become significantly more likely to uphold death sentences in years
immediately preceding reelection).
145. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50
B.C. L. Rev. 685, 751–53, 757 (2009).
146. See, e.g., Brace, Hall & Langer, supra note 108, passim.
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in those choices by popular preferences, at least in the years preceding
reelection.
There are plenty of reasons why one might denounce this kind of
cyclical behavior in the administration of justice. Proponents of judicial
elections must find a way to justify these findings, however, and it is not
available to them to pretend that majoritarian review is not occurring or
that it is equally likely to occur in appointive and merit selection jurisdictions. Elective systems create demonstrably superior incentives to reach
popular outcomes. The proponents’ strongest move, I submit, is to accept this charge and then seek to flip it—to draw on the theory of popular constitutionalism and the concept of role fidelity and to praise, rather
than discount, the possibility of judges who will not resist public clamor
and criticism.
The vast majority of judicial election supporters have done no such
thing. They have accepted the traditional view that judges should ignore
constituent preferences in reaching decisions, and then tried to show that
elections do not pose a special threat to this ideal.147 They have accepted
that judges should always act as if they have life tenure, even when they
have nothing of the sort. If this was ever a plausible line of argument, it
will become increasingly untenable as the new model of judicial elections
comes to supplant the old, and campaigns for the bench become more
salient and competitive. The notion of majoritarian review, by contrast,
holds out the possibility that courts should flexibly interpret the law to
reflect the contemporaneous beliefs of the people. The notion of role
fidelity, furthermore, holds out the possibility that elected courts have
special license to do this. Taken together, they can collapse much of the
distinction between deciding cases strategically and deciding them sincerely, as the vindication of public opinion becomes part of the elected
judge’s professional duty.
Popular constitutionalism thus helps provide a vocabulary and an analytic framework with which to celebrate, rather than downplay, the inevitable ways in which elected judges will deviate from the traditional ideal.
Elected judges, their supporters should exclaim, are giving the people
what is rightfully theirs!
III. DEFECTIVE VEHICLES?
Popular constitutionalism might be critiqued from many angles.
The most obvious antagonists are those who see judges as uniquely privileged actors in our constitutional order, those who esteem courts as “forums of principle” and celebrate their ability to check majoritarian abuses
147. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All
the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 267, 271 (2005) (“It would appear
indisputable, though distasteful to many observers, that elected judges do take public
opinion into account. Nevertheless, there is no reason to criticize judicial elections for
that fact while ignoring the effect of public opinion on appointed judges.”).
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precisely because of their comparative insularity from the rough-andtumble of ordinary politics.148 These theorists may believe that the (appointed) judiciary is more likely than the mobilized masses and the political branches to reach correct legal answers, to generate desirable consequences, to vindicate civil liberties, or to hold Americans to commitments
made in periods of higher lawmaking. Less pointed antagonists are those
who do not make particularly strong claims about the virtues of courts,
but nevertheless assign greater normative weight to the settlement function that judicial finality provides, as compared to the democratic goods
that popular constitutionalism promises.149 Subtler antagonists still
might be those theorists who, like popular constitutionalists, fret about
the countermajoritarian difficulty and the quality of current democratic
processes, yet who look to the courts to perfect those processes against
entrenchment, prejudice, and other such debilitating forces150 or to provide an additional screen against government infringement of fundamental rights.151 All of these scholars may have good reason to fear any political program that would undermine the interpretive authority of judges or
the stability of judicially enforced constitutional principles.
These objections to popular constitutionalism echo some of the standard objections to elective judiciaries, which should not be surprising
now that we have uncovered the many connections between the two.
Choosing judges through elections, it is often said, poses serious threats
to individual and minority rights, to the quality and impartiality of judges,
and to the norms of professional legal reason more generally. It elevates
personality over competence, passion over justice, politics over law.
Rather than rehash old debates, this Part will put aside many of these
critiques and approach the rest from a new angle. Now that we have seen
how elective systems might conceivably advance certain popular constitutionalist goals, this Part will ask whether those insights add up to an appealing argument to someone who subscribes to such goals. Because
popular constitutionalism and the democratic ideals that underlie it offer
one of the strongest grounds on which to defend elections, a contrary
answer may go a long way toward eroding their appeal—and thereby toward advancing the “endless” debate over judicial selection.152
The exercise can also shed new light on popular constitutionalism.
Scrutinizing elective judiciaries from within the popular constitutionalism
framework, we will see, can help to clarify some important questions not
148. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981).
149. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).
150. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980).
151. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008).
152. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It
Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1259 (2008).
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yet addressed by its advocates and to suggest some ways in which its logic
may prove self-undermining.
A. Formal Constitutional Change in the States
Before we consider what a popular constitutionalist ought to seek in
a judicial selection system, however, we need to take a step back. We
need to consider the broader context in which the state courts operate.
When we do this, we find constitutional orders that are dramatically different from the federal order in which they are nested, on at least three
dimensions.
First, state constitutions are much more easily and frequently
amended. At the federal level, the enumerated procedures to revise the
Constitution are among the most onerous of any democratic country,153
rendering the document “practically unamendable.”154 At the state level,
by contrast, constitutional amendments “are relatively ordinary events
in . . . political life.”155 The reasons for this are both structural and cultural. Structurally, many states employ mechanisms such as initiatives,
referenda, and simple majority voting through which the legislature and
the electorate can change the text of the constitution without having to
overcome the multistage, supermajority burdens imposed by Article V.156
Culturally, many states never developed a sharp distinction between
“higher,” constitutional lawmaking and “ordinary,” statutory lawmaking.
State constitutions never attained any mythic status; they tend to be regarded not as “a framework of permanent principles” but instead as a
“kind of superstatute” that can and should be adapted to changing values
and circumstances.157 The result is a quantitatively as well as qualitatively
153. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 355, 362–64 (1994).
154. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 32, 35 (2004).
155. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 127, at 1163; see also id. (describing state
constitutions as “more plastic and porous”); Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 69, at
1902 (discussing “conditional nature of state constitutional decisionmaking”).
156. See Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1641–43 (summarizing
variation in constitutional amendment procedures across states); William B. Fisch,
Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 485,
493–94, 498–99 (2006) (indicating that more than one-third of states use simple majority
thresholds for legislative votes on constitutional amendments, as do most states that allow
popular constitutional initiatives); Robert F. Williams, Rights, in 3 State Constitutions for
the Twenty-First Century: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform 7, 11 (G. Alan Tarr
& Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (“It might initially seem odd that by a mere majority vote
of the electorate, a constitutional amendment can be ratified or a new constitution
adopted that can change state constitutional rights guarantees. . . . Yet this is a
fundamental feature of state constitution making.”); infra notes 160–164 and
accompanying text (explaining initiatives and referenda).
157. Griffin, supra note 40, at 34; see also Gardner, supra note 67, at 818–20 (noting
that average state constitution is nearly four times as long as federal Constitution and deals
with fairly pedestrian policy details); G. Alan Tarr, Introduction, in Constitutional Politics
in the States, at xiii, xv (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) (“Far from viewing their constitutions as
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disparate model of constitutional reform: Whereas the U.S. Constitution
has been amended roughly two dozen times in more than two centuries,
by 1995 state constitutions had been amended some 6,000 times and replaced altogether some 100 times.158 If sclerosis has characterized the
American experience of formal constitutional change, “amendmentitis”
may be the more plausible diagnosis for the states.159
Second, “direct democracy” plays a significant role in state and local
lawmaking. Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and roughly
half of the nation’s cities allow citizens to vote on policy issues through
initiatives, referenda, or both.160 Eighteen of these states allow citizens to
propose and enact constitutional amendments through initiatives,161 and
sixteen allow them to amend the constitution without any legislative or
executive review.162 Constitutional initiative laws vary significantly in
their procedural requirements and utilization rates across jurisdictions.163 Everywhere they exist, though, they provide a streamlined
means for a submajority of the population to force a vote on amending
the constitution, and in many cases for a one-time simple majority to approve it. Initiative and referendum laws exert a major influence on the
legal development and political economy of the states that have them.
sacrosanct and above politics, the states have treated them as political documents to be
changed in accordance with the shifting needs and opinions of their citizens.”).
158. Robert L. Maddex, State Constitutions of the United States, at vii (1998); see also
Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33
Rutgers L.J. 799, 803–05 (2002) (contrasting state and federal patterns of constitutional
change). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, “the average state amended its constitution 2.0
times per year.” Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications
for State Constitutions, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 62, 63 (2005).
159. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, Am. Prospect, Sept. 21,
1995, at 20; cf. John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State
Constitutional Tradition, 38 Rutgers L.J. 983, 1019–38 (2007) (reviewing post-1960s
criticism of rate of constitutional amendment in states).
160. Initiative & Referendum Inst., State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum
Provisions, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). Initiatives permit a specified number of citizens
to petition to place a legislative proposal or constitutional amendment on the ballot.
Referenda permit citizens to approve or disapprove a measure the legislature has already
passed. Twenty-one states use both initiatives and referenda. Id.
161. Id. Every state except for Delaware requires a popular vote to approve
constitutional amendments. Id.
162. Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 302–04 & fig.1.1 (2008). A different set of eighteen states allow
public officials to be “recalled,” following a successful petition drive and vote, before the
next regular election. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Recall of State Officials
(Sept. 23, 2010), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/recallprovision.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). At least twenty-nine states allow recall of officials at
the local level. Id.
163. See Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy
on State Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal, 4 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 345, 348–51
(2004) (comparing and contrasting states’ constitutional initiative processes); Krislov &
Katz, supra note 162, at 310–20 (same).
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Notwithstanding the legions of critics who fault direct democracy for its
informational and deliberative deficits, its susceptibility to manipulation
by special interests and wealthy donors, and its insensitivity to minorities,
use of these mechanisms now stands at the highest level in over a
century.164
Third, judicial rulings are more easily and frequently overridden at
the state level. As many commentators have noted, state courts and legislatures engage in “dialogue” with one another in a richer fashion than
their federal counterparts.165 Numerous state constitutions expressly
provide for judicial review of legislative and executive action,166 and state
legislatures tend to be attuned to the work of their appellate judges, all of
whom exercise substantial common law lawmaking powers and many of
whom perform explicit policymaking and administrative functions. In
practice, it appears that state legislatures have been significantly more
active than the federal Congress in reversing disfavored rulings.167
Where initiatives are allowed, private citizens can take matters into their
own hands. These reversals are not limited to statutory interpretation.
Court-overturning constitutional amendments, John Dinan has shown,
“have been an enduring feature of the state constitutional tradition and
have been particularly prominent in the . . . post-1970 era.”168 In this
tradition, the exercise of judicial review is not nearly so fraught psychologically, structurally, or consequentially;169 relative to the national culture of judicial supremacy, modest departmentalism and popular constitutionalism both thrive.
Taken together, these three features of state practice—the mutability
of constitutional text, the prevalence of direct democracy, and the frequency of legislative and popular reversal of judicial interpretations—
164. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an
Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 396 (2003); see also id. at
401–12 (summarizing standard critiques of direct democracy).
165. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 127, at 1163 & n.183 (invoking
dialogue metaphor and providing citations to commentators doing same).
166. Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of
Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1601, 1605 (2001); Williams, Juristocracy, supra
note 70, at 80–81.
167. See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga. L. Rev.
469, 500–02 (2006) (observing that state legislatures are more likely to “be aware of and
able to respond to the decisions of [their] courts,” and that “state judges may approach
statutory interpretation with a higher expectation that the legislature will step in and
‘correct’” their work). Curiously, I have not seen any systematic empirical study of this
question, just impressionistic comparisons.
168. Dinan, supra note 159, at 1038; accord Reed, supra note 70, at 889 (“[P]opular
reversals of judicial interpretations of state constitutional provisions have become
increasingly common . . . .”).
169. According to one state supreme court justice, “[i]n the more than two hundred
years since judicial review was first introduced, there has been very little controversy or
debate about the legitimacy of the practice of judicial review in the state context.”
Durham, supra note 166, at 1605.
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yield a fundamentally different model of constitutionalism. State constitutionalism tends to be more polycentric than juricentric, more
politicized than professionalized. It may be the case that, “in the minds
of many, state courts are the authoritative interpreters of state constitutions exactly as the federal courts [are for] the national Constitution.”170
Yet any such sentiment has not bred a comparable extrajudicial quiescence. The fluidity, tempo, and broadly participatory nature of state constitutional lawmaking substantially “reduce[ ] the risk of . . . politically
unacceptable constitutional interpretation by state judges.”171 It is debatable whether the United States suffers at the national level from an excess
of judicial supremacy, dead hand rule, or constitutional elitism, notwithstanding the many informal pathways of constitutional change that have
emerged and the strong tendency of federal judicial decisions to stay
“within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people.”172 It begins
to strain credulity to think we suffer from such afflictions at the subnational level. There, on a routine basis, the people rule.173
In light of these differentials, it becomes harder to see why elective
judiciaries would also be needed to ensure adequate realization of popular constitutionalism. Perhaps one might fear that nonelective judiciaries
will be more likely to thwart direct democracy, as through overly stringent
applications of the single subject rule.174 Yet so long as the constitution
at issue can realistically be, and often is, amended by a motivated citizenry, the fundamental precondition of popular constitutionalism would
appear to be satisfied: The people are exercising continuous control over
the elaboration of fundamental law. It becomes harder to see why judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation would be so worrisome,175 or how it even exists in any meaningful sense.
170. Aaron Jay Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the States, 73 Fordham L. Rev.
1439, 1457 (2005). Saiger goes on to undercut this claim by recounting notable examples
of popular and governmental resistance to judicial constructions of state constitutions, in
particular a Vermont Supreme Court school finance equalization decision. Id. at 1459–62.
171. Shepard, supra note 70, at 442.
172. Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 2606.
173. The allusion is to Richard Parker’s influential manifesto, “Here, the People Rule,”
the title of which he attributes to President Gerald Ford. Parker, supra note 46, at iii.
174. Common to many state constitutions, this rule limits ballot propositions to one
“subject.” The rule is notoriously “difficult to apply,” and has been used by state courts to
invalidate a wide range of direct democracy measures in recent years. Michael D. Gilbert,
How Much Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single Subject Adjudication 2,
9–10 (July 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1433796 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Two noted scholars recently
found that judges’ partisan affiliation is highly correlated with enforcement rates of the
single subject rule. John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the
Single Subject Rule, 9 Election L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 28–29) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
175. Cf. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 251 (suggesting without
explication that “a strong case can be made for easing the difficulty of [formal
constitutional] amendment” as remedy for judicial supremacy).
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Consider California. In May 2008, the California Supreme Court,
whose members are appointed by the governor for twelve-year terms and
then put to retention elections, ruled by a 4-3 margin that same-sex
couples must be allowed to marry.176 In November 2008, less than six
months later, voters in California passed Proposition 8, amending the
state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages.177 Wholly independent
of the state’s judicial selection system, which lies toward the Article III
side of the spectrum in the amount of job protection it gives to the justices, these voters effected a dramatic victory for popular constitutional
decisionmaking. Not only did they rise up to repudiate a novel constitutional interpretation rendered by their high court, but the antiProposition 8 campaign also declined to spend any significant amount of
time or money arguing that the court’s judgment was entitled to respect
in virtue of its pedigree.178 The notion that ordinary folks ought to defer
to the considered view of their supreme court justices—that the justices
might have any special competence or authority to determine the meaning of equal protection—played no discernable role in a campaign to
affirm what those justices had held. To the contrary, the organized opposition to Proposition 8 ran as far as it could from the taint of constitutional elitism.
I doubt that many popular constitutionalists in the academy would
celebrate Proposition 8 on the merits. As a matter of process, however, it
is hard to see why its passage would not be cause for celebration; it is hard
to imagine a more direct repudiation of judicial constitutional lawmaking. The experience of Proposition 8 brings into focus not only the standard questions about whether direct democracy unduly threatens minority rights and substantive principles of justice, but also a more discrete
question about the normative relationship between a judicial selection
method and the broader constitutional context. Many states already have
a relatively vigorous tradition of popular constitutionalism outside of
their judicial selection regime.179 Where these background conditions
176. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
177. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (codifying Proposition 8, passed Nov. 4, 2008). The
California Supreme Court subsequently sustained Proposition 8 against a variety of legal
challenges. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
178. This argument appeared nowhere, for example, on the websites of leading
advocacy groups such as Equality for All, at http://www.noonprop8.com (last visited Sept.
17, 2010), and Equality California, at http://www.eqca.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2010), or
in most newspaper editorials urging rejection of the ballot proposition, see, e.g., Editorial,
The Myths of Prop. 8, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 2008, at A31; Editorial, Preserve Marriage Rights,
S.F. Chron., Oct. 1, 2008, at B8. But see Editorial, Preserving California’s Constitution,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2008, at A20 (“[T]he majority in the 4-to-3 ruling was acting to
protect a vulnerable group from unfair treatment. Enforcing the state’s guarantee of
equal protection is a job assigned to judges.”).
179. Some who equate popular constitutionalism with popular outcomes have
suggested that the former is alive and well at the national level, too, notwithstanding the
glacial rate of constitutional amendment and the rise of judicial supremacy. See, e.g.,
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 322 (2005) (“For

\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL802.txt

unknown

Seq: 47

9-NOV-10

16:19

2010] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 2093
obtain, the argument for tightening the link between judges and voters
may begin to look less urgent, and more perverse. Whether or not judicial elections are in themselves good vehicles for popular constitutionalism—the question to which we will now turn—even the committed popular constitutionalist has to consider whether there can be too much of a
good thing.
B. Efficacy, Voter Capacity, and Soundbite Democracy
Part II painted a fairly rosy picture of judicial elections outside the
courthouse, more in the spirit of charitable reconstruction than of dispassionate observation. The immediate concern that will arise for some
readers is whether “the people” are up to the task—whether we can trust
voters to exercise their power over judicial selection, and transitively over
the development of constitutional law, in reasoned and responsible ways.
Skeptical commentators have questioned the capacity of lay persons to
fulfill the popular constitutionalist enterprise.180 Americans today, they
argue, are too clueless, too apathetic, and too easily manipulated when it
comes to legal matters. Voter ignorance has reached scandalous levels.
Decades of survey research establishes that the majority of Americans lack
“even basic” political comprehension; nearly one-third are “political
‘know nothings’ who possess little or no useful knowledge of politics.”181
Judicial elections, it might be feared, will only exacerbate these concerns.
They force citizens to engage yet another domain of governance, involving judges and jurisprudence, about which they know even less.182 And
positive scholars, the whole debate [over popular constitutionalism] is overplayed; they
believe that constitutional law typically reflects popular values, albeit at some ill-understood
remove.”). As Part I explained, however, many popular constitutionalists deny this
equivalence; if anything, the literature has been more concerned with the manner in
which constitutional law gets made than with its content.
180. The most developed argument to this effect belongs to Doni Gewirtzman.
Gewirtzman, supra note 23, at 911–37; see also Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make
the Constitution More Democratic?, 55 Drake L. Rev. 971, 993 (2007) (arguing that
“[p]olitical ignorance and irrationality could easily reduce the quality of constitutional
change” that bypasses supermajority mechanisms of Article V); Neal Devins, The D’oh! of
Popular Constitutionalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1333, 1335 (2007) (book review) [hereinafter
Devins, Popular Constitutionalism] (arguing that “the people are uninterested in the
Constitution and the Supreme Court” and that consequently “it makes no sense for the
Court to sort out the Constitution’s meaning by looking to the American people”).
181. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287,
1304–05 (2004); see also id. at 1304–14 (summarizing recent research).
182. Cf. id. at 1308 (reporting finding from 2000 that only eleven percent of
Americans could identify post held by Chief Justice William Rehnquist); Michael C. Dorf,
Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? What Americans Don’t Know About Our Constitution—
and Why It Matters, FindLaw (May 29, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20020529.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting finding from 2002 that
“sixty-nine percent of respondents either thought that the United States Constitution
contained Marx’s maxim, [‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs,’] or did not know whether or not it did”).
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particularly as they become “nastier, noisier, and costlier,”183 judicial
races may tend to reduce complex issues to soundbites and caricatures, to
magnify the influence of wealthy and well-organized interests, and generally to degrade rather than elevate a constitutional culture.
These criticisms pose a serious but ultimately inconclusive challenge
to the popular constitutionalist case for electing judges. A first line of
rebuttal is empirical. Recently, a small band of political scientists has begun to push back on the notions that the American public is clueless
about the work of the Supreme Court,184 indifferent to judicial races,185
and incapable of evaluating judicial candidates.186 Thus far, this research
has shown only that judicial elections can meet minimal criteria of efficacy, that they are not destined to be arbitrary or trivial affairs. It has not
shown that these elections actually generate any of the evaluative, deliberative, or educational benefits described in Part II: Conspicuously absent
from the positive literature is any account of a judicial race that came
remotely close to facilitating reasoned public dialogue on issues of judicial duty or constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, campaign
rhetoric has frequently devolved into low content attack ads187 and outright efforts at misdirection.188 Nevertheless, this literature provides a
partial corrective to the “profoundly anti-democratic attitudes”189—the
professional self-regard and the reflexive mistrust of the masses—that undoubtedly animate some of the legal establishment’s antipathy toward
both elective judiciaries and popular constitutionalism.
These criticisms, moreover, may prove too much. If the people really cannot be bothered to learn or “care about constitutional principles”190 and “simply want nothing to do with constitutional culture,”191
then we have a much larger problem on our hands. The Constitution
lays out the basic institutional and normative framework within which
183. Schotland, Comment, supra note 97, at 150.
184. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations ch. 2 (2009) (using survey data to argue that public knows significantly
more about Supreme Court than is commonly assumed).
185. See, e.g., supra note 13 (noting Melinda Gann Hall’s research showing partisan
state supreme court elections are now significantly more competitive than elections for
U.S. House of Representatives in terms of challenger and retention rates).
186. See, e.g., Bonneau & Hall, supra note 120, at 96–103 (finding that voters are
more likely to select candidates who have previous judicial experience as against
candidates who lack it and asserting that, in light of these findings, “[j]udicial reform
advocates need to rethink traditional notions that the electorate is incapable of responding
to candidate stimuli”).
187. See Sample, Jones & Weiss, supra note 12, at 8–11 (providing noteworthy
examples).
188. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009)
(describing coal company executive’s funneling of judicial campaign contributions
through shell organization named “And For The Sake Of The Kids”).
189. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 2, at 242.
190. Devins, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 180, at 1335.
191. Gewirtzman, supra note 23, at 934.
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government officials exercise power. Not just popular constitutionalism
but virtually all theories of constitutional democracy take its legitimacy to
depend, at least in part, upon its societal acceptance as well as its capacity
to be collectively revisited and refined over time. Why select any set of
officials by popular election, indeed why have democracy at all, if the
people are utterly ignorant and impassive about the terms of their own
self-rule? Furthermore, in assessing the merits of judicial campaigns, it is
useful to keep in view the legislative and executive baseline against which
they might be compared. Legislative and executive races in America today are hardly paragons of reflective discourse and republican virtue, yet
most of us accept without reservation that these officials ought to be selected at the ballot box.
Finally, these criticisms raise a circularity problem. If the people
have sometimes shown themselves to be “irresponsible” in engaging the
Constitution, Akhil Amar observes, this may be because “they have not
been given responsibility, and trained themselves in its exercise,” leaving
their “constitutional muscles to atrophy through disuse.”192 Judicial
supremacy, on this account, is not an exogenous response to the people’s
interpretive limitations so much as their causal agent. Likewise, if the
people have sometimes failed to pay attention to judicial elections or to
make reasoned choices, as in the infamous race in which voters flocked to
the candidate with the same name as a movie star,193 this may be because
the campaigns have not given them the necessary means. In the traditional model of judicial elections, recall, candidates hardly ever discussed
their views on disputed legal and political questions; in numerous jurisdictions, they were prohibited from doing so.194
Hence, it cannot be a dispositive critique of judicial elections, or of
popular constitutionalism more generally, to demonstrate the ways in
which they have heretofore fallen short. None of this is to say that levels
of public knowledge, deliberation, or participation would be unimportant to the popular constitutionalist, just that a finding of even very low
current levels could not in itself defeat the case for elective judiciaries—
not without some account of why the selection of judges, in contrast to
constitutional interpretation, is inherently beyond the capacity of ordinary citizens.
The most developed statement of such an account appears in a new
article by political theorist Mariah Zeisberg.195 Zeisberg argues that be192. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1101 (1988).
193. “A man named Gene Kelly once won a Texas primary against a far more
experienced and widely endorsed candidate, without campaigning. His opponent in the
general election was able to eke out a victory only after spending nearly all of his funds on
advertisements saying, ‘He’s Not That Gene Kelly.’” Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note
8, at 267.
194. Id. at 266–67, 297–300, 311.
195. Zeisberg, supra note 61.
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cause of the special nature of the judicial role, political parties and campaigns cannot supply the galvanizing messages, structured cleavages, and
information shortcuts needed to enable voters to register discernable policy choice. The reason for this, Zeisberg asserts, is that the work of judges
is too complex factually and methodologically to be reduced to digestible
chunks; partisan cues, biographical information, and campaign slogans
will tend to “mask[ ] instead of illuminate[ ]” the central dynamics of judicial decisionmaking.196 “What does it mean to belong to the Federalist
Society?” Zeisberg asks rhetorically.197 “When the Supreme Court allows
for restrictions on protests outside abortion clinics . . . has the Court rendered a decision that is ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’?”198 The only way in
which judicial elections could achieve “the imperative of communicative
transparency,” Zeisberg concludes, is if judges were to be wholly resultsoriented in their approach to deciding cases, with results evaluated according to the political commitments of the parties structuring the elections.199 Yet this approach would violate basic principles of legality that
lead us to use judges in the first place.
Zeisberg raises challenging questions, but a popular constitutionalist
has the resources to mount a colorable rebuttal. To begin with, it might
be argued, political parties and interest groups can supply relevant deliberative and motivational goods in judicial elections. They can do this because it is possible to distinguish among judicial candidates on the basis
of their substantive and methodological views, and because the
Democratic and Republican parties do represent distinctive visions of constitutional interpretation and the judicial function.200 Avowing an
“originalist” jurisprudence, running on the Republican ticket, belonging
to the Federalist Society, securing endorsements from various advocacy
organizations or prominent individuals—each of these may provide a valuable heuristic for the otherwise clueless voter. Research showing that
judicial candidates have been more successful when identified on the ballot as having prior judicial experience, suggests that voters will respond to
heuristics when made aware of them.201 So long as there really is such a
thing as a Democratic or Republican style of judging, partisan affiliation
196. Id. at 787.
197. Id. at 792.
198. Id. at 793.
199. Id. at 794.
200. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 568–69 (2006) (describing rise of
originalism as conservative political practice, in contrast with “the idea of living
constitutionalism that has been at the core of progressive constitutional thought since the
1970s”); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 855, 884–86 (2005) (book review) (arguing that Larry Kramer overlooks
extent to which “the party system of the past several decades has found its own method of
embracing its adherents’ views of the Constitution,” via appointment of Supreme Court
Justices). Zeisberg acknowledges that her argument would not hold if “major party
divisions [were to] occur along jurisprudential lines.” Zeisberg, supra note 61, at 794.
201. See supra note 186.
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holds especial promise for increasing the coherence of voter decisionmaking, given the familiarity of the party label and the parties’ ability to
exert discipline over wayward officials.202
Zeisberg overlooks the extent to which the work of legislatures and
executives is similarly opaque to the average citizen. As compared to, say,
the legislative appropriations process, there is nothing so complex about
the adjudicative process as to disable meaningful public comprehension.
There is no need for judges to be even partially results-oriented to reach
systematically different interpretive conclusions in certain types of cases
and thereby to attract or repel systematically different types of voters.
Zeisberg also overlooks the extent to which a few high-salience issues—issues of constitutional dimension such as abortion or same-sex
marriage—can determine a judicial race. Judges usually agree. When
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia were colleagues on the
D.C. Circuit, they voted with each other ninety-five percent of the time
they sat on a panel together during the 1983 Term.203 Yet everyone knew
that Ginsburg was the “liberal” and Scalia the “conservative” jurist; it
would have been unthinkable, in the modern era of ideologically inflected nominations, for President Reagan to have chosen Ginsburg for
the Supreme Court or for President Clinton to have chosen Scalia. All of
the action is in the remaining five percent. Voters, pundits, and other
groups might reasonably focus on this domain of disagreement in comparing the two as candidates for the bench.204 Moreover, this domain is
liable to be larger in state supreme courts as compared to the lower federal courts, because the former have substantial control over their dock-

202. Cf. David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & Pol. 419, 426–27, 465–67 (2007)
(discussing potential for partisan heuristic, coupled with reforms designed to increase
competition and elicit information, to improve quality of decisionmaking in local
elections). If the partisan heuristic is seen as irredeemably arbitrary or otherwise
undesirable in the judicial election context, more radical reforms might be contemplated
to deal with the problem of low information voters: for instance, assigning some role in
the selection process to citizen assemblies. See generally Heather K. Gerken & Douglas B.
Rand, Creating Better Heuristics for the Presidential Primary: The Citizen Assembly, 125
Pol. Sci. Q. 233 (2010) (advocating use of citizen assemblies to deal with this problem in
situation where partisan heuristic is unavailable).
203. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 645 tbl.IV (1985).
204. Cf. 151 Cong. Rec. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama
on nomination of John Roberts to Supreme Court) (“[W]hile adherence to legal
precedent and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of
the cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the
same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the cases—what matters on the
Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence
to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation will only get you through the
25th mile of the marathon.”).
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ets and so can decline to hear cases that present only clear-cut legal
issues.205
Finally, Zeisberg’s argument is, as she acknowledges, contingent on
there being low levels of information in the judicial election environment, which leads to “the overwhelming significance of accurate cues for
structuring voter choice.”206 If campaigns for the bench could be engineered to generate robust information about the candidates and their
views, it would become increasingly untenable to insist that voters nonetheless lack the ability to make rational decisions.
The contingency of Zeisberg’s argument brings us back to the circularity problem and to the question that motivated this Article, the question of how to realize popular constitutionalism in practice. The basic
insight this section has developed is that, from the popular constitutionalist perspective, many of the concerns about voter competence, deliberation, and participation in the judicial election context might be recast as
issues of institutional design. The traditional allegations of public ignorance and apathy could be seen to reflect bugs in the traditional model of
judicial elections, rather than inescapable features of an elective system.
If, as Doni Gewirtzman suggests, “popular constitutionalism
need[s] . . . a certain level of political participation in order to legitimize
interpretive preferences,”207 states might pursue reforms aimed at increasing voter interest: for instance, permitting judicial candidates to affiliate with political parties and liberalizing codes of conduct so they can
issue pledges on how they will approach certain types of cases. Few states
have yet to take either step.208 If, to borrow from Thomas Jefferson, the
people are “not enlightened enough” to choose judges wisely, states
might seek “to inform their discretion by education.”209 States could augment the foregoing reforms by disseminating voter information guides,
linking judicial campaigns to broader educational outreach programs, or,
more ambitiously, holding public events or assemblies. No state, as far as
I can tell, sponsors public debates among its candidates for high court
judgeships, presumably out of a fear that such events will lead to inappropriate comments on pending cases or otherwise degrade the image of the
judiciary. Yet, by orienting debates toward the big constitutional ques205. See Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1649 (explaining that
“most state supreme courts retain substantial,” though far from plenary, “discretion over
which cases to hear”).
206. Zeisberg, supra note 61, at 797.
207. Gewirtzman, supra note 23, at 910.
208. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Chart of State Canons of Judicial Conduct, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_9221.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (identifying eleven state codes of judicial
conduct that allow judges to engage in any form of partisan political activity, and ten that
allow candidates to issue pledges or promises on how they will decide cases).
209. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 1816–1826, at 160, 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New
York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899).
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tions of the day, states could help thousands of listeners develop meaningful interpretive preferences. If these debates have the additional effect of dissolving the perception of the omniscient and infallible judge, so
much the better.
In sum, although we may have deep concerns about the efficacy of
judicial elections and the quality of the associated discourse, these concerns are not necessarily responsive to the popular constitutionalist program and might potentially be ameliorated by self-conscious reform. To
some extent, they are already being ameliorated unselfconsciously by the
rise of “new-style” campaigns.210 Those who oppose elective judiciaries
may need to look elsewhere to convince our popular constitutionalist.
C. Institutional Quality and Integrity
Critics have long charged that elections breed judges who are lower
in quality or captured by donors. A related line of attack charges elections with diminishing public trust in and respect for the courts. As big
money has flooded judicial races, advocacy groups have increasingly focused on these concerns.211 Their point might be broadened. In the
new era of more vigorous races, there is a growing risk that elected judges
will play favorites not only with donors but also with important interest
groups (because of their clout with voters), political parties (because even
judges in nonpartisan jurisdictions will be aligned more closely with one
side), political incumbents (because sitting judges are incumbents, too,
who stand to lose from antientrenchment measures), and popular litigants and legal positions generally (because voters will be primed to punish rulings seen as too generous to disfavored groups or causes).212 Campaign cash is just one of many mechanisms through which elections can
corrode the independence of the courts, and with it the due process
rights of litigants and the competitiveness of broader political processes.
Some readers may find these claims alarmist. Appointed and meritselected judges are hardly immune from extralegal pressures. And surely
any judge, these readers might say, would never flout the basic strictures
of her role. At most, we will see an increasing tendency for elected judges
to privilege the more popular options within the “zone of reasonable210. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 296–300 (elaborating ways in
which “new era” may enhance deliberative, participatory, and representative character of
judicial elections).
211. See Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5,
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08–205) (“Funding of
judicial elections . . . has emerged as a central concern for groups seeking to enhance the
effective administration of justice.”). The focal point of much recent discussion was the
case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), in which the Supreme
Court used an egregious set of facts to clarify the due process limitations on judges’
hearing disputes that involve campaign contributors. For a lucid overview and defense of
Caperton, see James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 Syracuse
L. Rev. 293 (2010).
212. Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 319–24.
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ness,”213 a tendency which, as explained earlier, might plausibly be
claimed as a victory for democracy rather than a mark of institutional
failure.214 Surely, we will not find judges routinely tipping the scales of
justice on account of professional self-interest, political affiliation, or
other such factors that almost anyone would find illegitimate.
These readers ought to review the evidence on sentencing described
above, which shows that, all else being equal, elected judges become significantly more punitive as their reelection date approaches.215 They
ought to consider Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok’s findings that
elected judges are more likely to redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state tort plaintiffs,216 and the Conference of Chief
Justices’ assessment that partisan elections lead to decisions “explainable
only by partisanship.”217 And they ought to consult Joanna Shepherd’s
new research showing “a strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ voting,”218 along with the survey results showing that
four out of five business leaders believe their contributions have at least
“some influence” on judges’ rulings,219 and that one in four state judges
agrees.220
In light of these data, as well as the increasingly politicized tenor of
campaigns, it cannot be taken for granted that elected judges will remain
within the zone of reasonableness in any given case—that they will not,
for example, pervert legal texts, defy the Supreme Court on federal law,
or scant the rights of litigants when doing so would placate an important
interest or avert the risk of electoral backlash. It may still be a distant
cloud, but the specter of lawlessness, of barely concealed favoritism and
presentist populism run amok, looms over the new era of judicial
elections.
Is any of this a problem for popular constitutionalism? The key to
seeing why the answer is yes, and perhaps to reframing the debate over
elective judiciaries, is to see that these criticisms raise not only lawyerly
concerns but also democratic ones. For if elections really do tend to de213. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.C.3.
215. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
216. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort
Awards, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 341, 356–68 (2002); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland,
Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 157, 177–87 (1999).
217. Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 14, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 99–4021)
[hereinafter CCJ Brief]; see also id. at 13–14 (arguing that partisan elections can lead to
“links with party leaders that interfere with the administration of the courts and justice”).
218. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 623,
669 (2009); see also id. at 651 (summarizing prior empirical research on this question).
219. Zogby Int’l, Attitudes and Views of American Business Leaders on State Judicial
Elections and Political Contributions to Judges 4–5 (2007).
220. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc. et al., Justice at Stake—State Judges
Frequency Questionnaire 5 (2002). Nearly half of the 2,428 judges surveyed said they
believed campaign contributions have at least “a little influence” on judges’ decisions. Id.
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grade the technical merits, basic fairness, or perceived legitimacy of judicial processes, they may also tend to decrease a society’s capacity for efficient exchange, rational planning, inclusive governance, and collective
action generally. Among the many other goals they are meant to serve,
the state courts play a critical role in channeling and resolving disagreements. They also play a critical role in supervising the administration of
nonjudicial elections.221 Like the Constitution itself, the state courts,
when they do their job reasonably well and are seen as transcending regular politics, help “make [that] politics possible.”222
The point here is simple but often overlooked. Inasmuch as elective
judiciaries stand in tension with principles of legality, equity, and efficiency, they also—and consequently—stand in tension with the demands
of self-government. Seen in a different light, many of the rule-of-law-type
critiques of elective judiciaries can be recast as popular sovereigntist critiques. Although they oppose judicial supremacy, popular constitutionalists still have a compelling interest in maintaining basic standards of judicial quality and integrity, if it is correct that some amount of professional
competence, public confidence, and decisional independence in an adjudicatory system is a necessary precondition to a flourishing politics in the
world beyond. Popular constitutionalists may be particularly concerned
that elected judges will not cater to the values of “the people” so much as
to the desires of supporters, special interests, and marginal voters.223
If it is easy enough to see why popular constitutionalists would disapprove of judicial decisionmaking based on factors such as campaign contributions or partisan affiliation—factors that are often uncorrelated or
even negatively correlated with the general will—it is a little harder to see
why they would disapprove of decisionmaking based on a naked desire to
please one’s constituents. No popular constitutionalists have endorsed
any such jurisprudence, so far as I know.224 They have accepted that
judges ought to apply settled law when it provides a clear answer, even if
the people would prefer that the judges do otherwise: for instance, by
giving a death sentence to an especially heinous murderer in a jurisdiction that has legislatively banned executions, or by upholding an abortion
restriction that plainly runs afoul of Supreme Court precedents.
It may seem trivial to observe that popular constitutionalists are not
so populist that they would go further,225 but I do not believe that it is. In
221. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 44, 78–80 (2004).
222. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 549, 554 (2009) (discussing function of constitutions).
223. Cf. Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 87, at 1064–65, 1143–44 (suggesting
judicial elections have failed to live up to their popular constitutionalist potential because
of special interest and partisan influences).
224. Cf. supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that popular constitutionalists
remain committed, at minimum, to following Constitution’s clear textual commands).
225. As an exercise in unconstrained populism, judging would lose any claim to
authority. The whole enterprise of adjudication would collapse.
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rejecting the idea that judges should be ciphers for public opinion, popular constitutionalists have conceded that law should constrain popular
will and that courts should apply these constraints.226 This concession
entails the conceptual and practical problem of demarcating the precise
extent to which judges ought to feel so constrained. It accepts an authoritative role for the Supreme Court within the judicial system on federal
questions, and therefore a unitary and nationalistic conception of judicially enforceable federal constitutional law. And it suggests that, in the
service of popular sovereignty, it can prove unhelpful if not counterproductive to submit every decision to the people themselves. The faintheartedness of popular constitutionalists, their unwillingness to transgress basic legal norms, undercuts their ostensible premise that
decisionmaking by reference to current majoritarian preferences inherently promotes political equality and procedural fairness.
Still, we have not scored a decisive blow against elective judiciaries.
Most importantly, although the empirical evidence supporting the criticisms outlined above is probative, it is far from conclusive.227 Unelected
judges have also acted in inappropriate or unprincipled ways, and their
heightened independence from the public creates a heightened concern
that they will act in “arrogant” or unpredictable ways.228 There is a spe226. It might be argued that a popular constitutionalist should want judges to follow
the law for instrumental reasons relating to their limited institutional capacity, as a secondbest strategy for approximating the popular will. This argument has not featured in the
popular constitutionalism literature, so far as I am aware, and it fails to account for the
many cases in which the legal answer is unclear or in which deviating from the best legal
answer is likely to satisfy more people in a particular community than following it.
227. Comparative measures of judicial quality remain especially crude. Among the
most notable results, see Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 98, at 308–19 (finding, inter
alia, that partisan-elected judges tend to produce more opinions than appointed and
merit-selected judges, but that former group’s opinions are cited less often by out-of-state
courts); Schotland, New Challenges, supra note 61, at 1087–88 (presenting evidence that
initially elected judges have been disciplined more frequently than initially appointed
judges). On public perceptions, compare Damon M. Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown
Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for State Courts, 36 Am. Pol.
Res. 297, 316 (2008) (finding that “[c]itizens’ views of their state courts diminish as they
are exposed to ‘new style’ state judicial election races” featuring policy-oriented
campaigning and high information content), with James L. Gibson, Challenges to the
Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” Judicial
Campaigns, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 69–70 (2008) (finding that public faith in judicial
impartiality is not diminished by candidates’ policy pronouncements, though it is by
campaign contributions and, to lesser extent, by attack ads). The evidence on judicial
diversity is also mixed. See Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Answering the
Call for a More Diverse Judiciary: A Review of State Judicial Selection Models and
Their Impact on Creating a More Diverse Judiciary 17 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/2005minoritylawyer/materials/jdr.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reviewing empirical literature and asserting that no “definitive
conclusions” can be reached as to which selection method best promotes diversity on
bench).
228. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 120, at 7, 139. Bonneau and Hall’s further charge
that nonelective systems “promote the unfettered exercise of personal preferences,” id. at
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cial risk that judges facing retention decisions made by the legislature or
governor will skew case outcomes to please those bodies.229 Absent a true
descent into lawlessness, a committed popular constitutionalist may not
find the threat of some additional improper behavior, by some elected
judges, sufficient to overwhelm all of the pro-election arguments made in
Part II.
Furthermore, incremental reform is possible. Judicial independence
can be safeguarded to an extent by measures short of switching from elections to appointments or merit selection. To mitigate the influence of
campaign contributions, for example, states can enhance their recusal
rules or apply stricter contribution limits.230 Term lengths can be increased. It is at least conceivable that an elective system could be engineered to provide sufficiently robust competition, accountability, and debate to excite popular constitutionalists, while also providing sufficiently
robust protections for judicial independence and public confidence to
placate their legalist foes.
Conceivable, but in my view exceedingly unlikely. For as I have argued elsewhere, the rule-of-law-type concerns sketched in this section interact in paradoxical ways with the efficacy and capacity concerns noted
in the previous section.231 Many of the reforms that would be best suited
to enhancing the deliberative, participatory, and representational character of judicial races—reforms such as holding elections more frequently
and permitting candidates to affiliate with parties, to promise to reach
certain outcomes, or to debate each other in public—also carry the greatest danger of politicizing the courts. The very same measures most likely
to enhance the democratic credibility of judicial elections, that is, are the
ones most likely to undermine the integrity of the judiciary as a distinctively legal institution. Popularize the courts’ “norm articulation” function too much, and a state will invariably degrade their adjudicative
function.232
Take one important example: Allowing candidates to run as
Democrats or Republicans is arguably essential for generating meaning137, is never substantiated—and indeed seems downright bizarre in light of the judiciary’s
practical inability to enforce its own judgments, the relative ease and frequency with which
state supreme court rulings are overturned, and the voluminous literature showing that
even appointed, life-tenured federal judges rarely stray from mainstream opinion. All
judging is fettered. The relevant questions concern by whom, to what degree, and through
which mechanisms.
229. See supra note 108 (noting Joanna Shepherd’s recent findings on this question).
All but three of the nonelective states deny their justices any form of life tenure. Am.
Judicature Soc’y, supra note 61, at 4–11.
230. See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why
Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 Washburn L.J. 503, 525–34 (2007)
(outlining possible recusal reforms).
231. Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 310–24.
232. Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 643–46 (1981) (explicating dual functions of
“norm articulation” and “dispute resolution” served by common law courts).
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ful voter choice in judicial elections, just as in legislative and executive
elections. Maybe more so, given that the vast majority of nonlawyer voters
are unequipped to evaluate the records of judicial candidates on their
own. No other heuristic is as salient or informative as the partisan label;
the democratic defender of elective judiciaries is virtually compelled to
support its use.233 Yet, by bringing judges into the fold of the parties, this
reform also creates a powerful new set of extralegal influences on judicial
behavior in any case with potential political valence. It risks subverting
the perception and reality of a just legal system by biasing the courts
against unsympathetic litigants and unpopular views, increasing judges’
dependence on donors,234 and generating decisions “explainable only by
partisanship.”235 To find this an attractive state of affairs, one would have
to embrace an unusual theory of the role of courts in a democracy.
D. Structural Concerns
The criticisms outlined in the preceding sections can contribute to
what might be termed the democratic case against elective judiciaries. If
valid, they suggest reasons why making judicial selection more democratic, in the sense of being more open and accessible to the people, does
not necessarily make the legal system as a whole more democratic, in the
sense of being more responsive to deliberative public opinion or conducive to moral and effective self-government.236 The empirical case for
these criticisms has yet to be proven, however. And the alternative selection methods come with their own problems. Let us grant, then, that in a
properly structured system, elections can be reasonably efficacious without doing too much collateral damage to the quality or integrity of the
courts. Bracketing these issues allows us to focus on structural concerns
more specific to popular constitutionalism.
1. Overinclusiveness. — Judges, of course, do many things besides interpreting the constitution. They preside over trials and appeals, construe statutes and regulations, adjudicate private disputes, sentence
233. See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
234. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “a
statistically significant relationship between campaign contributions and judicial decisions
in favor of contributors’ interests only for judges elected in partisan elections, not nonpartisan
ones,” and hypothesizing that this discrepancy reflects parties’ unique ability to facilitate
contributions and to punish or reward judicial performance).
235. CCJ Brief, supra note 217, at 13. Holding elections more frequently would
enhance popular control over the judiciary while exacerbating these risks. Hold elections
often enough, and we would no longer have to worry about cyclical behavior in criminal
sentencing. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (summarizing empirical
evidence). Judges would instead be punitive all the time.
236. I outlined some additional grounds on which to build a democratic case against
elective judiciaries in Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 8, at 317–24, and I will outline
several more infra Parts III.E.3–5.
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criminals, and so on. State judges often execute various administrative
and policymaking functions as well.237 When they do engage constitutional questions, lower courts are bound to follow the precedents of
higher courts, and on federal questions all are bound to follow the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court.238
The complication this raises is that even if judicial elections can foster desirable forms of popular constitutionalism—enshrining the people’s control over constitutional meaning, stimulating constitutional debate, helping ensure that judicial interpretations of constitutional
ambiguities track social values—that is not all they do. They can also align
judicial incentives more closely with electoral preferences in any matter
of potential public concern. By popularizing the work of the courts,
Steven Croley has observed, judicial elections may dissolve the countermajoritarian difficulty but raise a “majoritarian difficulty.”239
How should a popular constitutionalist feel about a judicial selection
system that enables greater popular influence over the administration not
only of constitutional law, but of every other type of law as well? This
would be a nonissue if either of two conditions holds. First, if voters were
to select judges solely on the basis of their constitutional views, then
elected judges would feel no pressure to satisfy popular opinion on any
other dimension. The problem with this condition is that it is unrealistic.
Although certain judicial races may turn on a hot-button constitutional
issue (as when the incumbent recently voted to grant or deny same-sex
marriage rights), and although these races can be engineered to place
greater emphasis on constitutional questions (as through candidate debates), history suggests that nonconstitutional issues will often
predominate. “Only a handful of cases will interest a significant portion
237. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
238. The idea that lower courts and state courts should not be so bound, that a kind
of vertical departmentalism should complement horizontal departmentalism, does not
appear in the popular constitutionalism literature, so far as I am aware. One assumes that
the potential costs of intrajudiciary interpretive anarchy are seen as too steep in relation to
any possible democratic benefits. The idea has appeared in the legal literature, however.
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of
Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & Religion 33, 77–88 (1989) (contending that
lower court judges are not obligated to follow higher court precedents when confident
precedents are fundamentally wrong).
239. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 713–28 (1995). Majoritarian judicial review, to which I will
return infra Part III.E, can be seen as a partial determinant of the majoritarian difficulty.
The former provides an (incomplete) explanatory theory of how elected judges decide
cases when the orthodox legal materials underdetermine outcomes. The latter provides a
normative critique of how elected judges can undermine the rule of law, not only in the
legal interpretations they render but also in the character of the justice they dispense, the
social messages they transmit, and the internal perspective they adopt. Pozen, Irony of
Elections, supra note 8, at 279–90. Majoritarian review is just one of several mechanisms
through which elective judiciaries may generate the majoritarian difficulty.
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of the electorate,” Judge Posner contends, and those cases “primarily . . .
involv[e] notorious crimes.”240
Second, this would be a nonissue if we simply deny the normative
distinction between constitutional law and nonconstitutional law so that,
for instance, a judge’s approach to sentencing criminals is deemed to
have comparable significance to her approach to construing the Equal
Protection Clause. The problem with this condition is that it is incompatible with any plausible substantive account of constitutionalism. It is unfaithful to constitutional law’s motivating premise that it comprises a special domain in which a polity sets forth fundamental commitments and
constitutive rules of government. Popular constitutionalists may challenge the boundaries of the constitutional, but they must accept some
distinction between lower- and higher-level law, “between present-day
preferences and more enduring values,”241 or else they are no longer operating within the framework of constitutionalism. Even if one believes
that the ambit of “the constitution” extends well beyond the document’s
written text and judicial construction, one must draw the line somewhere.
So, the overinclusiveness question cannot be avoided. The practice
of electing judges privileges candidates who have a taste and facility for
electoral politics, and it makes courts more responsive to constituent
preferences on a wide swath of issues. Constitutional law, even when conceptualized expansively, is just a fraction of what state judges do and of
what a selection method implicates.
Although it is impossible to answer the question satisfactorily without
knowing (or stipulating) more about the normative content of popular
constitutionalism, it is relatively easy to see why a proponent might celebrate the seepage of populism into the nonconstitutional aspects of the
adjudicative process. She might do this because she believes that much of
the courts’ work has a constitutional dimension, because many citizens do
not respect the constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction, or because
her belief in majoritarianism as political fairness extends to all matters in
which judges have decisional or procedural discretion.242 As Ernest
Young has observed, while it may be quite difficult in modern society to
separate constitutional norms from nonconstitutional ones, “this is only a
serious problem if something important turns on being able to mark that
boundary with precision.”243 For the popular constitutionalist, it is not
clear that anything does. Inasmuch as popular constitutionalism reflects
an undifferentiated commitment to present popular rule, we may have
240. Posner, How Judges Think, supra note 118, at 135.
241. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 78 (1998).
242. Moreover, overinclusiveness is to some extent inevitable in any governmental
vehicle of popular constitutionalism. The departmentalists’ preferred institutions, the
legislative and executive branches, also make countless nonconstitutional decisions.
243. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408,
454 (2007).
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simply added another argument to the positive side of the ledger in evaluating elective judiciaries. The majoritarian difficulty, on this view, is not
difficult at all.
Inasmuch as popular constitutionalists wish to distinguish the truly
constitutional from the merely legal, however, the sweep of the election
mechanism may substantially diminish its appeal, for two basic reasons.
First, it dilutes “public authorship,”244 or ownership, over the content of
constitutional law. Because judges fulfill so many tasks apart from resolving constitutional controversies, it will often be hazy or overdetermined
why an electorate has selected or rejected any particular candidate. Was
it because of her dissent in the major constitutional case from the previous term? Because of how she handled or reviewed a notable trial? Because of the unflattering photograph in the local paper? Because the
political winds in the state have shifted? One can never be sure; perhaps
each of these factors played a role. Judicial elections compass so many
possible issues that the connection between their returns and any particular constitutional ruling becomes highly attenuated, if not entirely
obscure.
Second, and relatedly, the sweep of these elections risks collapsing
constitutional politics into ordinary politics, constitutional law into ordinary law. Prominent popular constitutionalists have generally disclaimed
this goal.245 To the contrary, scholars such as Larry Kramer have sought
to preserve the idea of popular engagement with the Constitution as
something qualitatively distinct from and more momentous than other
forms of civic activity, even if each is recognized as fundamentally political in character.246
Judicial elections do not honor this distinction. In the type of
speech they elicit and the accountability they foster, these races seamlessly intermix the constitutional and the nonconstitutional, the “sacred”247 and the mundane. They flatten the legal landscape. By forcing
voters to weigh their constitutional convictions alongside everything else
they might seek in a judge, elections can contribute to a culture and a
jurisprudence that do not specially attend to—and so do not specially
244. Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 315 (2001) (discussing role of social
movements in shaping constitutional meaning).
245. Richard Parker is a notable exception. In his 1994 Constitutional Populist
Manifesto, he denies that there is any such thing as “constitutionalism,” as distinct from
ordinary politics or lawmaking. Parker, supra note 46, at 115.
246. See, e.g., Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 961 n.3 (distancing
himself from Akhil Amar’s early work on non-Article V amendments). The “dualist”
distinction between normal politics and higher lawmaking is central to Bruce Ackerman’s
theory of American constitutionalism and to his defense of judicial review. See Ackerman,
Foundations, supra note 7, ch. 1.
247. Post, supra note 76, at 9 (arguing that authority of Constitution derives in part
from its “‘sacred’” status (quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J.
Legal Educ. 167, 169 (1987))).

R
R

R
R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL802.txt

2108

unknown

Seq: 62

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

9-NOV-10

16:19

[Vol. 110:2047

empower the people to fashion the laws that bear on—the great questions of institutional structure and political morality. They can also compound the vulnerabilities of politically weak groups, further alienating
them from the Constitution and the justice system. In an era of widespread voter ignorance and soundbite-fueled campaigns, the ecumenicism of judicial races threatens to conflate the articulation of essentially
contested constitutional principles with the application of basic legal
craft, thereby trivializing both. It exacerbates the identification problem
inherent in popular constitutionalism,248 whereby the notion of higher
law loses its salience as a focal point, if not also its conceptual integrity.
On multiple grounds, then, a popular constitutionalist who wants to
disestablish judicial supremacy specifically on matters of constitutional
law may have reason to fear the broader implications of judicial elections.
The popular constitutionalist who instead embraces their spillover effects
has adopted a perfectly coherent position—just an extreme one. It
would take a fairly radical commitment to present popular rule to maintain that judges should draw upon the prevailing community sentiment
every time they resolve a high-profile dispute or sentence a criminal.249 It
is less radical to think they should do so every time they issue a constitutional ruling that could bind society for decades to come. Yet it is the
former sorts of decisions that occupy more of the state courts’ time and
that, at least at present, are more associated with the risk of electoral
backlash.
Inasmuch as the extraconstitutional aspects of judicial elections are
seen to detract from (yet not eclipse) their popular constitutionalist appeal, a practical lesson might also be gleaned: These elections ought to
be limited to the supreme court, or at least the appellate court, level.
Compared to lower court judges, state high court justices rule on constitutional issues more frequently and on nonconstitutional issues less frequently, and they do so with substantially greater discretion. They do not
administer trials or sentence criminals. And they exercise binding interpretive authority within their own judicial systems. Selecting these judges
through elections could yield the greatest popular constitutionalist benefits with the fewest subconstitutional spillovers—although when these
spillovers do occur, they may be more consequential.
2. Federalism. — It might be argued that judicial elections are overinclusive in an additional sense, in that they implicate questions of state
constitutional law, whereas popular constitutionalism, properly understood, involves only federal constitutional law. I explained above why
248. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
249. Even if we accept that uncodified public sentiment ought to be relevant in the
context of criminal sentencing, we might wonder why the judge should be the one to
channel it, when a jury of the defendant’s peers may also be sitting in the room. An
enhanced role for juries would seem to provide a procedurally, substantively, and
symbolically more efficacious means of integrating the views of the community into the
operation of the criminal justice system.
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popular constitutionalists have ample reason to care about state courts
and constitutions, independent of their federal analogues.250 However,
some prominent theorists of state constitutionalism have argued that the
development of a vigorous, self-conscious model threatens to subvert the
operations of federal constitutionalism, and that the project therefore
ought to be discarded.251 Some have further suggested that significant
portions of state constitutional texts lack “constitutional dimension.”252
Because scholars identified with popular constitutionalism have
largely ignored the states,253 I cannot purport to channel their views on
these arguments. But the arguments seem unlikely to persuade anyone
so inclined. Popular constitutionalism extols “diffuseness and decentralization” in the construction of constitutional norms;254 state law profoundly affects the daily lives of Americans. If judicial elections can spark
more robust public dialogue around fifty different constitutions, if they
can inspire greater allegiance to a plurality of constitutional traditions, if
they can democratize state constitutional law and culture, all this would
appear to be cause for celebration.
To the extent that state constitutions deal with distinct issues not
treated by the federal Constitution—and they deal with very many of
these255—there is no risk of direct conflict between the two. To the extent that the constitutions deal with overlapping concerns, the potential
arises for state judges to apply corresponding provisions in ways that go
beyond or diverge from the prevailing federal understanding. Barring
outright defiance, this too seems cause for celebration. Such diversity in
constitutional interpretation may compensate for the federal courts’ “underenforcement” of many constitutional norms;256 it provides an additional and more accessible platform for collective deliberation; it facilitates exit and voice in constitutional lawmaking; and it holds up a mirror
to the national model. In a federated and heterogeneous polity such as
ours, most popular constitutionalists would, I suspect, follow Lawrence
250. See supra notes 9–13, 61–77 and accompanying text.
251. Gardner, supra note 67, at 823–30.
252. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 1147, 1159 n.52 (1993). Unsurprisingly, this view was roundly criticized by state
judges, as was Professor Kahn’s call to turn away from “unique state sources” in favor of a
national perspective. See Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law:
Comments on Gardner’s Failed Discourse, 24 Rutgers L.J. 927, 928–31 (1993); Shepard,
supra note 70, at 440–44.
253. Cf. Aronson, supra note 18, at 985 (“[A]ll major critiques [of judicial review],
and all major normative responses to the critiques, focus almost solely on the acts and
omissions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court in its capacity as a constitutional court.”); Sandy
Levinson, Our Dysfunctional States, Balkinization, June 11, 2009, at http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2009/06/our-dysfunctional-states.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (calling state constitutions “an extremely important, but almost wholly ignored
subject by elite law professors and political scientists”).
254. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 963.
255. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
256. Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 40, at 1213–20.
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Sager in the belief that “variations among state and federal constitutional
rules ought to be both expected and welcomed.”257
But I may be wrong. It is certainly possible to imagine a brand of
popular constitutionalism that conceptualizes the people as an exclusively
or essentially national community and that trivializes or fears the development of a vibrant state constitutionalism. The United States Constitution
is what makes Americans a “People,”258 after all, and disestablishing judicial supremacy at the federal level may well be a more urgent project
sociologically and consequentially.
Scholarship on federalism, popular constitutionalism, and state judicial selection has largely proceeded on separate tracks. This cursory
treatment cannot begin to do justice to the subject, but it suggests there
are many rich potential intersections among the three. Indeed, it suggests that to the degree state judges (i) exercise discretion in the application of federal constitutional guarantees or cognate state provisions, and
(ii) their selection method systematically influences that task, any successful normative theory of state judicial selection may require a theory of both
federalism and constitutionalism. Popular constitutionalists could contribute significantly to our understanding of state constitutional theory,
not to mention our understanding of popular constitutionalism itself, by
devoting more attention to the subnational level.
3. Juricentrism. — Another disconcerting feature of judicial elections,
from the popular constitutionalist perspective, may follow from what they
do not do: permit nonspecialists to take up constitutional questions on
their own, as in an assembly or plebiscite on a particular issue or a recall

257. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between
the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 976 (1985); see also
Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93, 97, 129 (2000) (celebrating “attempts by state
courts independently to interpret the meaning of cognate textual provisions” for
advancing “the federal constitutional value of dialogue” and “providing an interpretative
counterpoint to the U.S. Supreme Court”); Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 382
(asserting that “state court opinions about state law are venues within which national values
are continually contested and reshaped”). Notwithstanding his support for a dynamic state
constitutionalism, Sager’s more recent work strongly suggests that he would oppose the use
of elective judiciaries in pursuit thereof. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in
Plainclothes 74 (2004) (identifying members’ job security and detachment from “the
potentially distorting influence of public will” as key reasons why federal courts are
“particularly well structured to address questions of constitutional justice”). Elective
judiciaries, it seems, are deeply incompatible with Sager’s justice seeking account of
American constitutional practice.
258. As a formal matter, this has been true since the Constitution was ratified. As a
cultural or phenomenological matter, it became increasingly true after the Reconstruction
Amendments began to reconstitute conceptions of citizenship. See generally Akhil Reed
Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 381–82 (2005) (observing that Fourteenth
Amendment “codified a profound nationalization of American identity”).
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vote on a particular decision.259 Judicial elections entail a kind of representative democracy. Although they allow ordinary citizens to shape the
interpretive outputs of the courts in potentially significant ways, they do
not in themselves allow citizens to interpret or resolve anything. The
judge continues to call the shots in any given case and thereby to mediate
between popular preferences and the content of enforceable law.
It is in this light that the “nasti[ness]” and “noisi[ness]”260 of today’s
campaigns for the bench may become most problematic for popular constitutionalism. The concern is not necessarily that competitive races degrade the civility of public discourse or the dignity of the judicial office,
but rather that they lack the proper focus. They foreground the candidates—their looks, their quirks, their backgrounds—rather than the
Constitution. Political energy that could be better spent arguing over the
substance of constitutional law may be dissipated arguing over what sorts
of candidates should be empowered to determine the substance of constitutional law. At the same time that “new-style” campaigns can diminish
the stature of the judiciary by subjecting aspirants to the degradations of
modern politics, they can enhance its visibility as a fulcrum of constitutional change. Ironically, the more competitive and salient judicial races
become, the more they may reinforce the juricentric notion that constitutional updating is the prerogative of the courts.261
Competitive judicial elections, consequently, may not complement
alternative forms of popular engagement with the Constitution so much
as displace and distort them. Whether and in what ways these races will
tend to invigorate or to debilitate the broader constitutional culture is a
question so far ignored by researchers. The previous Part made the case
for their invigorative potential, but we cannot be sure ex ante.262
Competitive election environments may also create unrealistic expectations about the transformative capabilities of the state courts. Like all
U.S. judges, state judges are not authorized to reach interpretive outcomes that are incompatible with controlling legal sources or to resolve
disputes that are not properly within their jurisdiction. Nor are state
259. Cf. Tamanaha, Beyond the Divide, supra note 122, at 72 (explaining that “a
proposal for the recall of individual [state] judicial decisions” by popular referendum was
“seriously debated” in early twentieth century).
260. Schotland, Comment, supra note 97, at 150.
261. Cf. supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing popular
constitutionalist critique of “juricentrism”). Michel Foucault once rejected a proposal for a
“people’s court” to judge the police, on the ground that a court, by its very nature, would
tend to deform rather than advance communal values. See Michel Foucault, On Popular
Justice: A Discussion with Maoists, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972–1977, at 1, 1–34 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980)
(identifying bureaucratic structure of courts and purported neutrality, universality, and
authoritativeness of judicial decisions as features antithetical to “popular justice,” which
“cannot achieve its full significance unless it is clarified politically, under the supervision of
the masses themselves”).
262. Later in the Article, I will give some additional reasons for skepticism. See infra
Part III.E.5 (discussing consequences of elected judges’ efforts to avoid backlash).
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judges authorized to revise U.S. constitutional doctrine when the
Supreme Court has already provided instructions. Courts are reactive
policymakers and constrained interpreters; state courts are especially constrained on federal questions. No matter how much their constituents
might want them to, elected judges cannot move constitutional law in any
particular direction unless a variety of external factors converge to provide an opportunity—at least, not without transgressing basic tenets of
our legal system. As mechanisms of constitutional change and accountability, judicial elections are bound to be underinclusive as well as
overinclusive.263
The representative character of elective judiciaries thus has a double
edge for the popular constitutionalist. On the one hand, it enhances
judges’ democratic credentials to speak for the people in rendering constitutional judgments. It gives them a plausible claim to be agents rather
than “enemies”264 of popular constitutionalism, and so dissolves some of
the tension between the popular sovereigntist premise that the
Constitution “belongs to the people”265 and the juricentric premise that
the judiciary ought to be its exclusive guardian. On the other hand, the
representative character of elective judiciaries channels populist energies
inward, toward campaigns for the bench and the interpretive outcomes
they can facilitate, and so accentuates rather than minimizes the centrality of the courts for constitutional lawmaking. At the same time that they
can make a constitutional culture more active, vibrant, and popular, elective judiciaries may exacerbate the tendency to “judicialize” constitutional
disputes and to see courts as privileged sites for the diffusion of constitutional norms.
Appointive and merit-selected judiciaries do not portend juricentrism in the same way, because they do not hold out the same kind of
promise to speak for the people. Their claim to institutional legitimacy
depends not upon their responsiveness to the present majority will but
instead upon their independence therefrom: They purport to be, not faithful agents or representatives of a constituency, but “mere instruments of
the law.”266 Appointive judiciaries with life tenure are designed precisely
to minimize the influence of inchoate popular pressures. In such a system, one may worry very much about unelected judges usurping the role
of the people as constitutional expositors and excessively “circum263. To be clear, underinclusiveness is not a problem per se: No one mechanism of
popular constitutionalism need do all the work. It is a problem only to the extent that
judicial elections warp or crowd out other, better mechanisms.
264. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting literature’s characterization of
judicial supremacy as “enemy” of popular constitutionalism).
265. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln 262, 269 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“This country, with its
institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.”).
266. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824); see also Post &
Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 384 (expanding on this point).
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scrib[ing] the domain of collective self-governance.”267 But one need
not worry nearly as much that the judicial selection process will itself
come to usurp alternative mechanisms of constitutional construction.
When judicial retention decisions are made regularly by the legislature or the governor, juricentrism may be further reduced. These decisions both dramatize and enforce the limited nature of judicial authority
in the larger governmental scheme. Reappointive systems can likewise
serve departmentalist values, by deterring courts from invalidating statutes and regulations268 and by empowering the other branches to pass
judgment on the constitutional record of any given judge, albeit in the
aggregate and at a temporal remove. One may worry very much that
reappointive schemes leave courts excessively vulnerable to politicians,
but one need not worry nearly as much that the coordinate branches will
be marginalized in the fight to determine constitutional meaning.
E. Majoritarian Review Revisited
Part II.C advanced the claim that majoritarian review, whereby
judges use their interpretive discretion to reach outcomes they believe
will be pleasing to (or at least will not outrage) their constituents, is an
inevitable and distinctive byproduct of elective judiciaries. If this claim is
correct, then supporters of elective judiciaries must have a theory of why
majoritarian review is desirable (or at least tolerable). Any number of
regulatory reforms, such as enhanced disqualification rules, could mitigate the risk of judicial favoritism toward discrete parties.
Promajoritarian decisionmaking is not so easily rectifiable; it is, rather,
the presumed point of using elections. The notion that we could manipulate an elective system so that its judges ignore the political consequences of their decisions is not only Panglossian but perverse. For if
that is the goal, then there is no good reason to use elections in the first
place.269
267. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1037.
268. See supra notes 108–116 and accompanying text.
269. At least, such is my position. Some judicial selection scholars, most notably
Michael Dimino, do not agree. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the
Fact, 22 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 451, 455–67 (2008) (advocating initial
popular election of judges followed by fixed, nonrenewable terms). Jed Shugerman has
recently argued that, in the mid-nineteenth century, judicial elections were conceptualized
in paradoxically “countermajoritarian” terms, in that they were meant to empower courts
to uphold the rule of law against government abuses by reducing their links to parties and
factions. Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 87, at 1126–44. Shugerman’s
fascinating history cautions against broad generalizations about the “point” of judicial
elections, which have assumed different forms and engendered different social
understandings over time. There is no plausible normative defense of these elections,
however, that does not embrace the unique weight they assign to public opinion, the
unique connection they forge between voters and judges.
As I understand Shugerman’s account, the countermajoritarian label is an awkward fit
for the theory that prevailed in the 1800s. For many reformers, the main attraction of
elections was that they were seen as enhancing courts’ ability to defy the other branches
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Part II.C.3 advanced the further claim that, on account of their electoral pedigree, these judges might possess a special dispensation, even a
duty, to practice majoritarian review. As elected officials, they may plausibly feel an obligation to apply the law in ways that promote the values and
beliefs of their constituents. Popular constitutionalists, I suggested,
might support majoritarian review as a means to enhance lay control over
the legal system and to update the content of the law more continuously
to match popular preferences. A number of commentators have recently
begun to offer proposals along these lines.270
This strikes me as a mistake. The balance of the Article will argue
that popular constitutionalists should not endorse majoritarian review as
a general theory of constitutional interpretation or elected judges as its
privileged practitioners—at least, not unless they hold quite dubious
views about the nature of democratic legitimacy and the capacities of the
courts. The jurisprudential method most explicitly attuned to the popular will is, paradoxically, as much a hindrance as an aid to the project of
popular constitutionalism.
Several explanatory notes are in order.271 First, the jurisprudential
distinctions between elective and nonelective judiciaries should not be
overdrawn. Some elected judges may eschew anything resembling
majoritarian review; some appointed judges may embrace it. Moreover,
elective and appointive systems can take many different forms,272 each of
which may have different implications for what sorts of lawyers attain the
bench and for what they do once there. We are dealing here with crude
(though hopefully valid) aggregates and approximations.
when those branches had failed to act as the citizenry’s faithful agents. See id. at 1067,
1125. Elections were intended to decrease judges’ dependence on special interests and
machine politicians but to increase their dependence on “the people”—and more
specifically on electoral majorities. It may well be the case that Americans of this era
generally wanted judges who would uphold the rule of law, and that the judges they chose
struck down a relatively large number of statutes in the service of this goal. Yet,
notwithstanding the traditional association of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” with
statutory invalidations by the Supreme Court, it hardly seems helpful to maintain that these
early elective regimes were therefore countermajoritarian. The basic logic on which these
regimes operated, indeed the very impetus for their creation, was to advance majoritarian
values. Cf. supra Part II.C.2 (explaining that judges seeking to mirror popular views may
be more or less deferential to legislative judgments, depending on context). This semantic
quibble with Shugerman’s masterful analysis would not deserve mention, except that it
illustrates some of the ways in which elective judiciaries can confound the standard
categories of constitutional theory.
270. See supra notes 117–126 and accompanying text (quoting suggestive passages by
Larry Kramer, Richard Posner, Jeffrey Rosen, Chris Bonneau, and Melinda Gann Hall and
summarizing views of other scholars). I do not mean to claim that Kramer, Posner, or
Rosen would, on considered reflection, endorse majoritarian review, just that their writings
contain hints of this view and help illuminate what a popular constitutionalist defense of
the practice would look like.
271. Also in order is a restatement of my original caveat about the crudeness of the
“majoritarian” label. See supra note 121.
272. See supra note 61.
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Second, it is important to restate what I am not doing: I am not
investigating majoritarian review through any lens other than popular
constitutionalism, except by way of comparison. As with popular constitutionalism itself, the obvious criticisms of this interpretive method do not
sound in popular sovereignty values. They sound in values such as individual rights and the rule of law.273
Finally, I wish to engage this subject on its strongest terms.
Majoritarian review is a theory of how judges negotiate interpretive ambiguity. In constitutional law especially, this is no small space. My contention is that elected judges have a higher statistical likelihood and a
stronger theoretical justification to assign their sense of public opinion
some meaningful, independent weight in this negotiation, alongside
whatever other legal principles guide their decisionmaking. Section C of
this Part explored concerns that majoritarian review will slip its legalist
bonds and transgress the zone of reasonableness, as when the judge defies a controlling authority or acts to reward a campaign supporter.274
This section will grant elected judges the benefit of the doubt and set
aside such concerns.
Let us consider, then, how a popular constitutionalist might feel
about a system that breeds judges who are systematically more likely to
consult public opinion as one significant factor in their resolution of constitutional controversies. As Jed Rubenfeld has observed in regard to
Christopher Tiedeman’s defense of this interpretive approach,275 it appears to founder on three “naı̈ve” assumptions: (i) that “the judiciary can
better speak for present majority will than can the people’s elected representatives”; (ii) that “there exists a ‘prevalent sense of right’ shared by the
people as a whole”; and (iii) that “the judiciary can discern” this sense.276
Rubenfeld seems to view these assumptions as so naı̈ve that to reveal
them is to refute them. He is correct that they reflect serious flaws of
majoritarian review, but when the judges are themselves elected and
when the desideratum is popular constitutionalism, it takes some work to
see why.
273. Whether and how popular constitutionalists can reconcile their rejection of
judicial supremacy with the Constitution’s claim to being supreme law, U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2, and with rule of law values generally, is an especially important question beyond the
scope of this Article. The question is all the more acute for those versions of normative
popular constitutionalism that emphasize methods of “constitutional change” outside of
the Article V amendment process and the faithful interpretation and construction of the
Constitution’s text.
274. Section III.D.1 explored concerns relating to majoritarian review and
nonconstitutional judicial decisionmaking.
275. See supra notes 122–126 and accompanying text.
276. Rubenfeld, supra note 122, at 58–59. As Rubenfeld also makes clear,
Tiedeman’s interpretive philosophy is deeply incompatible with Rubenfeld’s own
commitmentarian theory of constitutional law. See, e.g., id. at 172–73 (arguing that, to
honor enduring commitments embodied in Constitution and thereby facilitate
intertemporally extended self-government, “[c]onstitutional interpretation cannot be
vested in organs of government beholden to or expressing popular will”).
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1. Legislative Supremacy. — The first problem with majoritarian review, as Rubenfeld suggests, concerns institutional roles and competencies: Compared to executive and especially legislative efforts to advance
popular beliefs, judicial efforts will inevitably fall short on standard procedural criteria. This is true for elected state judges as well as life-tenured
federal judges. Even when its members are elected at regular intervals, a
court will never be as broadly accessible as the legislature, nor will it possess the latter’s deliberative structures, information gathering resources,
or proactive lawmaking capabilities. Judges are not actually authorized to
“represent” constituents in any formal sense, nor do they engage in the
sorts of dialogic interactions that help make that representation meaningful. Arguments proffered in courts are often technical and spare compared to the explicit value disagreements hashed out on a senate floor.277
While there is room to debate whether an elected judge ought to be susceptible to popular influence in executing her duties, legislators remain
avowedly open to popular influence in virtually all they do. Elected
judges might legitimately be responsive to the present popular will at the
margins, when the law is unclear. Legislatures unabashedly aspire to effectuate the popular will except at the margins.
At least at present, judges cannot even promise to decide a case in a
certain way without violating standard canons of judicial ethics.278
Should that case then come before the judge, she would be disqualified
from hearing it.279 It is a basic expectation of legislators, by contrast, that
they will make and be held accountable for specific campaign promises
about specific policy objectives. Furthermore, elective judiciaries are currently more distant from their constituents in a temporal sense, as every
state that elects its judges grants them relatively long tenure as compared
to other elected officials.280
277. See Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 53, at 1384–86 (contrasting richness
of British legislative debates on important issues of rights with sterility of American judicial
reasoning).
278. Although these canons are currently being challenged in lawsuits around the
country, most state codes of judicial conduct still contain a “Commit Clause,” banning
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases or
controversies likely to come before the court, and/or a “Pledges or Promises Clause,”
banning “‘pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office.’” Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 230, at
506–07 (quoting Mich. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B.1.c (1994); Ohio Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(2)(c) (1997)); see also Brennan Ctr. for Justice, supra note
208 (tabulating state canons).
279. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 230, at 518 & n.78 (documenting
that nearly every state code of judicial conduct requires disqualification whenever judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned).
280. Schotland, New Challenges, supra note 61, at 1094. There is nothing inevitable
about this arrangement; a state could grant its elected judges shorter terms than its
legislators. That every state has done the opposite suggests a widely held ambivalence
about the representative function of elective judiciaries—a concern that these judges not
be too responsive to their constituents.
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However flawed a state legislature may be as a stand-in for the people
themselves, then, it will have thicker and more extensive connections to
them than will its judiciary. As vehicles of mediated popular constitutionalism, legislatures will always have superior bona fides.
These comparative points help explain why a court, even when
elected, could be seen to undermine democratic values when it strikes
down a duly promulgated law that does not clearly violate the
Constitution—and therefore why the popular constitutionalist case for judicial restraint could be applied to elected state courts as well as to the
appointed federal ones.281 Yet these points cannot in themselves defeat
the popular constitutionalist case for majoritarian review, for three main
reasons.
First, in comparing the representative character of the judiciary to
that of the legislature, the appropriate reference point is not the legislature as it is today, but the legislature as it was at the time it enacted the
measure the judiciary is now tasked with interpreting. When many years
have passed or when social norms or conditions have substantially
changed since the legislature last took up an issue, the representativeness
gap may have closed. This gap may be smaller still in situations where the
judges were elected on a statewide basis and the legislators were not.
Second, in the lion’s share of constitutional controversies that come
before a court, there will be no clear legislative position to which a court
might defer. (The same holds true for many important questions of common law, and even many questions of statutory interpretation.) Legislatures are not structured to render constitutional judgments outside of the
general terms of statutes and resolutions. Consequently, no matter how
much one might prefer the legislature as a departmentalist agent of popular constitutionalism, it will inevitably be an incomplete agent. If the
goal is to maximize popular control over the administration of fundamental law, it may be desirable for the courts to combine deference to
the legislature with majoritarian review, reserving the latter method for
the (many) situations in which the former fails to provide a determinate
answer.
Finally, even when the legislature has spoken clearly on an issue,
there may be plenty of reasons to doubt its fidelity to the popular will.282
Procedural gridlock, special interest capture, ideological polarization,
gerrymandered districts, and a slew of other pathologies can steer legisla281. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (explaining that scholars
sympathetic to popular constitutionalism have preached various forms of judicial restraint
as means of reconciling judicial review with democratic imperatives). This logic also
suggests why in some cases there may be a net democratic loss from a jurisprudence that
asks courts to adapt the meaning of legislation in light of contemporary norms, as the
court perceives them, rather than apply the most textually or purposively sound reading of
the statute. See supra note 126 (discussing William Eskridge’s “dynamic statutory
interpretation”).
282. For now, let us continue to bracket concerns about the notion of a “popular
will.”
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tion away from public preferences. On account of factors both intended
and unwanted, statutory lawmaking in the United States has always operated at a large remove from pure majority rule. These factors help explain why, by some measures, life-tenured U.S. Supreme Court Justices
have recently been delivering a more majoritarian product than their
elected counterparts in Congress.283 Accordingly, to the extent that popular constitutionalists seek popular outcomes, they may see a space for
courts to compensate for deficits in legislation—not necessarily to improve its democratic quality in any strong normative sense, as by granting
special protections for discrete and insular minorities, but simply to ensure that popular majorities get their way on the issues that matter most.
Regardless of whether legislatures are superior representatives of the people, they are imperfect representatives, and a popular constitutionalist
might embrace majoritarian review as a means of picking up some of
their principal-agent slack.
A commitment to legislative supremacy in constitutional decisionmaking, in short, is not necessarily incompatible with majoritarian review.
Nor does it necessarily entail a commitment to legislative control over
judicial selection. A legislative appointment scheme has the evident virtue (for the legislative supremacist) of putting judges under the thumb of
the Congress. Yet inasmuch as the theory of legislative supremacy reflects
an underlying concern to maximize representativeness or responsiveness
in government, we have seen not only why judicial elections may hold
appeal but also why the institutional designer may wish to give courts
enough independence from the legislature to be able to override it on
occasion. Although elections expose judges to some of the same potentially distortionary influences that act upon congressmen, such as special
interest dollars, so do legislative retention schemes, at one level of remove. And while judges subject to legislative retention have been found
to strike down statutes least often, elected judges are not far behind.284
Elected judges have a strong incentive to defer to the legislature’s constitutional judgments—treating them as if they were supreme—both as a
strategy for minimizing controversy and as a proxy for the views of the
electorate.
283. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 20, at 372 (arguing that “the Court
of late seems to be doing a better job than the Congress in meeting public expectations”
and that, “[i]f any worry seems legitimate,” it is not that Justices defy public opinion but
rather that they “kowtow” to it); Devins, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 180, at 1347
(arguing that “the Supreme Court . . . may be more reflective of public opinion than
Congress”); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Countermajoritarian Classics (and an Upside-Down
Theory of Judicial Review) 5 (Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669560 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that in
classic mid-twentieth-century cases, “the Court’s position was actually a better reflection of
prevailing sentiment than [was] that of the democratically elected, representative
branches”).
284. See supra note 108.
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Rather than tweak its judicial selection or retention scheme, a polity
seeking to encourage legislative resolution of constitutional controversies
could do so far more forcefully by curtailing judges’ lawmaking power. A
polity could, for example, institute a supermajority voting rule for courts
to invalidate statutes or a streamlined procedure for legislative overrides,
as several U.S. states and Commonwealth countries have done.285 Or it
could, as Jeremy Waldron has urged, simply do away with judicial review
of legislation altogether.286 These reforms may not have much chance of
passage in many states today. But the strongest departmentalist response
to judicial supremacy is to recalibrate the structure of judicial review, not
the composition of the reviewing body.
2. Coherence, Feasibility, and Direct Democracy. — This brings us to
Rubenfeld’s second and third arguments against majoritarian review:
that there is no good way for the judge to discern public sentiment on
matters of constitutional interpretation, and that rarely will there be any
such sentiment to be discerned. These, too, are important though ultimately incomplete critiques.
Majoritarian review raises a practical problem as well as many normative ones: How are judges supposed to know what the people want, except by looking to the laws their representatives have passed and the constitutional provisions their predecessors have enacted (sources that even
the most staunchly legalistic judge would consult)? Opinion polls will
rarely be available. The briefs of litigants and amici are works of advocacy. Intuition and common sense can only go so far. As Neal Devins has
pointed out, however, numerous structural and sociological factors make
state judges better positioned than their federal counterparts to estimate
the reception their decisions will receive. Often, state judges have lived
in their jurisdiction for many years and have extensive experience working within its legal system; regularly interact with other public officials on
budgetary, administrative, and policymaking matters; maintain strong ties
to local political parties and civic groups; and are “well-informed with
respect to the in-state political climate,” which is generally less complex
than the national climate.287 Procedurally, moreover, some of these
285. See Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 20, at 186 & n.182 (identifying
three U.S. states that have used supermajority invalidation rules); Stephen Gardbaum, The
New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 719–39 (2001)
(explaining that Canadian Constitution grants legislature express power to reenact
legislation courts have found invalid, British Human Rights Act of 1998 allows for fast track
statutory amendment in wake of judicial invalidation, and New Zealand Bill of Rights gives
courts no power to invalidate statutes deemed incompatible with its guarantees); Waldron,
Core of the Case, supra note 53, at 1353–59 (distinguishing American-style “strong judicial
review” from these “weak[er]” models); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three
Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 893, 916,
988–91, 995–96 (2003) (discussing legislative proposals in 1820s, 1860s, and 1920s that
would have required two-thirds vote of U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate act of Congress).
286. See, e.g., Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 53, at 282–312; Waldron,
Core of the Case, supra note 53.
287. Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1669–71.
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judges will be able to avail themselves of devices such as expert testimony,
special masters, and facilitators, which state courts routinely use to enhance their understanding of social and factual issues.288
The institution of judicial elections itself provides an additional, partial solution. If an elected judge observes that a particular talking point
has been receiving favorable media attention, that a particular attack ad
seems to resonate with voters, or that a particular type of candidate has
had the most success at the polls, she may find clues about how the community would like to see the law applied. The signaling function of elections is especially acute when incumbents are voted out of office; clearly,
those judges did something the people disliked. Reappointment and
merit selection practices may yield some useful information too, but they
have significantly less capacity to stimulate and disseminate criticism of a
judge’s work. Compared to the other selection methods, elections generate more regular and robust information about the content of public
opinion. The more competitive, frequent, and substantive the races, the
better their epistemic value.
More fundamentally, just because a judge lacks perfect epistemic insight into popular preferences, it does not follow that her efforts to apply
them will be hopeless or misguided. Even if the elected judge is bound to
miss the mark some percent of the time when she seeks to gratify public
opinion, she will presumably hit the mark more often than if she never
tries at all. If she fails miserably in the effort, voters can throw her out.289
As for whether “there exists a ‘prevalent sense of right’ shared by the
people as a whole”290 on most questions of constitutional law—clearly
there does not. No sentiment has ever been shared by the people as a
whole. Yet just as clearly, a significant number of citizens can have coherent preferences on some constitutional questions. To defend the view that
courts ought to aim to effectuate those preferences within certain interpretive constraints, there is no need to conceptualize “the people” or
their “will” as an organic unity, to overlook the Condorcet paradoxes and
deliberative deficits that may confound the endeavor, or to believe that
judges possess any special access to the popular zeitgeist. One need not
be “naive”291 to be a populist.
Nevertheless, Rubenfeld’s arguments point to a subtler complication. The problem is not that lay persons are unable to develop intelligible, respectworthy preferences on questions of constitutional law—popular constitutionalism is committed to the view that they can—but rather
288. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 127, at 1177–79.
289. This is not to say that social welfare, or the courts’ social standing, is likely to be
enhanced in the long run by judicial efforts to satisfy popular preferences, see, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 200, 211–12 (defending traditional, law-focused model of
judging on second-order consequentialist grounds), just that judges are reasonably capable
of discerning and applying these preferences.
290. Rubenfeld, supra note 122, at 58.
291. Id.
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that they are unlikely to hold such preferences on the precise sorts of
questions that come before a court. State judges do not address constitutional disputes in a vacuum. They do so in the context of specific cases,
laden with all manner of supplemental claims, factual particularities, procedural histories, jurisdictional complexities, and doctrinal precedents
that shape and constrain the judicial task. Ordinary citizens have neither
the training, nor the resources, nor the responsibility to engage constitutional disputes in the way that judges must engage them. Citizens are far
better equipped to develop meaningful views on what the Constitution
provides in a class of cases, as might a legislator, or on what it ought to
provide in the future, as might a reformer. Judges cannot do constitutional law in such categorical or aspirational terms. And this will remain
true so long as American courts continue to articulate general norms only
in the process of resolving discrete disputes.292
A popular constitutionalist might plausibly dismiss as “elitist” or unsubstantiated the concern that citizens will tend to approach constitutional interpretation through the lens of ordinary politics, and thereby
conflate their sense of the proper constitutional result with their momentary desires. She cannot, in my view, plausibly dismiss the concern that
citizens will tend to evaluate constitutional controversies at a higher level
of abstraction, and with less sensitivity to the demands of professional
legal reason, than would be expected of a judge. This descriptive feature
of our sociolegal order, if not many others, significantly limits the utility
and coherence of any jurisprudence that aspires to vindicate popular
preferences. For those preferences are unlikely to be keyed to the precise issues facing any given judge, or to have been developed, tested, and
refined in any manner resembling the judicial process.293
The notion that judicial decisions ought to “mirror popular views”294
is, in fact, quite a few steps away from being a workable principle of jurisprudence. In addition to the question of how to assimilate generalized
preferences into specific cases or controversies, the judge who subscribes
to this notion must ask herself whether the circumstances call for popular
292. Cf. supra note 232 and accompanying text (invoking Robert Cover’s insight that
common law courts serve dual functions of “norm articulation” and “dispute resolution”
and discussing potential tensions between these two).
293. This fairly modest predictive claim could be expanded into a stronger normative
one. Whatever its virtues or vices as a framework for judicial elaboration of constitutional
meaning, it might be argued, there is no reason to believe that the case format provides a
suitable framework for collective decisionmaking. In light of the systemic biases, fleeting
passions, partisan attachments, and informational cascades that can affect the popular view
of any given controversy, institutional designers may be wise to force members of the
public to engage constitutional questions prospectively, in general rather than in casespecific terms. These sorts of arguments can easily bleed into a broader mistrust of
popular politics that is anathema to popular constitutionalism. But they need not. There
are many different ways to enhance the people’s control over constitutional law without
giving them control, even indirectly, over active disputes between specific parties.
294. Friedman, Mediated Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 2598 (suggesting this
notion is key “share[d]” tenet of scholars identified with popular constitutionalism).
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views to be given weight; how much weight is due; and, given the inevitable heterogeneity of public opinion, what kind of views she (and popular
constitutionalism generally) should aspire to vindicate in the first place.
The epistemic difficulties of majoritarian review do not even arise until
the judge knows what to look for. Is it the prevailing view of today’s society, as might be reflected in a vote or a poll? The prevailing view within
the segment of society that has the right to vote? Within the motivated
minority that has bothered to study the issue, write editorials, lobby the
legislature, and so forth? Or would the judge better serve popular constitutionalism by attending instead to the majority belief that would arise
under conditions of fuller information, participation, and
deliberation?295
These questions admit of no easy answer. To the extent that
majoritarian review focuses on views that have been presented to the
court in amicus briefs, expert testimony, and the like, it will be easier to
administer and will reflect a more realistic notion of group agency than
any appeal to the views of “the people.” But the cost of this added coherence is an elite frame of reference potentially at odds with the aim of
popular empowerment. Likewise, to the extent that majoritarian review
licenses the judge to depart from the will of the present people (as best
she can perceive it) in the service of some more idealized or transtemporal conception thereof, its empirical demands may become more
manageable. Yet any such concession leads away from popular constitutionalism’s core commitments in favor of a more freewheeling and paternalistic judicial role. And if majoritarian review ought to concentrate on
what today’s citizens want as the touchstone for negotiating interpretive
ambiguity, this begs another question of institutional design: Why not
ask them?
Mechanisms of direct democracy such as ballot initiatives, referenda,
and assemblies would seem to hold privileged, if not paradigmatic, status
as formal instruments of popular constitutionalism. After all, only a popular vote to amend (or not to amend) the Constitution makes the people
themselves the explicit authors of constitutional change, and makes explicit what they have decided.296 Elections might have a unique claim to
295. These questions lead us back to the identification problem. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. Until we have a clear understanding of what counts as popular
constitutionalism, and what counts as superior or inferior forms of popular
constitutionalism, we cannot confidently develop a theory of how it should bear on the
judicial function—or on anything else, for that matter.
296. But see Raphael Rajendra, “The People” and “The People”: Disaggregating
Citizen Lawmaking from Popular Constitutionalism, 27 Law & Ineq. 53, 84–91 (2009)
(arguing that ballot initiatives should not count as popular constitutionalism because they
“fetishiz[e] constitutional texts” and substitute discrete mode of political engagement for
more dynamic and diffuse social movements). When a thoughtful, published paper argues
that “initiative constitutionalism”—whereby ordinary citizens propose and vote on explicit
reforms to their constitution—“is not, and cannot be, popular constitutionalism,” id. at 91,
one has to wonder whether the vocabulary of “popular constitutionalism” has ceased to
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satisfy a commitment to political equality with respect to the composition
of the judiciary. But they do not give citizens an equal share in the elaboration of fundamental law in a remotely comparable sense.
If any of the standard “good government” criticisms of direct democracy297 were to trouble a popular constitutionalist, that might be grounds
to establish a supermajority voting threshold, to incorporate informational aids, to constrain spending, to apply a single subject rule, to require legislative or gubernatorial signoff, or to make any number of other
procedural tweaks designed to discipline the process and facilitate a
graver, richer, more “constitutional” mode of deliberation. It would presumably not be grounds to bypass direct democracy altogether. For if
direct democracy seems categorically unattractive as a means of determining constitutional law, if ordinary citizens cannot be trusted to change the
legal status quo, then the theoretical basis of normative popular constitutionalism unravels.
Still, though, we have not entirely defeated the case for majoritarian
review as a tool for popular constitutionalism. Holding repeated plebiscites would be an exceedingly costly and time consuming way to develop
constitutional law. For this practical reason alone, if not also to preserve
the basic stability of the legal system, it is unrealistic to think that the
judicial role in determining constitutional meaning could be fully taken
over by the people. Even a committed popular constitutionalist, moreover, may have qualms about such pervasive reliance on decisionmaking
procedures unmediated by any institutional actor. The indirect nature of
the constitutional change that judicial rulings can foster may not be as
empowering as direct democracy. Yet it may do a better job of preserving
the distinction between higher law and ordinary politics—facilitating a
productive tension rather than an outright collision between the constitutional ideals of stability and commitment over time, on the one hand, and
the populist ideals of responsiveness and accountability in the here and
now, on the other.298
In any event, even if greater use of referenda, relaxed amendment
procedures, and the like offer more potent instruments of popular constitutionalism, majoritarian review could be seen as a welcome complement.
Just as the proponent of legislative supremacy might want judges to consult public opinion interstitially, when the legislature has not already spoken to an issue, the proponent of direct democracy might regard
majoritarian review as an attractive gap-filling solution.
3. Democratic Legitimacy. — We have seen that the case for
majoritarian review rests on a number of controversial assumptions about
the capacity of ordinary citizens to evaluate issues of constitutional interadvance comprehension. At this point, we may be better off simply retiring the phrase,
and thereby pushing authors to focus on the specific forms of popular constitutional
engagement they mean to celebrate or critique.
297. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (summarizing criticisms).
298. I thank Heather Gerken for emphasizing this point to me.
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pretation and of judges to perceive and incorporate those evaluations.
But at least in situations where the greater part of a community seems
likely to hold a certain considered view—for instance, that the equal protection clause of the state’s constitution does or does not guarantee a
right to same-sex marriage—these assumptions are not so implausible as
to defeat the theory out of hand. This kind of textually underdetermined, newly emergent, high salience, value laden question is
precisely the kind of question for which it makes the most sense, conceptually, to advocate majoritarian review. If it seems clear that the majority
of citizens would strongly oppose a ruling that same-sex couples have a
right to marry, the brand of normative popular constitutionalism considered in this Article suggests that courts ought to try to avoid such a ruling.
The choice to elect judges can be seen to embody this same logic. Both
presuppose that lay persons should be empowered to influence the interpretation of the fundamental laws that govern them.
Yet, if this is a coherent position, it may also be a misguided one. For
it is at this point that popular constitutionalism’s ambivalence about judicial independence comes into maximal tension with its agenda to democratize constitutionalism. Numerous strands of American constitutional
theory provide reason to fear that even the most responsible and efficacious practice of majoritarian review will tend to diminish rather than
enhance the democratic character of constitutional law.299 The basic arguments are familiar from debates over the countermajoritarian difficulty. Applied to the institution of elective judiciaries, they help show
why the view that judges should “draw upon public perceptions and the
prevailing . . . political climate when resolving difficult disputes”300 reflects not only a highly contestable set of empirical assumptions, but also
a highly contestable conception of democratic legitimacy.301
Depending on its precise formulation, the view that judges should be
guided by public perceptions may conflict with the idea that the
Constitution embodies an intergenerational scheme of self-government
that combines majoritarian and nonmajoritarian aspects in the service of
something greater than “statistical”302 democracy or “brute forms of pref299. Readers who reject the analogy between federal constitutional law and state
constitutional law may not much care what theorists of the former have had to say. This is
a complicated issue that I cannot adequately treat here. I take it, however, that most
participants in the debate over state judicial selection view state constitutions as “real”
constitutions and state supreme court justices as “real” constitutional judges, and so would
at least be inclined to entertain the analogy.
300. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 120, at 15. I take this view to be common to many
advocates of both judicial elections and popular constitutionalism.
301. I will have nothing novel to say here about the relationship between
nonmajoritarian models of judicial review and democratic legitimacy (if anything novel
remains to be said). My limited point is that the popular constitutionalist critique of the
former necessarily presupposes a theory of the latter that is compatible with
“constitutionalism,” and yet it is not clear what that theory is.
302. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 20 (1996).
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erence aggregation.”303 It may conflict with the idea that judicially enforced constitutional norms can themselves be democracy enhancing,304
for instance because they compensate for breakdowns in the political process caused by irrational prejudice, special interest pressure, incumbent
self-entrenchment, temporal myopia, or other pathologies; because they
keep government officials within the bounds of their enabling grant of
power; because they honor commitments made in more profound moments of prior populism, involving heightened political engagement and
agreement; or because certain kinds of secure entitlements of person and
property are necessary prerequisites to meaningful social discourse and
self-determination. The view may likewise conflict with the idea that judicial review embodies a deontic commitment to forms of political equality
that help legitimize democratic rule, such as providing all aggrieved persons an opportunity for a fair hearing on a claim that some law or practice violates their rights.305 If everyone knows at the outset that an
elected court is less likely to rule in favor of same-sex marriage because its
members are afraid to contravene the apparent preferences of their constituents (whether out of a high-minded commitment to role fidelity, a
self-interested commitment to job preservation, or anything in between),
this value may be degraded.306
Raising a separate set of equity concerns, judicial elections and
majoritarian review threaten unpopular persons and causes differentially
across jurisdictions. Judges will generally find it easiest to discern the will
of the people in communities that are normatively homogeneous: for
instance, a state in which few openly gay citizens hold positions of prominence. Majoritarian review is most viable where it is easiest to tell who is
in the majority, and who is despised. As judicial elections become increasingly salient and competitive, incumbents in these communities can
expect to face increasingly steep penalties for decisions that protect
marginalized groups, paradigmatically noncitizens who lack the
franchise. There is irony in this tradeoff, for the most famous advocate of
a vigorous, self-conscious state constitutionalism, the late Justice Brennan,

303. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1036.
304. See id. at 1035–36 (summarizing well known variations on this idea).
305. See, e.g., Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 Va. L. Rev.
991, 999–1006 (2006).
306. The view that judges should be guided by public perceptions may further conflict
with the central tenet of American constitutionalism that the best understanding of the
principles set forth in the Constitution ought to trump the public’s latest desires, no matter
how strongly they are expressed short of formal revision. There is no conflict if public
preferences help judges to identify the “best” understanding of the Constitution, cf. supra
note 129 (distinguishing epistemic rationale for consulting public opinion from
majoritarian review), or if the best understanding itself depends upon popular acceptance
or approval.
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championed this vision with the express aim of expanding rights and liberties beyond the federal floor.307
By shrinking the space for independent judgment, judicial elections
and majoritarian review are also liable to shrink the temporal horizons of
constitutional law. Every government faces a question of how to allocate
political control over time, and every constitutional democracy experiences a tension between the goals of “representatives of the actual people of the here and now”308 and constitutional limitations of any sort.
Judicial elections can deprive government of the one branch that is backward looking in its focus on the work of prior courts and lawmakers, instead of the will of present voters, and that is nonmajoritarian in its composition and role orientation. In so doing, they can alter the balance of
intergenerational control and mixed representation in ways that retard
rather than foster a people’s capacity to realize collective self-rule.
This cursory tour of alternative theoretical perspectives is hardly a
decisive rejoinder to the popular constitutionalist case for electing
judges: An enormous amount of fine-grained work would need to be
done to map the competing models of constitutionalism, democracy, and
judicial review onto the competing models of judicial selection and retention. But it suffices to show that, by aligning the decisionmaking norms
307. The classic work is William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). See also Paul W. Kahn, Two
Communities: Professional and Political, 24 Rutgers L.J. 957, 968–69 (1993) (discussing
Justice Brennan’s “political agenda for the state courts—they are to be a counterforce to
the increasingly conservative federal courts”—and contrasting it with movement for more
vigorous state constitutionalism on grounds of state sovereignty); Peter R. Teachout,
Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the
Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 Vt. L. Rev. 13, 34–35 (1988) (similar).
In response to the argument in the main text, it might be objected that because the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, commits all courts to follow the federal
Constitution, state judges are bound to be at least as protective of individual and minority
rights as Article III judges. Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due
Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 563, 627–31
(2004). Furthermore, the federal courts can devote special scrutiny to potentially
compromised decisions by elected state courts. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note
8, at 329 (flagging this possibility); see also Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 Va. L. Rev. 719 passim (2010) (developing this
idea). It is true that the federal floor protects all Americans from certain forms of state
abuse, and that the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, can police their state
counterparts on certain issues. Yet these rebuttals would hardly satisfy a liberal like Justice
Brennan, given that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights cover only a minimal slate of basic
rights, Supreme Court doctrine elaborating these rights often leaves great discretion to
state judges, Supreme Court review of any given state court ruling is discretionary and
exceedingly rare, and state constitutions cover far more substantive ground than the
federal Constitution. More generally, if one takes seriously the idea that state constitutions
provide independent sources of fundamental rights and values in our federalist system, as
this Article does, then it will never be a sufficient response to an argument about their
systematic misapplication that the federal courts can pick up the slack.
308. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 17 (2d ed. 1986).
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of the courts more closely with those of the legislature, popular methods
of judicial review can frustrate some of the distinct democratic benefits
that the former have, in countless formulations, been thought to provide.
A jurisprudence that privileges contemporary sentiment may be at odds
with thicker conceptions of democracy that encompass ideals of political
equality, liberty, and universality as essential components of selfgovernment. Corrupted forms of judicial populism, in which judges privilege the views of powerful interests rather than the community as a
whole, deviate even further from these ideals. Nonmajoritarian review
may well disserve democracy in some systematic respects; it depends upon
what the courts do and upon one’s understanding of democracy. This
section has simply pointed out that there is no need to venerate judges,
mistrust the masses, or adopt an esoteric account of democratic legitimacy to believe that majoritarian review can do so too.
Perhaps some supporters of popular constitutionalism really do subscribe to an ideal of constitutional democracy that seeks to maximize popular influence over every significant decision of state, equates democracy
with elections, or lacks any notion of higher-order law. Absent some such
premise, it is a fallacy to think that making the structure of each part of
government more democratic, invariably makes the government as a
whole more democratic.309 Even if one believes that majoritarian decisionmaking procedures are uniquely fair or uniquely supportive of political equality, it does not follow that every institution of government ought
to be selected by them or aim to reproduce them.
4. Much Ado About Nothing? — But enough abstract theorizing about
democracy and majoritarian review. In how many constitutional cases is
judicial selection method actually likely to make a difference, and to what
extent? The normative concerns outlined above generally presuppose
that the choice to elect judges (and, thereby, to authorize majoritarian
review) will be a consequential one, affecting numerous persons and decisions. Relax this assumption, and one might challenge the interpretive
case for electing judges from a very different angle.
Recall how we got here. Previous sections of this Article sought to
establish the viability of majoritarian review as a method of constitutional
interpretation: Before it could assess whether judges ought to rely on
public preferences in deciding constitutional issues, the Article had to
show that, at least in some situations, the public can have meaningful,
discernible preferences, and that judges can incorporate those preferences into their decisionmaking without transgressing basic norms of the
judicial role.310 In responding to all of these threshold objections to
majoritarian review, the Article progressively narrowed the space for its
309. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System
Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 37–39 (2009) (discussing obverse form of
this “fallacy of composition,” as it manifests in countermajoritarian critiques of U.S.
Supreme Court).
310. See supra Parts II.C.2–3, III.B, III.E.2.
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application to situations in which the community appears to hold a firm
view on an underdetermined constitutional question.
Such situations, however, may be few and far between. If we accept
that a popular constitutional jurisprudence only becomes viable, practically and normatively, when public opinion reaches a high degree of intensity and unanimity, the judicial selection question becomes less pressing. For it seems fair to assume that virtually all judges, no matter what
modes of formal discipline they face, will feel compelled to heed that kind
of public opinion. It is unclear whether the most plausible variant of
majoritarian review—the belief that “attention to public consensus,” or
near-consensus, “in constitutional decisionmaking would show respect for
democracy . . . and enhance public identification with the regime”311—
supports any significant preference for choosing judges by popular election. One would have to show that unelected judges have a greater likelihood or ability to defy such consensus.
We thus confront a tension in the interpretive case for electing
judges. Narrowing the space for majoritarian review, by placing strict
conditions on the types of public opinion that can be consulted, opens
up horizons for reconciling it with more traditional conceptions of constitutional reasoning and judicial duty—and hence for reconciling popular
constitutionalism’s “competing commitments to the rule of law and to
self-governance.”312 Yet it also threatens to trivialize the theory’s jurisprudential aims. And it bolsters the argument that judicial elections are
overinclusive in the pursuit of those aims, that they popularize too many
areas of law too indiscriminately.313
5. Backlash and Constitutional Change. — But still, isn’t there a clear
democratic benefit from the fact that elective judiciaries are more likely
to avoid the kind of extreme backlash we have seen at the federal level in
response to a few cases, such as Roe v. Wade?314 Once again, it depends
upon one’s conception of democracy, as well as the dynamics of backlash.
Further distancing themselves from the robust normative strains of popular constitutionalism, Robert Post and Reva Siegel suggested several years
ago that it is not necessarily a bad thing, democratically speaking, for
courts to occasionally eschew minimalism and render decisions that risk
generating outrage.315 The presence of backlash indicates that a segment of the population feels deeply aggrieved, it can be disruptive and
inefficient, and it can come over time to undermine the very goals that
inspired the contested ruling. Yet backlash can also sharpen constitutional questions, catalyze political engagement, and ultimately invigorate
311. Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1207, 1220 (2010). In Primus’s view, public opinion may legitimately be consulted
only when it “approach[es] consensus.” Id. at 1209, 1222.
312. Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 375.
313. See supra Part III.D.1 (presenting overinclusiveness critique).
314. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
315. See generally Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7.
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the popular responsiveness of constitutional law.316 Sometimes, moreover, backlash may be an unavoidable “consequence of vindicating constitutional rights.”317 Think of Brown v. Board of Education.318
Elected judges, however, will generally seek to avoid backlash at all
costs. Any segment of the population angry enough about a judicial decision to protest it represents a serious threat to the judge’s reelection bid.
Especially in low information election environments, the safest strategy
for an incumbent, absent a clear and widely held communal desire to
move the law in some particular direction, will be to preserve the legal
status quo. According to a group of state judges who met recently with
Judge Posner, “[t]he goal, if you are standing for reelection, is to avoid
scrutiny. The goal in getting elected is to avoid negative attention, to be
invisible.”319 A judge’s best hope for achieving invisibility: Aim whenever
feasible to uphold laws and regulations, to skirt difficult issues, and to
conceal controversial judgments behind a cloak of legalisms. So long as
Americans continue to be skeptical of judicial innovation and to favor
incumbents, majoritarian review is likely to remain a relatively conservative, and opaque, social practice.
Consider once more the same-sex marriage example. It is a remarkable feature of the evolving constitutional jurisprudence on this subject
that all four of the state high courts that have found a right to same-sex
marriage (Massachusetts,320 California,321 Connecticut,322 and Iowa,323
in chronological order), plus all three of the high courts to issue sympathetic rulings covering much of the same ground (Hawaii,324 Vermont,325
and New Jersey326), were courts selected by gubernatorial appointment
or by merit selection.327 It is a remarkable testament to constitutional
theory’s aloofness from judicial selection that hardly anyone has noted
this yet.328 Each of these opinions provoked significant forms of back316. Id. at 388–406.
317. Id. at 390, 395.
318. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
319. A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 Duke L.J. 1807, 1822 (2009);
see also Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual
Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. Pol. 1117, 1117–19 (1987) (finding that elected judges are
less likely to publish dissents on politically volatile issues).
320. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
321. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
322. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
323. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
324. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
325. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
326. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
327. Am. Judicature Soc’y, supra note 61, at 4–10. This is not to say that all
nonelective high courts have endorsed same-sex marriage rights. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
328. To my knowledge, Neal Devins is the only legal scholar to have drawn this
connection. See Devins, State Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at 1676 (“The most salient
characteristic shared by all seven courts [that have interpreted their constitutions to
provide expansive protections for same-sex couples] is their retention schemes. None of
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lash, at the national as well as state level. Yet several of them also appear
to have solidified support for same-sex marriage within the jurisdiction.
In Massachusetts, where justices are appointed by the governor and
hold office until age seventy, legislative efforts to recognize same-sex marriage had gone nowhere for many years, and seemed to have no immediate prospects, prior to the landmark Goodridge decision.329 Nevertheless,
polls taken just days after the opinion came down showed that a full half
of the state’s residents supported the court’s decision,330 and its logic
now seems solidly entrenched. Goodridge transformed the political culture. “[O]nce Goodridge’s dust had settled,” researchers have consistently
found, “the state’s elected institutions were significantly more supportive
of [same-sex marriage] than they had been at the outset.”331 Decisions
such as Goodridge have also emboldened some politicians from other
states to endorse same-sex marriage, not through any binding legal force
but through their reasoning, their mainstreaming effect, and their persuasive authority.332 There is currently a debate raging among same-sex
marriage supporters over whether the backlash occasioned by these decisions threatens to overwhelm any short-term gains.333 Wherever one
comes out on this debate, it is by no means clear that the courts that have
taken the lead on the issue have disserved democracy, and to the contrary
that argument may look increasingly formalistic—and hence increasingly
at odds with the popular constitutionalist sensibility—in light of the mass
mobilization these rulings have inspired and the continued growth of the
same-sex marriage movement.
the seven makes use of contested judicial elections.”). Devins’s article provides a nuanced
account of the same-sex marriage decisions and the lessons they hold for how and why
state courts take backlash risks into account. Id. at 1675–91.
329. See Tonja Jacobi, How Massachusetts Got Gay Marriage: The Intersection of
Popular Opinion, Legislative Action, and Judicial Power, 15 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 219,
223 (2006).
330. Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, 50% in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage, Bos.
Globe, Nov. 23, 2003, at A1.
331. Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions
on LGBT Rights, 43 Law & Soc’y Rev. 151, 162 (2009); see also Jacobi, supra note 329, at
220–23 (finding no negative electoral repercussions for Massachusetts politicians who
supported same-sex marriage following Goodridge).
332. See, e.g., Richard Just, Maine and Judicial Activism, New Republic The Plank
Blog (May 8, 2009, 6:52 PM), at http://tnr.com/blog/the-plank/maine-and-judicialactivism (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing remarks by Governor of Maine for
claim that “as judges across the country reinterpret equal protection clauses in light of our
culture’s changing understanding of homosexuality, they are not merely persuading
themselves or their peers in other courts; they are also persuading those outside the
judicial system”).
333. Compare, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage:
Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
1493 (2006) (summarizing and criticizing backlash thesis as applied to same-sex marriage),
with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279, 1324–27 (2005) (urging judicial
caution in this area).
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The rulings in favor of same-sex marriage by appointed and meritselected high courts did not come out of nowhere. As scholars have documented at the federal level, judges continue to care about how their
decisions are received even when they have life tenure, and judicial interpretations of open-ended constitutional guarantees are invariably shaped
over time by changing social mores, grassroots movements, partisan
trends, and countless other extrajudicial inputs.334 Goodridge likely never
would have happened, would not have been possible, if the Massachusetts
polling numbers in support of same-sex marriage had been in the single
digits.
Yet, if the ability of any court to forge new constitutional understandings will always be heavily dependent on context, the first wave of prosame-sex marriage rulings suggests a substantial difference between
elected and unelected judges in their willingness to try. Elected judges
generally lack the job security, the moral stature, and the professional
self-conception to defy entrenched norms or strongly held preferences
about constitutional meaning. The nonelective selection method of the
courts in the first wave plainly was not a sufficient factor to account for
their rulings. It may have been a necessary one.
We have now adduced one more reason why the existence of a politically insulated branch of government might ultimately lead to greater
democratic legitimacy for constitutional law. At one level, Part II explained, the majoritarian review facilitated by an elective system makes
the law more fluid. A concern for public opinion adds to the store of
permissible interpretive materials, and it invites novel measures to elicit
and enforce citizen preferences. Yet at another level, this Part has shown,
majoritarian review can make the law more rigid, by preempting courts
from issuing decisions ahead of the legal zeitgeist—decisions such as
Brown and Goodridge that might have altered future public opinion,
whether through their agenda setting effects, the force of their arguments, the real-life consequences they engender, the cover they give to
politicians, or any number of other mechanisms. When pusillanimous
judicial interpretations of the Constitution merely reproduce and reinforce prevailing beliefs, when judges aspire to “invisib[ility],”335 the complex dialectic of backlash never gets off the ground. The courts contribute nothing distinctive to the “discursive formation of popular will upon
which democracy is based.”336
334. To take just one notable recent example, Reva Siegel has demonstrated that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s explicit focus on the original meaning of the Second
Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), a dedicated
movement of gun rights activists and partisan politicians helped lay the groundwork for
that decision over many years. Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Dead or
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 201–45
(2008).
335. Supra text accompanying note 319.
336. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1036. The implicit
reference here is to Habermas. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 304
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Popular constitutionalists sometimes speak as if “the will of the people” has an ontic or teleological status, as if it exists in the ether (or an
opinion poll) waiting to be vindicated or frustrated by judicial action.
This suggestion is misleading on several levels. There is, of course, no
such thing as “the will of the people” when it comes to constitutional
interpretation. That notion may serve as a useful metaphor or shorthand, but no plausible theory of group intention supports it,337 and the
majesty of its phrasing obscures the essentially majoritarian ideal that lies
beneath. And as the recent history of backlash suggests, judicial rulings
can do more than consolidate, at the back end, constitutional norms that
have arisen outside of the courts. They can also catalyze, at the front end,
a dialogic process of constitutional construction that unfolds over many
iterations. The time and effort it takes to reach an accommodation between judicial and extrajudicial interpreters may be quite costly. But the
accommodation process can yield deliberative, participatory, and substantive dividends: It helps “separat[e] out the considered ‘constitutional’
views of the American people from passing fancy.”338
The countermajoritarian difficulty, in other words, may solve itself
through the antagonism it breeds between “undemocratic” judges and
democratic movements that, over time, produce new judges and new understandings of the Constitution. Elective systems, however, invite not
antagonism but identification, not conflict but conciliation.339 In so doing, they are liable to reduce not only judicial creativity and courage but
also the public’s felt need to invest in extrajudicial mechanisms of constitutional control.
These arguments cannot prove that judicially inspired backlash is
likely to be a net positive for popular constitutionalism, just that it is not
an unmitigated harm. Some popular constitutionalists may not assign
much weight to the potential communicative benefits of controversial decisions, relative to their immediate costs. The arguments do, however,
severely undercut the vision outlined in Part II of judicial elections as
agents of a more dynamic and experimental model of constitutional
change.340 In the short term, a backlash-less jurisprudence might seem
to mark a democratic triumph, as there will be fewer decisions that roil a
significant portion of “the actual people of the here and now.”341 Yet if
we take the diachronic view and conceptualize a people through time, as
the Constitution invites us to, this triumph begins to look more hollow. A
(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (“Deliberative politics acquires its
legitimating force from the discursive structure of opinion- and will-formation that can
fulfill its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a
reasonable quality.”).
337. Lawrence B. Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev.
(forthcoming) (book review) (manuscript at 17) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
338. Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 20, at 383.
339. See supra Part III.D.3.
340. See supra Part II.B.3.
341. Bickel, supra note 308, at 17.

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL802.txt

unknown

Seq: 87

9-NOV-10

16:19

2010] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 2133
system that ties judges too closely to public opinion can usurp the
achievements of previous generations by channeling constitutional interpretation toward contemporary understandings of the provisions they enacted. It can usurp the achievements of future generations by foreclosing
judicial innovations that might have helped generate, consolidate, and
legitimize new understandings of the Constitution. It leaves us in a
majoritarian circle.
CONCLUSION
This Article responds to Larry Kramer’s call to consider “what kind
of institutions we can construct to make popular constitutionalism
work.”342 Among the many possibilities, it has shown, elective judiciaries
offer a potent option. What’s more, they are already in widespread use;
they are politically viable, distinctively American, and richly deserving of
study. In applying the theory of popular constitutionalism to the question of judicial selection, the Article has also tried to cast light back on
the theory. Attending to the issue of judicial selection, it has shown, can
illuminate questions regarding popular constitutionalism’s implications
for jurisprudence, its deliberative and participatory preconditions, its
commitment to majoritarian rule as distinct from democratic rule, its willingness to trade off potential constitutional benefits for potential extraconstitutional harms, its relationship to federalism, and its perspective
on alternative devices such as ballot initiatives, legislative overrides, and
juries.
At the same time that it provides an important new framework and
vocabulary with which to defend elective judiciaries, the Article has argued, popular constitutionalism also points the way toward an original
critique. For in the service of aligning judges more closely with “the people,” judicial elections do more than threaten collateral damage to values
such as legality and equality: They threaten to undermine the democratic aspirations of popular constitutionalism itself. The relationship between popular constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, and judicial
supremacy is significantly more fraught than the former’s exponents have
tended to acknowledge. Popular constitutionalists need not demand the
election of every branch of government. And critics of elective judiciaries
need not cede the democratic high ground.
The import of these conclusions transcends the states. Although this
study has adopted the premise that state constitutions are constitutions,
that they are legal charters of great intrinsic as well as practical significance in a federated polity, one need not accept this view to care about its
implications for constitutional law. Constitutional theory has been obsessed for the past half-century with the countermajoritarian difficulty,343
342. Kramer, Response, supra note 6, at 1182.
343. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman,
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the ostensible democratic problem that arises when appointed, lifetenured judges contravene the will of the people’s representatives. Popular constitutionalism’s critique of judicial supremacy can be seen as an
especially acute statement of these old concerns. What happens when
the judges are themselves the people’s representatives?
Constitutional scholars have not wrestled with this question, presumably because they take it for granted that federal judges will always be
selected the same way. They should not be content to rely on this assumption. Even if, as a practical reality, it is inconceivable that the federal courts will move to an elective model in the foreseeable future, constitutional revision remains possible in America. If the current system
really does imperil popular sovereignty or other important values, we
should be thinking about how to change it. More generally, we should
bear in mind that the appointive, life-tenured structure of the federal
judiciary is a contingent feature. Destabilizing our conception of the
courts can help us to think more clearly about what we want from them.
Popular constitutionalism teaches us to mistrust judicial supremacy
and to think critically about the rigidity of formal constitutional change,
in light of the nation’s fundamental commitment to government of, by,
and for the people. Historical experience at the state level teaches us
that many Americans prefer to select judges through competitive elections, if given a choice. It is tempting to construct from these sources a
new argument for elective judiciaries; this Article has shown how that
might be done. Yet, while there may be numerous reforms to the federal
courts that could help democratize American constitutionalism without
degrading the judicial function, the analysis here ultimately suggests why
popularizing their selection and retention method is not likely to be
among them. At least in this one respect, we may be grateful that it is so
very difficult to amend the Constitution.

The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95
Nw. U. L. Rev. 933 (2001).

